88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 185 (1874)
In August 1861 Mr. Adams and his wife, the plaintiff Mrs. Adams, executed a deed dated August 13th that purported to convey the premises mentioned in the deed.1 Mr. Adams signed and sealed the deed, and both parties acknowledged its execution before two justices of the peace.2 The deed contained language declaring that it was signed, sealed, and delivered, and Mr. Adams himself caused the instrument to be recorded at his request and expense.3
After recording the deed Mr. Adams retained it in his possession but placed it inside the conveyed house in a location equally accessible to his wife and himself.4 He showed the deed to Mrs. Adams, informed her of its contents, and stated to her and to her brothers and sisters that the deed constituted a completed provision for her protection.5 The deed further provided that any proceeds from a sale ordered by Mrs. Adams would be held for her use during her lifetime and for the children after her death.6
In 1870 Appleton, the person named as trustee in the deed, refused to accept the deed or to act as trustee.7 Mrs. Adams and two other witnesses gave testimony describing the execution, recording, and Mr. Adams's statements admitting the trust; Mr. Adams, although competent to testify, made no denial of those statements.8
Mrs. Adams filed a bill in equity against Mr. Adams alleging that the deed had been delivered and recorded in the manner described.9 Mr. Adams answered by denying delivery.10 The lower court entered a decree in favor of Mrs. Adams, which the Supreme Court affirmed.11
Whether there was a delivery of the deed of August 13th, 1861?12
Delivery is essential to the validity of a deed in both law and equity, yet what constitutes delivery turns on whether the grantor has performed acts demonstrating final intent to transfer title, such as acknowledgment before proper officers, recording at the grantor's expense and request, retention of the instrument in a place equally accessible to the grantee, and repeated declarations that the deed creates a completed provision.13
Yes. The established facts establish that Mr. Adams signed and sealed the deed of August 13th, 1861, acknowledged its execution jointly with Mrs. Adams before two justices of the peace, caused the deed to be recorded at his own request and expense, placed the recorded deed inside the conveyed house in a location equally accessible to his wife, showed the deed to Mrs. Adams, informed her of its contents, and stated to her and to her brothers and sisters that the deed constituted a completed provision for her protection.14 These concrete steps satisfy every element of the delivery rule because they left nothing further for the settlor to do and placed the instrument under the joint dominion of the parties while the deed itself recited that it had been signed, sealed, and delivered.15 Mr. Adams never countermanded any of these acts, and the testimony describing them stands uncontradicted even though he was competent to deny it.16
The deed of August 13th, 1861, was delivered.17
Whether the refusal of Appleton to accept the deed or act as trustee in 1870 defeats the conveyance?18
A trustee's refusal to accept a deed does not defeat the conveyance of the equitable interest to the intended beneficiaries.19 Title vests in the trustee subject to disclaimer.20 A trust cannot fail for want of a trustee, and a court of chancery will appoint a new trustee to carry out the settlor's intent.21
No. The established facts show that Appleton refused to accept the deed or act as trustee in 1870, yet Mr. Adams had already executed, acknowledged, and recorded the deed years earlier with the intent to create a trust for Mrs. Adams during her life and the children thereafter.22 Under the rule, the refusal affects only the legal title held by the named trustee and leaves the equitable interest intact, so the court may appoint a substitute trustee without disturbing the beneficial interests already created.23 The facts further confirm that the deed's terms directed any sale proceeds to be held under the same trusts, demonstrating that the settlor contemplated enforcement regardless of the original trustee's acceptance.24
The refusal of Appleton to accept the deed or act as trustee in 1870 does not defeat the conveyance.25
Whether the transactions and declarations of Mr. Adams created a trust that the beneficiaries are entitled to have established by a court of chancery?26
When a settlor executes a deed declaring a trust, acknowledges and records it, retains the instrument in a place accessible to the beneficiary, and repeatedly declares the arrangement final and binding, the trust is perfectly created and will be enforced in equity even though the legal title remains with the settlor or a refusing trustee.27
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Mr. Adams executed the deed of August 13th, 1861, in language that granted the premises in trust, acknowledged and recorded it at his expense, placed it where Mrs. Adams could access it equally with him, and openly declared to her and her siblings that the deed was a completed provision under which she would be perfectly protected.28 These acts meet every requirement of a perfected voluntary trust because the settlor contemplated no further act for completion, executed an express declaration intended to be final, and thereby either delivered the deed to the named trustee for the beneficiaries or constituted himself a trustee by conduct binding upon him.29 The uncontradicted testimony of Mrs. Adams and the two other witnesses confirms both the execution and the settlor's contemporaneous statements of intent, leaving equity with no basis to refuse enforcement.30
The transactions and declarations of Mr. Adams created a trust that the beneficiaries are entitled to have established by a court of chancery.31