895 F.2d 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
Appellant Abourezk made a reservation to fly from Washington National airport to New York on New York Air Flight 28. Flight 28 was cancelled, and Abourezk boarded New York Air Flight 30, scheduled to depart from Washington to New York at 4:30 p.m. on October 3.1 Flight 30 left the gate at about 4:35 p.m. and was then delayed on the runway for over three hours before taking off for New York.2
Flight 30 arrived at New York’s LaGuardia Airport at 8:35 p.m.3 As a consequence of this delay, Abourezk’s purpose in going to New York — attending a reception at the United Nations being given to honor one of his clients — was completely frustrated.4
During the delay before takeoff at Washington National, Abourezk asked Flight 30’s captain three times to allow him to deplane.5 Citing a variety of safety and operational concerns, the captain denied all of Abourezk’s requests to deplane.6
Abourezk filed suit in federal district court on December 20, 1985, asserting that New York Air was liable to him for false imprisonment and infliction of emotional distress.7 Abourezk also sought punitive damages.8 After extensive discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.9 The district court granted New York Air’s motion.10
In a memorandum opinion explaining his grant of summary judgment, Judge Penn found that Abourezk had failed to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.11 Although New York Air argued in the district court that Abourezk’s suit was preempted by 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1), Judge Penn did not address the preemption question in his decision.12 New York Air does not press its preemption argument on appeal.13 It seeks affirmance of the district court on the grounds that Judge Penn offered for his decision.14
Abourezk appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.15 He also challenges the district court’s refusal to address the issue of punitive damages.16
Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to New York Airlines on the false imprisonment claim?17
Under District of Columbia law, false imprisonment is defined as the restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another without consent or legal justification.18 The essential elements are (1) the detention or restraint of one against his will, within boundaries fixed by the defendant, and (2) the unlawfulness of the restraint.19 In the context of air travel, the special concerns of common-carrier air transport require that an airline demonstrate justification based on safety and operational concerns for refusing to allow a passenger to deplane, and the passenger must present an exigent circumstance that gives rise to a duty to release.20
No. The established facts show that Abourezk boarded New York Air Flight 30.21 During the delay on the runway, he asked the captain three times to deplane.22 The captain denied the requests citing safety and operational concerns.23 Abourezk presented no facts supporting a conclusion that an exigent circumstance existed that triggered the airline's duty to release him.24
Although his purpose of attending a United Nations reception was frustrated by the delay, this does not constitute the sort of exigency that would mandate release from the aircraft.25 Therefore, the detention was lawful under the rule of false imprisonment in the air travel context, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment to New York Airlines on the false imprisonment claim.26
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to New York Airlines on the false imprisonment claim.27
Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to New York Airlines on the infliction of emotional distress claim?28
To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress in the absence of physical injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements. The defendant must engage in extreme and outrageous conduct. The conduct must be intentional or reckless. It must cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress.29 Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.30 It is the job of the trial court to determine in the first instance whether the defendant's conduct may be regarded as so outrageous as to permit recovery.31
No. Abourezk does not claim any physical injury as a result of his detention on Flight 30.32 The pilot's refusal to allow Abourezk to deplane, based on a variety of safety and operational concerns during the runway delay, does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct that goes beyond all possible bounds of decency.33 No facts presented by Abourezk could warrant a conclusion that reasonable people could differ on whether the conduct is extreme and outrageous.34 The district court properly determined that the pilot's actions did not constitute the kind of outrageous behavior required for the claim.35
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to New York Airlines on the infliction of emotional distress claim.36
Whether the district court erred in refusing to address the issue of punitive damages?37
Punitive damages are not available in the absence of liability on the underlying claims of false imprisonment and infliction of emotional distress.38
No. Because the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Abourezk's claims for false imprisonment and infliction of emotional distress, there is no basis for an award of punitive damages.39 The district court therefore did not err in declining to reach the question of punitive damages.40
The district court did not err in refusing to address the issue of punitive damages.41