Facts

In 1965, Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to provide remedial education, guidance, and job counseling to disadvantaged children, channeling federal funds through states to local educational agencies for distribution to eligible students—including those in private schools—on an equitable basis. The New York City Board of Education, as a local agency, began providing these services in 1966, with about 10% of eligible students attending private schools, over 90% of which were sectarian. After initial attempts like transporting students to public schools for after-school instruction proved ineffective due to poor attendance and safety concerns, the Board implemented a plan to send public school teachers into parochial schools during school hours to deliver secular, neutral Title I services, with safeguards including instructions to avoid religious involvement, removal of religious symbols from classrooms, and monthly unannounced supervisory visits.

In 1978, six federal taxpayers filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against the Board, alleging that this on-premises program violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and causing excessive government entanglement with religion, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Parents of parochial school students receiving Title I services intervened as codefendants. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board, but the Second Circuit reversed, citing cases like Meek v. Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter, and in 1985, the Supreme Court affirmed in Aguilar v. Felton, holding the program unconstitutional. On remand, the district court entered a permanent injunction barring the use of public funds for Title I services by public employees on sectarian school premises.

Post-Aguilar, the Board modified its program to provide services off-site, including at public schools, leased sites, mobile units parked near sectarian schools, and through computer-aided instruction, incurring over $100 million in additional costs since the 1986-1987 school year, which reduced funds available for student services and led to fewer students receiving benefits. In 1995, the Board and a group of parents of parochial school students eligible for Title I services filed motions in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) seeking relief from the injunction, arguing changed factual conditions from high costs and shifts in Establishment Clause jurisprudence that undermined Aguilar. The district court denied the motions, finding no sufficient change in law, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether relief was warranted.

Analysis

Issue #1

Issue

Are petitioners entitled to relief from the district court's permanent injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5)?

Legal Rule

Under Rule 60(b)(5), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment if it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. Relief is appropriate when there is a significant change in factual conditions or in law, including changes in decisional law, and a court errs by refusing to modify an injunction in light of such changes.

Rule Analysis

Petitioners argued for relief based on three changes: the high costs of off-site services, statements by five Justices in a prior case calling for Aguilar's reconsideration, and subsequent Establishment Clause decisions such as Witters, Zobrest, and Rosenberger that undermined Aguilar. Respondents contended that costs were anticipated in Aguilar and that the law had not changed sufficiently.

The high costs of compliance, exceeding $100 million, did not constitute a significant factual change because they were foreseen at the time of Aguilar and thus did not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(5), as modification is not granted for anticipated events. Similarly, the statements in Kiryas Joel did not effect a change in law, as they were dicta and not binding.

However, subsequent cases like Witters, Zobrest, and Rosenberger had eroded Aguilar's foundations, representing a significant change in decisional law. Because this change made the injunction inequitable, petitioners were entitled to relief, consistent with the practice of applying new rules to parties before the court even when overruling precedent.

Conclusion

Yes, petitioners are entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(5) because subsequent Establishment Clause decisions constituted a significant change in law that rendered continued enforcement of the injunction inequitable.

Issue #2

Issue

Has subsequent Establishment Clause jurisprudence undermined Aguilar such that it is no longer good law?

Legal Rule

Government aid violates the Establishment Clause if it lacks a secular purpose, has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or fosters excessive government entanglement with religion. Aid has an impermissible effect if it results in governmental indoctrination, defines recipients by reference to religion, or creates excessive entanglement.

Rule Analysis

Aguilar and Ball rested on assumptions that public employees in sectarian schools would inculcate religion, their presence created a symbolic union of church and state, public aid directly financed religious indoctrination, and monitoring caused excessive entanglement. These assumptions were undermined by later cases.

Zobrest rejected the presumption of inculcation by allowing a public sign-language interpreter in a sectarian school, assuming public employees would perform duties secularly without evidence otherwise, and dismissed notions of symbolic union based on mere presence. Witters and Zobrest also upheld neutral aid that reached religious schools through private choices, not state decisions, even if it assisted educational functions, as it did not subsidize religion directly.

