208 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436 (1908)
The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company operated as a common carrier engaged in the transportation of passengers and property by steam railroad between the states of Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Tennessee.1 William Adair acted as master mechanic and agent for the railroad company in the Eastern District of Kentucky.2 O.B. Coppage worked as a locomotive fireman in train service for the railroad and belonged to the Order of Locomotive Firemen.3
On or before October 15, 1906, Adair discharged Coppage from his employment with the railroad.4 The United States obtained an indictment against Adair in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky.5 The first count of the indictment alleged that Adair unlawfully and unjustly discriminated against Coppage by discharging him because of his membership in the labor organization.6 The second count charged that Adair threatened Coppage with loss of employment because of the same membership.7
Adair demurred to the indictment on the ground that it was insufficient in law.8 The district court overruled the demurrer after concluding that the tenth section of the Act of June 1, 1898, was constitutional.9 Following a trial on a plea of not guilty, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the first count alone.10 The court then entered a judgment requiring Adair to pay a fine of one hundred dollars to the United States.11
The case came before the Supreme Court of the United States after Adair challenged the validity of his conviction under the federal statute.12
Whether Congress may make it a criminal offense for an agent or officer of an interstate carrier to discharge an employee from service because of the employee's membership in a labor organization?13
The Fifth Amendment protects the liberty of contract, which includes the right of an employer to prescribe terms for accepting labor and the right of an employee to sell labor on such terms as he deems proper, subject only to reasonable restraints for the common good; absent a fixed-term contract, neither party may be compelled to continue the employment relationship against its will.14 Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce extends only to rules bearing a real and substantial relation to such commerce and may not be exercised to invade fundamental rights secured by other constitutional provisions.15
No. The tenth section of the Act of June 1, 1898, makes it a crime for an agent of an interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of membership in a labor organization.16 Under the established facts the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company operated as a common carrier in interstate commerce across Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Tennessee; William Adair served as its master mechanic and agent in the Eastern District of Kentucky; O.B. Coppage worked as a locomotive fireman in train service and belonged to the Order of Locomotive Firemen; and on or before October 15, 1906, Adair discharged Coppage solely because of that membership. The discharge occurred without any fixed-term contract between the parties, so Adair possessed the same liberty to end the at-will employment that Coppage possessed to quit.17 The statute therefore invades Adair's personal liberty and property right by criminalizing an otherwise lawful exercise of contract freedom.18
In addition, an employee's membership in a labor organization bears no real or substantial relation to the fitness or diligence with which the employee performs train service, and therefore supplies no basis for regulation under the commerce power.19
Congress may not make it a criminal offense for an agent or officer of an interstate carrier to discharge an employee from service because of the employee's membership in a labor organization.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice McKenna dissented on the ground that section 10 forms an integral part of a coordinated statutory scheme for voluntary arbitration between carriers and employees.21 He reasoned that Congress could recognize the practical influence of labor organizations on interstate commerce.22 Congress could prohibit discrimination against members in order to make mediation and arbitration effective, thereby preventing strikes that disrupt commerce.23
In his view the restraint on discharge is a limited and reasonable means to achieve the legitimate end of preserving the flow of interstate traffic.24 The Fifth Amendment does not forbid such regulation of the employment relation in a quasi-public business.25
Whether the tenth section of the Act of June 1, 1898, is repugnant to the Fifth Amendment?26
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects the liberty to enter into contracts for the purchase or sale of labor and forbids arbitrary legislative interference with that liberty unless the interference is a reasonable exercise of governmental power for the protection of public health, safety, or welfare.27
Yes. The tenth section criminalizes the discharge of an employee because of union membership even when the employment is at will and no contract fixes the term of service.28 In the present case Adair, acting for the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, discharged Coppage on or before October 15, 1906, solely on that ground.29 Because the statute compels the carrier to retain an employee against its will or face criminal penalties, it arbitrarily invades the liberty of contract protected by the Fifth Amendment.30
The Court therefore held the provision unconstitutional as applied to these facts.31
The tenth section of the Act of June 1, 1898, is repugnant to the Fifth Amendment.32
Whether the tenth section of the Act of June 1, 1898, is embraced by Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce?33
A valid exercise of the commerce power requires that the regulation have a real and substantial relation to interstate commerce. Legislation that merely touches an activity having no direct connection with the movement of goods or persons among the states exceeds congressional authority.34
No. The tenth section prohibits discharge because of union membership, yet under the established facts the only conduct punished was Adair's termination of Coppage's employment on that ground.35 Membership in the Order of Locomotive Firemen has no inherent bearing on an employee's fitness or diligence in performing train service for an interstate carrier, and therefore supplies no substantial connection to the regulation of commerce.36 The statute cannot be sustained as a legitimate means of protecting interstate traffic.37
The tenth section of the Act of June 1, 1898, is not embraced by Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.38
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Holmes dissented separately, concluding that the statute effects only a limited interference with freedom of contract.39 He observed that labor unions of railroad employees exercise direct influence on the terms and conditions of employment in interstate commerce.40 Their connection with commerce is at least as close as safety appliances or employer liability rules already sustained by the Court.41
In his view Congress could reasonably conclude that protecting union membership would advance the policy of fostering arbitration and preventing strikes. That judgment is entitled to judicial respect even if the Court might weigh the policy differently.42