473 U.S. 402 (1985)
The City of New York has since 1966 used federal funds under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to pay the salaries of public school teachers and other professionals who provide remedial reading, remedial mathematics, English as a second language, and guidance services to educationally deprived children from low-income families enrolled in parochial schools.1 In the 1981-1982 school year, 13.2 percent of the students eligible for these services attended private schools.2 Of that group, 84 percent were enrolled in schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York and the Diocese of Brooklyn, and 8 percent attended Hebrew day schools.3
The Court of Appeals described the participating schools as a system in which religious considerations play a key role in the selection of students and teachers.4 The schools have as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values.5 Public school personnel are assigned to the parochial schools by the City's Bureau of Nonpublic School Reimbursement.6 Each professional's time at a given school is determined by the number of participating students and their needs.7
Field supervisors make at least one unannounced visit per month, and program coordinators make occasional unannounced visits.8 Teachers are directed to avoid involvement with religious activities.9 They must use only government-supplied materials.10 Teachers select students independently.11 They keep contacts with parochial school personnel to a minimum.12 Parochial administrators must clear the classrooms of all religious symbols before the Title I classes begin.13
In 1978 six taxpayers filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against city and state officials.14 They sought to enjoin further distribution of Title I funds for programs conducted on parochial school premises.15 The case was initially held for the outcome of National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Harris, a parallel challenge to the same program.16 After the district court in that case upheld the program and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, the present taxpayers renewed their challenge.17 The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of the evidentiary record developed in the earlier litigation.18 A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in 1984.19 The Supreme Court postponed probable jurisdiction.20 It later concluded that jurisdiction by appeal did not lie.21 The Court treated the papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, granted the petition, and heard argument on December 5, 1984.22
Whether the City of New York's Title I program, which assigns public school teachers and other professionals to provide remedial and guidance services on the premises of parochial schools, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?23
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits government aid that fosters excessive entanglement between church and state.24 Under the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and applied in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), a program supplying public employees to deliver instruction in pervasively sectarian schools requires ongoing governmental supervision to prevent advancement of religion.25 That supervision itself constitutes the excessive entanglement forbidden by the Clause, distinct from any separate inquiry into primary effects.26
Yes. The City of New York has since 1966 assigned public school teachers and other professionals to deliver remedial reading, remedial mathematics, English as a second language, and guidance services directly on the premises of parochial schools attended by educationally deprived children from low-income families.27 In the 1981-1982 school year, 13.2 percent of eligible students attended private schools.28 Of that group, 84 percent were enrolled in schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York and the Diocese of Brooklyn, and 8 percent attended Hebrew day schools. The Court of Appeals found these schools operate in a system where religious considerations play a key role in selecting students and teachers and where inculcation of religious values is a substantial purpose.29 Public personnel are assigned by the City's Bureau of Nonpublic School Reimbursement.30 Their time at each school is determined by student numbers and needs.31 The City maintains a monitoring regime of at least one unannounced visit per month by field supervisors plus occasional visits by program coordinators to ensure teachers avoid religious activities and materials.32
Because the schools are pervasively sectarian, this permanent and pervasive state presence inside the schools, together with the required administrative cooperation on schedules, classroom assignments, and student needs, produces the precise ongoing inspection and day-to-day relationship that Lemon and Meek condemned as excessive entanglement.33 The scope and duration of the program require ongoing inspection that cannot be avoided.34 Teachers must be directed to clear religious symbols from classrooms, to use only government-supplied materials, and to keep contacts with parochial personnel minimal.35 Public officials must therefore regularly enter the schools, inspect for religious content, and resolve disputes over what constitutes a religious symbol.36 These contacts are not occasional or one-time.37 They are built into a program that has operated continuously since 1966 and that serves thousands of students each year.38 The resulting administrative relationship between public agencies and pervasively sectarian institutions infringes the Establishment Clause values of religious freedom and governmental neutrality that the entanglement doctrine protects.39
The City of New York's Title I program violates the Establishment Clause.40 The on-premises delivery of services by public employees in pervasively sectarian schools necessitates a system of supervision and administrative cooperation that constitutes excessive entanglement between government and religion.41
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment.42 He stressed that the elaborate structure of the Title I program, the participation of public school teachers inside parochial schools, and the government surveillance needed to ensure secular use of funds create a serious risk of excessive entanglement.43 Powell further observed that direct aid of this kind carries an additional risk of political divisiveness along religious lines.44
Competition for limited public resources among sectarian and public-school interests is likely in a state with large and varied religious populations.45 He also noted that the aid effectively subsidizes the religious mission of the schools by relieving them of part of their educational responsibilities.46
Chief Justice Burger dissented.47 He argued that the majority's application of the Lemon criteria produced a result contrary to the long-range interests of the country by denying remedial services to children who need them most.48 Burger maintained that some interaction between church and state is unavoidable and that the Title I program presents no danger of the sort the Establishment Clause was meant to prevent.49
He viewed the decision as exhibiting hostility toward religion rather than neutrality.50 In his view, the Court had become overly rigid in its formulas and had lost sight of the practical benefits the program delivered to disadvantaged students.51
Justice Rehnquist dissented.52 He contended that the Court had created a Catch-22 in which aid must be supervised to avoid advancing religion yet the supervision itself is held to cause entanglement.53 Rehnquist argued that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit nondiscriminatory, nonsectarian aid to educationally deprived children from low-income families.54
The majority relied on gossamer abstractions to strike down a law that plainly serves an entirely secular need.55 He would have reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.56
Justice O'Connor dissented in a detailed opinion.57 She maintained that the risk that public school teachers would inculcate religion merely by entering parochial school classrooms had been greatly exaggerated.58 This is evidenced by the nineteen-year record in New York City with no incidents of religious indoctrination.59
O'Connor argued that the modest supervision actually employed, monthly unannounced visits by public school field supervisors, was no greater than ordinary public-school oversight and did not produce excessive institutional entanglement.60 She questioned the continued utility of entanglement as a separate Establishment Clause test when a program has a clear secular purpose and no detectable religious effect.61 She concluded that the judgment should be reversed so that disadvantaged parochial-school children could continue receiving the remedial services Congress intended.62