421 U.S. 240 (1975)
A major oil field was discovered in the North Slope of Alaska in 1968.1
In June 1969, the oil companies constituting the Alyeska consortium submitted an application to the Department of the Interior for rights-of-way for a pipeline that would transport oil from the North Slope across land in Alaska owned by the United States.2 An amended application was submitted in December 1969 requesting a 54-foot right-of-way along with applications for special land use permits for additional space and a construction road.3
Respondents Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and Friends of the Earth brought suit in March 1970 against the Secretary of the Interior seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the intended issuance of the permits would violate the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and fail to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.4 The district court granted a preliminary injunction.5 The State of Alaska and Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. subsequently intervened in the action.6
On March 20, 1972, the Interior Department released a six-volume Environmental Impact Statement and a three-volume Economic and Security Analysis.7 After a period for public comment, the Secretary announced that the requested permits would be granted.8 The district court then dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.9 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the Mineral Leasing Act issue alone.10 Congress then enacted legislation amending the Mineral Leasing Act to allow the permits and declaring that no further action under NEPA was necessary.11
With the merits of the litigation terminated by this legislation, the Court of Appeals turned to the respondents' request for an award of attorneys' fees and granted fees against Alyeska on the private attorney general theory.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the fee award.13
Whether the Court of Appeals properly awarded attorneys' fees to the respondents against Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. based on the private attorney general theory?14
The American rule provides that the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser.15 Federal courts lack authority to create a private attorney general exception to this rule without specific legislative guidance because Congress has reserved the policy of fee shifting for itself through targeted statutory authorizations.16
No. The Court of Appeals awarded attorneys' fees to respondents Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and Friends of the Earth against petitioner Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. on the private attorney general theory after Congress enacted legislation amending the Mineral Leasing Act to authorize the permits and declaring no further NEPA action necessary.17 The established facts demonstrate that the litigation was terminated by this legislation with no applicable statutory authorization for the fee award.18 The Court of Appeals expressly disclaimed reliance on bad faith or common benefit exceptions while stretching the private attorney general rationale beyond any recognized equitable power.
The Court of Appeals did not properly award the attorneys' fees.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan agreed that federal equity courts possess the power to award attorneys' fees on a private attorney general rationale.20 He would have held that this case was a proper one for the exercise of that power.21 The respondents ensured the proper functioning of the governmental system.22
They advanced substantial public interests in a concrete manner.23 An award of fees would not have unjustly discouraged Alyeska from defending its case in court.24 Denying fees might well have deterred the respondents from undertaking the heavy burden of this litigation.25
Justice Marshall contended that federal equity courts have an independent basis in their equitable powers to award attorneys' fees when the interests of justice so require.26 The private attorney general rationale is consistent with prior cases expanding the common benefit exception.27 He further concluded that the equities supported an award against Alyeska.28
The litigation conferred direct economic benefits on the company.29 The respondents' altruistic efforts vindicated important public rights that would otherwise have gone unenforced.30 The Court today disavows the well-established power of federal equity courts to award attorneys' fees when the interests of justice so require.31
Whether federal courts may create a private attorney general exception to the American rule against fee shifting in the absence of specific statutory authorization?32
Federal courts may not fashion a private attorney general exception to the American rule because the rule is deeply rooted in history and congressional policy.33 Any expansion of fee shifting to encourage private enforcement of important public policies is a matter that Congress has reserved for itself by carving out specific statutory exceptions rather than granting roving authority to the judiciary.34
No. The Court of Appeals created a private attorney general exception by awarding fees to respondents Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and Friends of the Earth against Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. after the merits were resolved by congressional legislation.35 The established facts show no statutory provision authorizing such fees.36 The Court of Appeals relied solely on its assessment that the respondents had vindicated important statutory rights of all citizens.37 The American rule, as applied to these facts, precludes judicial creation of the exception because Congress has made explicit fee shifting provisions in selected statutes while leaving the general prohibition intact.38
Federal courts may not create a private attorney general exception to the American rule.39
Whether the 1853 fee statute and its successors, including 28 U.S.C. § 1923 and § 2412, preclude judicial awards of substantial attorneys' fees beyond the specified amounts?40
The 1853 fee statute and its successors, including 28 U.S.C. § 1923 and § 2412, preclude judicial awards of substantial attorneys' fees beyond the specified amounts because Congress standardized taxable costs to limit allowances for attorneys' fees chargeable to the losing party.41 Congress expressly barred inclusion of attorneys' fees in costs taxed against the United States absent specific statutory authorization.42
Yes. The 1853 fee statute and its successors, including 28 U.S.C. § 1923 and § 2412, preclude judicial awards of substantial attorneys' fees beyond the specified amounts as applied to the facts where the Court of Appeals awarded fees against Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. after the litigation involving the Mineral Leasing Act and NEPA was terminated by legislation.43 The Court of Appeals noted that § 2412 barred any award against the United States.44 The award was for the reasonable value of services rendered, taking into account time, labor, public benefit, and other factors, far exceeding the small docket fees permitted by § 1923.45
The award violated the general statutory rule that attorneys' fees are not recoverable absent express congressional provision.46
The 1853 fee statute and its successors preclude judicial awards of substantial attorneys' fees beyond the specified amounts.47