164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896)
This was a writ of error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas sentencing the plaintiff in error to death for the murder of Philip Henson, a white man, in the Cherokee Nation of the Indian Territory.1 The defendant was tried and convicted in 1893, and upon such conviction being set aside by this court, 150 U. S. 551, was again tried and convicted in 1894.2 The case was again reversed, 157 U. S. 675, when Allen was tried for the third time and convicted, and this writ of error was sued out.3
The facts are so fully set forth in the previous reports of the case that it is unnecessary to repeat them here.4 We are somewhat embarrassed in the consideration of this case by the voluminousness of the charge, and of the exceptions taken thereto, as well as by the absence of a brief on the part of the plaintiff in error.5
Whether the trial court's instruction on the facts as narrated by the two Erne boys permitted the jury to find wilfulness and malice aforethought?6
If the facts were as stated by the Ernes, there was no error in saying to the jury, not that they were bound to, but that they were at liberty to, infer not only wilfulness but malice aforethought.7
No. The established facts show that the trial court instructed the jury on the prosecution theory drawn from the Erne boys' testimony describing the defendant approaching with a pistol, entering the wheat field, striking Henson, and firing multiple shots.8 This instruction properly permitted the jury to infer wilfulness and malice if those facts were credited because the described conduct constituted a wrongful act without just cause or excuse.9
The instruction on the Erne boys' testimony was not erroneous.10
Whether the instruction that a deliberate intent to kill may spring up on the spur of the moment was erroneous?11
No. The established facts establish that the trial court explained to the jury that deliberate intent could arise instantaneously in the era of improved weapons.14 It could be evidenced by the act of shooting itself when the act could not be justified as manslaughter or self-defense.15 This application of the common-law definition of murder allowed the jury to find malice from the circumstances of the killing of Philip Henson without requiring proof of prolonged premeditation.16
The instruction on the timing of intent was not erroneous.17
Whether the charge that a person is presumed to intend what he does and that intent may be inferred from the fact of killing was proper?18
This is nothing more than a statement of the familiar proposition that every man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own act.19
No. The established facts demonstrate that the trial court instructed the jury that a person is presumed to intend the natural results of using a weapon.20 The fact of a fatal blow permits an inference of prior intent even if formed only moments earlier.21 The instruction remained within the bounds of common experience and did not shift the burden of proof.22
The presumption instruction was proper.23
Whether the definition of manslaughter excluding malice aforethought and requiring provocation by acts rather than words was correct?24
It is well settled by the authorities that mere words, however aggravating, are not sufficient to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.25
No. The established facts show that the trial court defined manslaughter as unlawful and wilful killing without malice aforethought.26 It explained that provocation must come from an act by the deceased sufficient to inflame the mind into heat of passion rather than from words alone.27 The charge correctly excluded mere words as a basis for reducing the grade of the offense.28
The manslaughter definition was correct.29
Whether the instruction on the circumstances under which killing would be justifiable in self-defense, including the duty to retreat, was erroneous?30
No. The established facts indicate that the trial court instructed the jury that self-defense requires a deadly assault or one threatening great bodily harm.33 The defendant must use all means in his power to avoid the necessity of killing, including retreat where reasonably possible.34 This standard was applied to the facts of the encounter in the wheat field without conflicting with the special rules for attacks on one's own premises.35
The self-defense instruction was not erroneous.36
Whether the instruction that flight of the accused may be considered against him unless satisfactorily explained was proper?37
The law is entirely well settled that the flight of the accused is competent evidence against him as having a tendency to establish his guilt.38
No. The established facts show that the trial court told the jury to consider the defendant's conduct after the killing, including flight from the country, as a circumstance that could be weighed against him unless satisfactorily explained.39 This instruction was applied to Allen's actions following the death of Philip Henson.40 Although prior cases condemned language creating a legal presumption from flight, the charge here merely identified flight as competent evidence of guilt.41
The flight instruction was proper.42
Whether the charge that false testimony knowingly invoked by the defendant may be used against him as raising a presumption of guilt was erroneous?43
There was no error in instructing the jury to disregard evidence that was bound to be false.44 The further charge that false testimony, knowingly and purposely invoked by defendant, might be used against him, is but another method of stating the principle that the fabrication of testimony raises a presumption against the party guilty of such practice.45
No. The established facts establish that the trial court directed the jury to reject fabricated evidence.46 It further instructed that false testimony knowingly presented by the defendant could serve as the basis for a presumption against him.47 The instruction properly distinguished between disregarding false evidence and drawing an adverse inference from its deliberate introduction.48
The false testimony instruction was not erroneous.49
Whether the refusal to charge that a probability of innocence creates a reasonable doubt of guilt was error, given the existing charge on presumption of innocence?50
The court having thus charged upon the subject of the presumption of innocence, could not be required to repeat the charge in a separate instruction at the request of the defendant.51
No. The established facts show that the trial court had already instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and its disappearance only upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.52 This occurred before refusing the requested additional charge on probability of innocence.53 The court was not obligated to give a redundant separate instruction.54
The refusal to give the additional instruction was not error.55
Whether the supplemental instructions to the jury after they returned, urging consideration of others' views and that the verdict should be that of each juror, were erroneous?56
There was no error in these instructions.57
No. The established facts demonstrate that after the jury returned for further guidance the trial court delivered supplemental instructions.58 Each juror's verdict must reflect his own conscientious judgment while also encouraging open-minded consideration of fellow jurors' views and the desirability of reaching unanimity through deliberation.59 The charge properly balanced individual responsibility with the jury system's goal of collective decision-making.60
The supplemental instructions were not erroneous.61