Applied to Title I, the program provided neutral, supplemental services to eligible disadvantaged children regardless of school attended, without favoring religion or requiring pervasive monitoring beyond unannounced visits, which did not constitute excessive entanglement. The program's safeguards ensured secular delivery, and off-site services implied by Aguilar as permissible faced the same supplantation concerns, eliminating any basis to distinguish on-site aid as impermissible.

Conclusion

Yes, subsequent decisions have undermined Aguilar's assumptions, rendering it inconsistent with current Establishment Clause jurisprudence and no longer good law.

Issue #3

Issue

Does the doctrine of stare decisis preclude overruling Aguilar?

Legal Rule

Stare decisis is not an inexorable command and yields where a prior decision's underpinnings have been eroded by subsequent decisions, particularly in constitutional cases where interpretations can be altered only by amendment or overruling. The law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply if a prior decision is clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.

Rule Analysis

Stare decisis carried less weight here because Establishment Clause jurisprudence had significantly evolved since Aguilar, eroding its foundations and justifying departure to avoid perpetuating error. Adhering to Aguilar would work manifest injustice by continuing an inequitable injunction that imposed high costs and reduced educational benefits for disadvantaged children.

The law-of-the-case doctrine did not bar reconsideration, as the change in law made Aguilar clearly erroneous under current standards.

Conclusion

No, stare decisis does not preclude overruling Aguilar, as its underpinnings have been eroded and continued adherence would cause manifest injustice.

Additional Opinions

Justice Souter: Dissent

Justice Souter dissents from the majority's decision to overrule Aguilar v. Felton and parts of School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, arguing that providing direct state aid to religious schools through on-premises Title I programs violates the Establishment Clause by subsidizing religion and endorsing it. He contends that Aguilar and Ball correctly identified impermissible effects, including the risk of public teachers advancing religious doctrine, symbolic union of church and state, and subsidization of religious functions by relieving schools of secular teaching responsibilities. Souter disagrees with the majority's interpretation of subsequent cases like Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist. and Witters, asserting they do not undermine Aguilar's core principles, as Zobrest involved a limited, non-instructional role (sign-language interpretation) and did not repudiate concerns about symbolic links or direct aid. He emphasizes that no principled line can be drawn between 'supplemental' and general education in religious schools, potentially allowing unlimited state funding of secular subjects, which constitutes direct subsidization. Souter proposes no new rule but defends the Aguilar-Ball line as sensible and necessary to prevent government endorsement or subsidy of religion, highlighting the importance of stare decisis given unchanged facts and the high costs of compliance, which do not justify breaching constitutional boundaries. Drawing on historical concerns, he warns that government support compromises religious freedom and fosters exclusion, urging adherence to Establishment Clause tenets to avoid corrosion of church-state separation.

Justice Ginsburg: Dissent

Justice Ginsburg dissents, focusing on procedural impropriety, arguing that the Court wrongly uses Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) to rehear and overrule Aguilar v. Felton, a decision from 12 years prior in the same case. She disagrees with granting relief under Rule 60(b), as there was no significant change in facts or law at the time of the district court's denial, and lower courts must follow Supreme Court precedent without anticipating overrulings, per Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express. Ginsburg contends the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, as Aguilar remained binding law, and an appeal from such denial does not allow relitigation of the underlying judgment. She proposes no new substantive rule but emphasizes strict adherence to procedural rules to maintain judicial integrity, prevent agenda-setting, and avoid rehearings based on Court membership changes. Reasoning that Rule 60(b) is meant for district courts to address inequitable prospective judgments, not for the Supreme Court to bypass its own rehearing rules (like Rule 44), she suggests waiting for another case (e.g., Helms or PEARL II) to reconsider Aguilar, preserving the Court's responsive character and avoiding unprecedented expansion of procedural tools.