510 U.S. 266 (1994)
In 1987 Illinois authorities issued an arrest warrant for petitioner Kevin Albright.1 The warrant charged him on the basis of a previously filed criminal information with the sale of a substance which looked like an illegal drug.2 When he learned of the outstanding warrant, Albright surrendered to respondent Roger Oliver, a police detective employed by the city of Macomb.3 He denied his guilt of such an offense.4 He was released after posting bond, one of the conditions of which was that he not leave the State without permission of the court.5
The charge rested on information supplied by a paid informant.6 The informant had previously made over fifty false accusations leading to dismissed prosecutions.7 She twice misidentified the seller before naming Albright.8
At a preliminary hearing respondent Oliver testified that petitioner sold the look-alike substance to the informant, and the court found probable cause to bind petitioner over for trial.9 At a later pretrial hearing the court dismissed the criminal action against petitioner on the ground that the charge did not state an offense under Illinois law.10
Albright then instituted this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective Oliver in his individual and official capacities.11 He alleged that Oliver deprived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment—his liberty interest—to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause.12 The complaint also named the city of Macomb as a defendant and charged a common-law malicious prosecution claim against Oliver.13
The District Court granted respondent's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint did not state a claim under § 1983.14 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.15 It relied on this Court's decision in Paul v. Davis.16 It held that prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort actionable under § 1983 only if accompanied by incarceration or loss of employment or some other palpable consequence.17
Albright petitioned for a writ of certiorari.18 This Court granted the petition to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning whether malicious prosecution or prosecution without probable cause states a claim under § 1983.19
Whether a claim alleging prosecution without probable cause states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment?20
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against state action that deprives them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, but where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.21
No. In 1987 Illinois authorities issued an arrest warrant for petitioner Kevin Albright charging him on the basis of a previously filed criminal information with the sale of a substance which looked like an illegal drug.22 When he learned of the outstanding warrant, Albright surrendered to respondent Roger Oliver, a police detective employed by the city of Macomb, but denied his guilt of such an offense. He was released after posting bond, one of the conditions of which was that he not leave the State without permission of the court.
The charge rested on information supplied by a paid informant who had previously made over fifty false accusations leading to dismissed prosecutions and who twice misidentified the seller before naming Albright. At a preliminary hearing respondent Oliver testified that petitioner sold the look-alike substance to the informant, and the court found probable cause to bind petitioner over for trial. At a later pretrial hearing the court dismissed the criminal action against petitioner on the ground that the charge did not state an offense under Illinois law.
Albright then instituted this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective Oliver in his individual and official capacities, alleging that Oliver deprived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment—his liberty interest—to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. The complaint also named the city of Macomb as a defendant and charged a common-law malicious prosecution claim against Oliver.
The District Court granted respondent's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint did not state a claim under § 1983. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, relying on this Court's decision in Paul v. Davis and holding that prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort actionable under § 1983 only if accompanied by incarceration or loss of employment or some other palpable consequence.
Albright petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning whether malicious prosecution or prosecution without probable cause states a claim under § 1983. The established facts involve an arrest and pretrial seizure governed by the Fourth Amendment, so the substantive due process claim fails under the rule.23
The claim does not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.24
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Justice Scalia joined the opinion but wrote separately to clarify that the Court was not holding the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to malicious prosecution claims.25 He noted that the only deprivation here was the pretrial arrest and that procedures due for an arrest are likely limited to Fourth Amendment requirements, though petitioner had not invoked procedural due process.26 Scalia rejected using substantive due process to impose additional requirements on criminal processes already addressed by the Bill of Rights.27
Justice Ginsburg joined the opinion and wrote to explain why the claim should be viewed through a Fourth Amendment lens.28 She argued that Albright's submission to arrest constituted a seizure that continued until the charges were dismissed because at common law a bailed defendant remains in custody.29 Oliver's misleading testimony at the preliminary hearing perpetuated the unlawful seizure.30
Ginsburg noted that Albright had abandoned the Fourth Amendment claim but that it would not have been time-barred if the seizure was understood to persist until dismissal.31
Whether the Fourth Amendment rather than the generalized notion of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment governs analysis of pretrial deprivations of liberty arising from criminal prosecutions?32
Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.
Yes. The established facts show Albright surrendered to Detective Oliver pursuant to an arrest warrant, posted bond with travel restrictions, and faced a preliminary hearing where Oliver testified, all of which constitute a seizure and pretrial deprivation of liberty.33 The rule requires analysis under the Fourth Amendment because it directly governs such seizures rather than substantive due process.34
The Fourth Amendment rather than the generalized notion of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment governs analysis of pretrial deprivations of liberty arising from criminal prosecutions.35
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Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment on different grounds.36 He agreed that arrest without probable cause must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment but focused on the malicious initiation of prosecution.37 Kennedy concluded that due process does not impose an evidentiary standard for initiating charges beyond those in the Bill of Rights.38
He determined that any claim for malicious prosecution is barred by Parratt v. Taylor because Illinois provides an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy for such injuries.39
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment by a different route from the plurality.40 He stressed that the doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires the utmost care when asked to break new ground in substantive due process.41 Due process should not be reduced to duplicating protections already provided by other constitutional provisions like the Fourth Amendment.42
Petitioner failed to allege any substantial injury attributable to the initiation of prosecution distinct from the seizure that followed.43 Souter left open the possibility that in exceptional cases some harm might occur before a seizure, justifying a due process claim, but no such substantial burden was shown here.44
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes a basis for a § 1983 claim when a specific constitutional provision addresses the challenged government conduct?45
Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.
No. The established facts demonstrate that Albright's arrest, bond conditions, and prosecution arose from a seizure addressed by the Fourth Amendment.46 The rule directs that the specific provision controls, so the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim provides no basis for relief under § 1983.47
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not furnish a basis for a § 1983 claim when a specific constitutional provision addresses the challenged government conduct.48
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Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Blackmun.49 He argued that the Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary official action including the commencement of criminal proceedings without probable cause.50 Stevens maintained that the formal accusation itself deprives the accused of liberty interests in reputation, employment, and freedom of movement.51
He rejected the plurality's reliance on Graham v. Connor and Paul v. Davis, insisting that the Fourteenth Amendment independently requires a responsible probable-cause determination before prosecution and that procedural regularity cannot save a substantively baseless accusation.52