477 U.S. 242 (1986)
In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," along with a shorter introductory article.1 These articles portrayed respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder Willis A. Carto as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist.2
Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners Jack Anderson, the publisher, Bill Adkins, and the Investigator Publishing Co., alleging that 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the articles were false and derogatory.3 Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.4 In support, they submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, the author of the articles, stating that he had spent substantial time researching from a wide variety of sources and believed the facts to be truthful, along with an appendix detailing sources for each allegedly libelous statement.5
Respondents opposed the motion, asserting inaccuracies and that Bermant had relied on patently unreliable sources, and presented evidence that editor William McGaw had told Adkins before publication that the articles were terrible and ridiculous.
The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures to whom the New York Times standards applied.6 After reviewing the evidence, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners.7
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9.8 It held that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.10
Whether the clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement applicable to proof of actual malice in a New York Times case must be considered by a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56?11
Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine.12 That is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.13 The inquiry necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at trial.14 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.15
Yes. The substantive law of defamation for public figures requires proof of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.16 The District Court applied this standard after reviewing the Bermant affidavit detailing research from numerous sources and the respondents' opposition evidence regarding unreliable sources and the pre-publication criticism by editor McGaw.17 The District Court concluded no genuine issue existed as to actual malice.
The Court of Appeals erred by declaring the heightened standard irrelevant at summary judgment.18 It reversed on nine statements based on a mere possibility that a jury could find actual malice.19 Applying the correct standard to the established facts shows the evidence was of insufficient caliber to permit a rational finder of fact to find actual malice with convincing clarity.20 This confirms the District Court's grant of summary judgment was proper.21
The clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement must be considered by a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a New York Times case.22
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Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the majority's holding would make it more difficult for defamation plaintiffs to survive summary judgment, especially in public figure cases requiring clear and convincing proof of actual malice.23 He argued that the decision conflicts with the purpose of Rule 56 to eliminate only frivolous claims.24 Plaintiffs in such cases often require discovery and trial to establish the defendant's state of mind.25
He would have affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment.26 Rehnquist further contended that engrafting the clear and convincing standard onto Rule 56 would lead to erratic summary judgment decisions without clear guidance on its practical application in particular cases.27 He illustrated with hypothetical examples that the distinction among proof standards often makes little difference at the summary judgment stage when credibility remains a jury question.28
Justice Brennan dissented, agreeing that the ruling would hinder defamation plaintiffs at summary judgment but stressing that it undermines the First Amendment values protected by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.29 He explained that the clear and convincing standard exists to safeguard robust public debate and that easing summary judgment for defendants erodes those protections.30 He respectfully dissented from the majority's approach.31
Brennan maintained that the majority's new procedure would transform summary judgment into a paper trial.32 This forces parties to present all evidence upfront and raises concerns about the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial.33 He argued that once a plaintiff presents evidence supporting a prima facie case under the substantive law, summary judgment must be denied regardless of the ultimate burden of proof.34
Whether the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard in reviewing the District Court's grant of summary judgment in this libel case?35
A court ruling on summary judgment in a New York Times case must determine whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not.36 The genuine issue standard mirrors the directed verdict standard.37 It requires sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict under the governing evidentiary burden.38
No. The Court of Appeals failed to apply the clear and convincing standard when it held that respondents need not show a jury could find actual malice with convincing clarity.39 It reversed on nine statements based on conflicting evidence and inferences.40 The District Court had properly examined the Bermant affidavit, the appendix of sources, and the McGaw statement.41 The District Court found the evidence insufficient under the New York Times burden.42
The Court of Appeals' refusal to incorporate the substantive evidentiary standard produced an erroneous reversal.43 The Supreme Court corrected this by vacating and remanding for application of the proper inquiry.44
The Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard in reviewing the District Court's grant of summary judgment.45
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Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority's entire framework, contending that engrafting the clear and convincing standard onto Rule 56 would lead to erratic summary judgment decisions without clear guidance on its practical application in particular cases.46 He illustrated with hypothetical examples that the distinction among proof standards often makes little difference at the summary judgment stage when credibility remains a jury question. Rehnquist emphasized that the Court failed to apply its newly announced rule to the facts of this case.47
Instead it contented itself with abstractions and paraphrases of abstractions.48
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the majority's new procedure would transform summary judgment into a paper trial, forcing parties to present all evidence upfront and raising concerns about the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial.49 He maintained that once a plaintiff presents evidence supporting a prima facie case under the substantive law, summary judgment must be denied regardless of the ultimate burden of proof.50 Brennan was troubled that the Court's opinion sends conflicting signals to trial courts.51
The opinion instructs judges to consider heightened evidentiary standards without explaining what that means in practice.52