521 U.S. 203 (1997)
In 1965, Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to provide remedial education services to disadvantaged children.1 The Board of Education of the City of New York first applied for Title I funds in 1966 and initially arranged to transport eligible private school students to public schools for after-school instruction.2 When that approach proved unsuccessful due to poor attendance and safety concerns, the Board implemented an on-site program in 1978 that sent public school teachers into parochial schools during regular school hours.3
In 1978, respondents, who are parents of parochial school children and federal taxpayers, sued the Board in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging the on-site program as violating the Establishment Clause.4 The District Court enjoined the on-site services in 1981, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the following year.5 While the appeal was pending, the Board developed an off-premises program that required transporting students to neutral sites at an estimated additional cost of $6 million per year.6
In 1983, the parties entered into a consent decree requiring the Board to provide Title I services off the premises of sectarian schools and to establish a monitoring system.7 Following the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Aguilar v. Felton, which invalidated a similar program, the parties entered a second consent decree that required the Board to pay for the additional costs of the off-premises program.8 The Board complied with both decrees, spending over $100 million on computer-aided instruction, leased sites, and transportation between the 1986-1987 and 1993-1994 school years.9
In 1995, the Board and a group of parents of parochial school students moved in the District Court for relief from the consent decrees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), citing subsequent decisions including Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind.10 The District Court denied the motion, concluding that Aguilar remained good law and that no significant change in factual conditions had been shown.11 The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1997.12
Whether changes in the law since the entry of the consent decrees in 1983 and 1985 warrant their modification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5)?13
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) permits relief from a final judgment with prospective application when it is no longer equitable that the judgment should continue. Changes in governing law may justify such modification as established in Railway Employees v. Wright.14
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Aguilar v. Felton is no longer good law.15 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind undermined the presumptions that public employees on parochial school premises would inevitably inculcate religion.16 Pervasive monitoring was no longer required to prevent it.17
The Board of Education of the City of New York is therefore entitled to relief from the consent decrees on the basis of this change in the law alone, without needing to demonstrate any additional factual developments.18
Changes in Establishment Clause jurisprudence since the consent decrees warrant their modification under Rule 60(b)(5).19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Stevens And Ginsburg, And Justice Breyer In Part
Justice Souter dissented, arguing that the Court's decision rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Establishment Clause.20 The Clause prohibits government from providing aid to religion in a manner that has the primary effect of advancing religion or that creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion.21 The provision of public school teachers on the premises of sectarian schools creates both the effect of advancing religion and the entanglement that the Clause prohibits.22
Souter maintained that the presumptions on which Aguilar relied remain valid, as public school teachers on sectarian premises are likely to inculcate religion and pervasive monitoring is required.23 He concluded that the decision erodes the protections of the Establishment Clause by allowing government to provide aid to sectarian schools in a manner that advances religion, overruling the central holding of Lemon v. Kurtzman.24
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, And Breyer
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent and wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's decision today marks a significant departure from the principles that have guided Establishment Clause jurisprudence for more than fifty years.25 The decision to overrule Aguilar and Ball is not supported by the text of the Constitution or by precedents.26 Ginsburg stressed that the ruling will have the unfortunate effect of blurring the line between church and state.27
She noted that the Court had granted rehearing in an unprecedented manner using Rule 60(b), which she viewed as an improper vehicle for reconsidering settled law.28 Ginsburg concluded that the proper course was to await a new case rather than revisit Aguilar in this manner, preserving the integrity of procedural rules and the non-agenda-setting character of the Court.29 She respectfully dissented.30
Whether the Board demonstrated a significant change in factual conditions warranting modification of the consent decrees?31
Under Rule 60(b)(5) and Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, a party may obtain modification by showing a significant change either in factual conditions or in law. When the law has changed, factual change is not required.32
No. The Board was entitled to relief on the change in law alone, rendering any separate factual showing unnecessary.33 In addition, the District Court's finding that the monitoring program successfully prevented inculcation of religion was inconsistent with its earlier conclusion that the same program created excessive entanglement.34 The Board's inability to comply without such entanglement itself constituted a significant change in factual conditions.35
The Board was not required to demonstrate a significant factual change because the legal change alone sufficed, though such a change was also present.36
Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying the motion to modify the consent decrees?37
A district court abuses its discretion when it refuses to modify a consent decree in light of a significant change in law that renders continued prospective application inequitable under Rule 60(b)(5).38
Yes. The Supreme Court determined that Aguilar is no longer good law.39 The consent decrees have prospective application that is no longer equitable.40 The District Court's denial of the Board's Rule 60(b)(5) motion rested on an erroneous view of the law and constituted an abuse of discretion.41 The decrees must be modified to permit Title I services on the premises of sectarian schools.42
The District Court abused its discretion by denying modification.43