386 U.S. 738 (1967)
After his conviction for the felony of possession of marijuana, Anders moved the California District Court of Appeal to appoint counsel to represent him on appeal. The court granted the motion.1
Appointed counsel studied the record and consulted with Anders before concluding that the appeal had no merit. Counsel informed the court by letter of this conclusion and noted that Anders wished to file a brief on his own behalf.2 Anders requested the appointment of a different attorney, but the court denied this request. Anders proceeded to file a brief pro se, the State responded, and Anders filed a reply brief. On January 9, 1959, the District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction.3
In 1965, Anders filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Appeal. He sought to reopen the case on the basis that he had been deprived of counsel on his original appeal due to the court's refusal to appoint new counsel.4 The court denied the application the same day in a brief memorandum, stating that it had reviewed the record and determined the appeal to be without merit, and that the procedure from In re Nash had been followed.5
Anders then submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court of California on June 25, 1965. That court denied the petition without opinion on July 14, 1965.6
Whether California's procedure for handling first appeals by indigent defendants, under which appointed counsel files a no-merit letter after concluding the appeal has no merit and the court then reviews the record itself, satisfies the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment?7
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, an indigent defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel on a first appeal from a criminal conviction.8 Appointed counsel must act in the role of an active advocate rather than as amicus curiae.9 If counsel concludes after a conscientious examination that the appeal is wholly frivolous, counsel must request permission to withdraw and file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.10 The court must then conduct its own full examination of the proceedings, and if it finds any legal points arguable on their merits, it must afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal before decision.11
No.12 In Anders's case, appointed counsel studied the record and consulted with the defendant.13 Counsel then sent a letter to the District Court of Appeal.14 The letter stated only that there was no merit to the appeal and that Anders wished to file his own brief.15 No brief referring to arguable points accompanied the letter.16 The District Court of Appeal examined the record itself and affirmed the conviction on January 9, 1959.17 When Anders later filed a habeas application in 1965 claiming deprivation of appellate counsel, the court denied relief the same day.18 It did so after again reviewing the record and finding the appeal without merit under the In re Nash procedure.19
The Supreme Court of California denied the subsequent petition without opinion.20 This procedure provided neither advocacy by counsel nor the full consideration required when counsel acts in an advocate capacity.21
California's procedure does not satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that the California procedure described in In re Nash satisfied the requirements of Douglas v. California.23 He explained that when appointed counsel thoroughly studies the record, consults with the defendant and trial counsel, and conscientiously concludes there are no meritorious grounds, the appellate court may properly decide the appeal without appointing new counsel if it is satisfied from its own review that counsel's assessment is correct.24 Stewart argued that the majority's requirement of a brief identifying arguable issues is quixotic because any such issues would mean the appeal is not frivolous in the first place.25
He rejected the implicit assumption that appointed lawyers' professional representations in no-merit letters are not to be trusted, noting there was no suggestion that counsel here was incompetent or unethical.26 Stewart concluded that the majority erred in asserting there can be but a single inflexible answer to the difficult problem of how to accord equal protection to indigent appellants in each of the 50 States.27 He would have affirmed the judgment.28