Abo Petroleum Corporation v. Amstutz

What estates were created by the 1908 deeds from James and Amanda Turknett to their daughters Beulah and Ruby?

A deed conveying property 'during her natural life' creates a life estate. Language providing that upon the life tenant's death, the property passes to her 'heir or heirs' (defined as children if any at death) creates a contingent remainder in unascertainable persons, vesting only upon the life tenant's death. If the contingent remainder fails, a grant over to the life tenant's estate creates an alternative contingent remainder to her heirs. Where remainders are contingent, the grantor retains a reversionary interest.

The 1908 deeds explicitly gave each daughter the property 'during her natural life,' which conveyed life estates. The deeds then provided that upon each daughter's death, the property would pass to her 'heir or heirs,' specifically her children if any at her death.

Since the daughters were unmarried and childless at the time of conveyance, it was impossible to determine if they would have children or if those children would survive them, creating contingent remainders in the daughters' potential children that would vest only upon the daughters' deaths.

The deeds further stated that if a daughter died without heirs, the property would become part of her estate and pass by law, effectively creating an alternative contingent remainder to her heirs, who are unascertainable until death.

By divesting themselves of the life estates and contingent remainders, the grantor-parents retained reversionary interests because both remainders were contingent.

The 1908 deeds created life estates in Beulah and Ruby, contingent remainders in their potential children, alternative contingent remainders to the daughters' heirs, and reversionary interests in the parents.

Does the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders apply in New Mexico?

The doctrine of destructibility, originating in 16th-century English common law, holds that a contingent remainder is destroyed if the supporting prior estate (e.g., a life estate) terminates before the contingency occurs, such as through merger with a reversionary interest, based on the feudal principle that seisin cannot be in abeyance. Although New Mexico has adopted English common law by statute, it need not apply common law rules inapplicable to modern conditions or that are obsolete.

The doctrine arose from feudal concepts requiring continuous seisin and was triggered when a life estate merged with a reversion, destroying unsupported contingent remainders.

New Mexico's adoption of common law does not require adherence to obsolete doctrines unsuited to contemporary circumstances, as demonstrated by prior decisions abolishing sovereign immunity.

The doctrine has been widely criticized as obsolete, leading to complexity, unpredictability, and frustration of grantors' intent; it was abandoned in England over a century ago and rejected by most U.S. jurisdictions via statute or judicial decision.

Its promotion of land alienability is arbitrary and often defeats grantors' intentions, and it can be avoided through trusts, favoring skilled drafting over equitable outcomes.

As a relic of the feudal past without justification in modern society, the doctrine was deemed inapplicable in New Mexico.

No, the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders does not apply in New Mexico.

Did the subsequent deeds from the parents to Beulah and Ruby destroy the contingent remainders in the daughters' children and vest fee simple title in the daughters?

Without the doctrine of destructibility, merger of a life estate with a reversion does not destroy contingent remainders. Subsequent conveyances cannot enlarge a grantee's interest beyond what was originally granted, and any purported conveyance of greater interest transfers only the actual interest held.

The parents' subsequent deeds purported to convey absolute or corrected title to the daughters, which Abo argued merged the parents' reversions with the daughters' life estates, destroying the children's contingent remainders under the destructibility doctrine.

Since the doctrine does not apply in New Mexico, no destruction of the contingent remainders occurred through merger.

The daughters thus acquired no additional interest from the later deeds beyond their original life estates.

Consequently, Beulah and Ruby could convey only their life estates to Abo's predecessors, even if the conveyances purported to transfer fee simple title.

No, the subsequent deeds did not destroy the contingent remainders or vest fee simple title in the daughters; the daughters could convey only life estates, leaving the children's interests intact.