342 U.S. 485 (1952)
Appellants brought a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, praying that section 12-a of the Civil Service Law as implemented by the Feinberg Law be declared unconstitutional, and that action by the Board of Education of the City of New York thereunder be enjoined.1
The Feinberg Law added section 3022 to the Education Law of the State of New York.2 This section directed the Board of Regents to list after full notice and hearing organizations that advocate the overthrow of government by force or violence or any other unlawful means.3
It provided that membership in any listed organization shall constitute prima facie evidence for disqualification for appointment to or retention in any office or position in the school system, with rights to full hearing, representation by counsel, and judicial review preserved for affected employees or applicants.4
On motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court held that the provisions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and issued an injunction.5 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division.6 The appellants appealed to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.7
The related statutes had stood on the books for years with no proceedings taken under them prior to this suit.8 The case was decided wholly on the pleadings without any enforcement having occurred.9
Whether the Feinberg Law and the rules promulgated thereunder constitute an abridgment of the freedom of speech and assembly of persons employed or seeking employment in the public schools of the State of New York?10
Persons employed or seeking employment in the public schools have the right to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will.11 They have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms.12 The state may inquire into the company they keep in determining fitness and loyalty for positions in the sensitive area of the schoolroom where teachers shape the attitude of young minds.13
No. The Court applied this rule to the established facts that the law denies employment to those who advocate overthrow or are members of listed organizations known to have such purpose.14 The limitation is on the choice between membership and employment, not on freedom of speech or assembly itself.15 Individuals remain free to retain their beliefs and associations and seek employment elsewhere.16 The state has a vital concern in preserving the integrity of the schools from pollution.17
The Feinberg Law and the rules promulgated thereunder do not constitute an abridgment of the freedom of speech and assembly.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Black
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the law proceeds on a principle repugnant to our society of guilt by association.18 A teacher is disqualified because of membership in an organization found to be subversive in a proceeding to which the teacher is not a party.19 The very threat of such a procedure raises havoc with academic freedom.20
Teachers will shrink from any association that stirs controversy, thereby stifling freedom of expression.21 The law turns the school system into a spying project with loyalty reports and informers.22 A pall is cast over the classrooms so that there can be no real academic freedom.23
The system produces standardized thought rather than the pursuit of truth that the First Amendment was designed to protect.24
Justice Black dissented on the ground that this is another rapidly multiplying legislative enactment making it dangerous for school teachers to think or say anything except what a transient majority approves at the moment.25 These laws rest on the belief that government should supervise and limit the flow of ideas into the minds of men.26 The tendency of such governmental policy is to mould people into a common intellectual pattern.27
Quite a different governmental policy rests on the belief that government should leave the mind and spirit of man absolutely free.28 This policy of freedom is embodied in the First Amendment and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.29 Public officials cannot be constitutionally vested with powers to select the ideas people can think about or choose the persons or groups people can associate with.30
Whether the provision in section 3022 directing that membership in any organization listed by the Board of Regents after notice and hearing shall constitute prima facie evidence of disqualification denies due process of law?31
Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is within the general power of government.32 Such a presumption satisfies due process when the relation between the fact found and the presumption is clear and direct and is not conclusive.33 The affected party must have full opportunity to rebut it at a hearing.34
No. The Court applied this rule to the established facts that membership in a listed organization found to advocate overthrow and known by the member to have such purpose constitutes a legislative finding that the member supports the unlawful purpose.35 The presumption is not conclusive but rebuttable in a hearing where the person has full opportunity to present substantial evidence to the contrary.36 After such evidence the burden shifts to the official to sustain the order by a fair preponderance of the evidence, with judicial review available.37
The provision in section 3022 does not deny due process of law.38
Whether section 3021 of the Education Law is unconstitutionally vague?39
The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a state statute before the state courts have had an opportunity to do so.40
The question whether section 3021 of the Education Law is unconstitutionally vague is not before the Court.43
Whether the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the statutes and whether the case presents a ripe controversy for adjudication?44
No. Justice Frankfurter applied this rule to the established facts that the intricate machinery of enforcement has not yet been set in motion.47 The case was decided wholly on pleadings without enforcement.48 The taxpayer plaintiffs have no material interest as any expenditure is de minimis and not shown to affect their taxes.49 The teacher plaintiffs do not allege they have engaged in proscribed conduct, intend to do so, or are threatened with action under the law.50
The plaintiffs lack the immediacy and solidity of interest necessary to support jurisdiction, and the case is not ripe for constitutional adjudication.51
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the scheme is still an unfinished blueprint.52 The Court should dismiss the appeal because the limits imposed upon free inquiry and association, the scope of scrutiny that it sanctions, and the procedural safeguards that will be found to be implied for its enforcement have not been authoritatively defined.53 He adhered to the teaching of this Court’s history to avoid constitutional adjudications on merely abstract or speculative issues and to base them on the concreteness afforded by an actual, present, defined controversy appropriate for judicial judgment between adversaries immediately affected by it.54
In accordance with the settled limits upon our jurisdiction he would dismiss this appeal.55 The absence in these plaintiffs of the immediacy and solidity of interest necessary to support jurisdiction is reflected in the atmosphere of abstraction and ambiguity in which the constitutional issues are presented.56