555 A.2d 1042 (Me. 1989)
In the fall of 1983, Hornsby, a practicing lawyer in Orlando, Florida, retained Elliott on a contingent fee basis to represent him in a title dispute with a third party over land Hornsby owned in Boothbay Harbor, and they executed a written fee agreement as required by Maine Bar Rule 8.1 The title dispute was settled in the spring of 1984 with an exchange of deeds and the payment by the third party to Hornsby of $5,000 delivered to Elliott, who kept the entire amount and billed Hornsby for an additional $9,101.51 on the ground that his efforts had enhanced the value of the property by $46,500. Hornsby died in July of 1986 with that fee dispute unresolved.2
The following April, Elliott commenced a breach of contract action against Anderson, Hornsby's personal representative, in the Superior Court, and in July he filed a claim against the estate in the Lincoln County Probate Court. In September 1987 Anderson denied the claim against the estate and filed a petition for fee arbitration under Maine Bar Rule 9, asking that Elliott be ordered to refund $2,500 to the estate. Elliott's reply to the petition addressed only the merits of Anderson's claim.3
A Fee Arbitration Panel held a hearing on February 18, 1988, and the same day granted Anderson the relief he requested.4 When Anderson filed a motion in the Superior Court for entry of judgment confirming the arbitration award, Elliott moved to vacate the award, contending that the Maine Declaration of Rights forbids any compulsory arbitration law that does not provide a right to review the arbitrator's award through a jury trial de novo. The court granted Anderson's motion, entering judgment in his favor for $2,500 and dismissing Elliott's pending contract action.5
Elliott appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.6
Whether the requirement under the Maine Bar Rules that an attorney submit to binding arbitration of a fee dispute at the client's request violates the attorney's right to trial by jury under article I, section 20 of the Maine Constitution?7
The judicial power of the State, vested exclusively in the courts by the Maine Constitution, confers upon the Supreme Judicial Court plenary and inherent authority to regulate all aspects of the practice of law, including the attorney-client relationship and fee disputes.8 Because attorney fees have long been subject to judicial supervision as part of the attorney's fiduciary duties and professional obligations, the court may establish a client-initiated compulsory arbitration system under Maine Bar Rule 9 without infringing the civil jury trial guarantee of article I, section 20.9
No. Elliott, as a practicing Maine attorney, took the statutory oath upon admission to the bar and thereby became an officer of the court subject to the Supreme Judicial Court's regulatory authority under the Maine Bar Rules.10 The fee dispute arose from a contingent fee agreement executed pursuant to Maine Bar Rule 8 in connection with representation of Hornsby in a title action, and Anderson, as personal representative, properly invoked Rule 9 arbitration after denying the estate claim.11 The resulting arbitration proceeding, conducted by a panel of the Fee Arbitration Commission with full procedural safeguards under the Uniform Arbitration Act, addressed a matter uniquely tied to the attorney-client relationship rather than an ordinary breach-of-contract action, confirming that the court's exercise of its inherent power did not abridge any constitutional jury right.12
The requirement under the Maine Bar Rules that an attorney submit to binding arbitration of a fee dispute at the client's request does not violate the attorney's right to trial by jury under article I, section 20 of the Maine Constitution.13
Whether an attorney preserves a constitutional objection to compulsory fee arbitration by participating fully in the arbitration proceeding on the merits without objection until after receiving an adverse award?14
A party who fully participates in an arbitration proceeding on the merits without raising any objection to the tribunal's authority waives the right to later challenge the procedure on constitutional grounds.15 This is especially true when the objection is asserted only after an adverse award, because strong public policy favors arbitration and belated challenges would undermine its efficiency and finality.16
No. Elliott filed a reply to Anderson's arbitration petition that addressed solely the merits of the fee claim, appeared at the February 18, 1988 hearing before the Fee Arbitration Panel, and raised no protest to the panel's jurisdiction or authority at any point during the proceeding.17 Only after the panel issued its adverse award ordering a $2,500 refund did Elliott first assert a constitutional objection in his motion to vacate the award in Superior Court.18 This sequence of conduct demonstrates acquiescence in the arbitral forum and constitutes a failure to preserve the objection.19
An attorney does not preserve a constitutional objection to compulsory fee arbitration by participating fully in the arbitration proceeding on the merits without objection until after receiving an adverse award.20