131 S.Ct. 2527, 564 U.S. 410, 180 L.Ed.2d 435
In July 2004, two groups of plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the Southern District of New York against the same five major electric power companies.1
The first group included eight States and New York City.2
The second group joined three nonprofit land trusts.3
The defendants were four private companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, a federally owned corporation.4
According to the complaints, the defendants are the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States, with collective annual emissions of 650 million tons constituting 25 percent of emissions from the domestic electric power sector.5
The plaintiffs asserted that by contributing to global warming, the defendants’ carbon-dioxide emissions created a substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights, in violation of the federal common law of interstate nuisance or state tort law.6
The States and New York City alleged that public lands, infrastructure, and health were at risk from climate change.7
The trusts urged that climate change would destroy habitats for animals and rare species on land they owned and conserved.8
All plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring each defendant to cap its carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade.9
The District Court dismissed both suits as presenting non-justiciable political questions.10
The Second Circuit reversed.11
On threshold questions, the Court of Appeals held that the suits were not barred by the political question doctrine and that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged Article III standing.12
Turning to the merits, the Second Circuit held that all plaintiffs had stated a claim under the federal common law of nuisance and that the Clean Air Act did not displace federal common law.13
Responding to the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency undertook greenhouse gas regulation.14
In December 2009, the Agency concluded that greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.15
EPA issued a joint final rule regulating emissions from light-duty vehicles and initiated a joint rulemaking covering medium- and heavy-duty vehicles.16
EPA also began phasing in requirements that new or modified major greenhouse gas emitting facilities use the best available control technology and commenced a rulemaking under section 111 of the Act to set limits on greenhouse gas emissions from new, modified, and existing fossil-fuel fired powerplants.17
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2010.18
Four Members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts v. EPA, while four Members would hold that none of the plaintiffs have Article III standing.19
The Court therefore affirmed, by an equally divided Court, the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction and proceeded to the merits.20
Whether at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing to maintain these suits?21
Article III standing requires a plaintiff to show an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, a causal connection fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and redressability by a favorable judicial decision, as established in precedents governing challenges to regulatory inaction on environmental harms.22
No. Four Members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts v. EPA, which permitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.23
The established facts show that the States and New York City alleged risks to public lands, infrastructure, and health from climate change caused by the defendants’ emissions of 650 million tons of carbon dioxide annually.24
The land trusts alleged destruction of habitats on lands they conserved.25
The Court therefore affirmed the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction by an equally divided vote and proceeded to the merits.26
The Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction by an equally divided Court and proceeded to the merits without resolving the standing question on its own.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment while adhering to the view expressed in the Massachusetts dissent that none of the plaintiffs have Article III standing.28
He agreed with the displacement analysis only on the assumption that the Massachusetts interpretation of the Clean Air Act is correct.
This position indicates that the suits should not have proceeded past the threshold jurisdictional inquiry.
Whether the Clean Air Act and EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired powerplants?29
When Congress addresses a question previously governed by federal common law, the need for judicial lawmaking disappears if the statute speaks directly to the question at issue, without requiring the same clear and manifest purpose demanded for preemption of state law.30
Yes. The Clean Air Act speaks directly to emissions of carbon dioxide from the defendants’ plants through section 111.31
Section 111 directs EPA to list categories of stationary sources that cause or contribute significantly to air pollution endangering public health or welfare.32
The Agency must establish standards of performance for new and existing sources.33
EPA has already commenced a rulemaking under section 111 to set limits on greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fuel fired powerplants.34
The Act provides multiple avenues for enforcement, including delegation to states, EPA inspections, civil and criminal penalties, and private enforcement actions under section 7604(a).35
Because the Act delegates to EPA the decision whether and how to regulate these emissions, it displaces any federal common-law right to seek abatement.36
The Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired powerplants.37
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment and agreed with the Court’s displacement analysis on the assumption that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA is correct.38
This concurrence confirms that the statutory scheme occupies the field even under the broader regulatory authority recognized in that precedent.39
Alito made clear that his agreement with displacement rests solely on the Massachusetts interpretation of the Act.40
Whether the plaintiffs may pursue relief under state nuisance law after federal common-law claims are displaced?41
If a case should be resolved by reference to federal common law, state common law is preempted, but once federal common law is displaced the availability of state-law claims depends on the preemptive effect of the federal statute.42
No. The Court did not decide whether the plaintiffs may pursue relief under state nuisance law.43
After holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law, the Court noted that the availability of a state lawsuit depends on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.44
None of the parties briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the availability of a claim under state nuisance law.45
The Court therefore left the matter open for consideration on remand.46
The Court left open for consideration on remand the question whether the plaintiffs may pursue relief under state nuisance law after federal common-law claims are displaced.47