415 U.S. 36 (1974)
In May 1966, Harrell Alexander, Sr., a black man, was hired by Gardner-Denver Co. to perform maintenance work at its Denver, Colorado plant.1 In June 1968, he was awarded a trainee position as a drill operator, which he held until his discharge on September 29, 1969.2 The company stated that he was discharged for producing too many defective or unusable parts.3
On October 1, 1969, Alexander filed a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement between the company and his union, Local No. 3029 of the United Steelworkers of America, stating that he had been unjustly discharged and seeking reinstatement with full seniority and pay.4 No explicit claim of racial discrimination was made at that time.5 The agreement included provisions for management rights to discharge for proper cause, a nondiscrimination clause, just cause for discharge, and a multi-step grievance procedure culminating in compulsory arbitration whose decision would be final and binding.6
The union processed the grievance through the steps, and Alexander raised the racial discrimination claim in the final pre-arbitration step.7 Prior to the arbitration hearing, Alexander filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which referred it to the EEOC on November 5, 1969.8 At the November 20, 1969 arbitration hearing, Alexander testified that his discharge resulted from racial discrimination and that he had filed the charge because he could not rely on the union; the union introduced evidence including a letter from Alexander claiming preferential discriminatory treatment.9
On December 30, 1969, the arbitrator ruled that Alexander had been discharged for just cause, making no reference to the racial discrimination claim.10 On July 25, 1970, the EEOC determined there was not reasonable cause to believe a Title VII violation had occurred and later issued a right-to-sue notice.11
Alexander then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII.12 The District Court granted summary judgment to the company, finding the claim had been submitted to arbitration and resolved adversely, binding Alexander.13 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam on the basis of the District Court’s opinion.14 The Supreme Court granted petitioner’s application for certiorari.15
Whether an employee’s statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII may be foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement?16
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 confers upon individuals a statutory right to pursue claims of employment discrimination in federal court through a trial de novo.17 This right operates independently of any remedies available under a collective-bargaining agreement.18 The legislative scheme establishes parallel or overlapping remedies.19 Neither election of remedies nor waiver doctrines bar the statutory claim after arbitration of the contractual grievance.20 An arbitrator's authority is limited to interpreting the collective-bargaining agreement and cannot displace the federal court's plenary responsibility to enforce Title VII.21
No. Harrell Alexander, Sr., pursued his grievance through the multi-step procedure in the collective-bargaining agreement with Gardner-Denver Co., raising the racial discrimination claim at the arbitration hearing on November 20, 1969, after which the arbitrator issued a decision on December 30, 1969, finding discharge for just cause with no reference to discrimination.22 Alexander had already filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission prior to the hearing, received a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC, and then instituted the Title VII action in the District Court for the District of Colorado.23 These specific facts illustrate that the contractual and statutory rights were asserted in their respective forums without any inconsistency or waiver, confirming that the prior arbitral resolution does not foreclose the de novo judicial proceeding.24
An employee’s statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII may not be foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement.25