801 F.2d 936 (1986)
Donald Anderson, an Illinois resident, worked as a sandblaster for Tri-Kote, Inc. from 1970 until 1983.1 Tri-Kote held a contract with Marathon Petroleum Company to clean the interiors of Marathon's oil storage tanks by sandblasting.2 Anderson performed sandblasting work on those tanks three or four days per week throughout his employment.3 He was diagnosed with silicosis in 1983 and died while the case was pending on appeal; his widow continued the action.4
Marathon supervisory personnel observed Anderson emerging from storage tanks with silicon dust on his face after completing shifts.5 They knew Tri-Kote supplied him only with a desert hood that had wire mesh over the nose and mouth and lacked any fresh-air hose.6 Two earlier Tri-Kote employees assigned to the same Marathon tanks had also died of silicosis.7 Until 1980 the desert hood remained the sole respiratory protection Tri-Kote provided.8
Anderson and his wife brought a diversity personal-injury action against Marathon in federal district court.9 At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence the district judge directed a verdict for Marathon.10
Whether a principal is subject to vicarious liability for torts committed by its independent contractor against the contractor's employees when the contracted work involves sandblasting inside oil storage tanks?11
A principal is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor.12 Liability arises only if the contracted activity is abnormally dangerous or involves a peculiar risk of harm.13 Even then, employees of the contractor generally may not recover in common-law tort against the principal.14 This is because workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy.15
No. Donald Anderson was employed by Tri-Kote, an independent contractor engaged by Marathon to clean storage tanks by sandblasting.16 The established facts show that Anderson performed this work three or four days per week for thirteen years using only a desert hood that permitted silicon dust to reach his face.17 Marathon supervisors regularly observed the dust on him.18 Two prior Tri-Kote sandblasters on the same Marathon tanks also died of silicosis.19 These facts do not trigger vicarious liability.20 Sandblasting was not shown to be abnormally dangerous.21 The plaintiff was the contractor's employee rather than a third party.22 Workers' compensation benefits, funded indirectly through the contract price paid by Marathon, supply the exclusive remedy and eliminate any need for additional tort liability that would upset the statutory balance.23
The distinction between employees and third parties is dispositive.24 When an abnormally dangerous activity injures strangers, the principal cannot escape liability by delegating the work.25 But when the only persons endangered are the contractor's own employees, the principal already bears the cost of workers' compensation.26 The principal has every incentive to insist on safe practices to keep contract prices down.27 Allowing a tort suit would duplicate that remedy and contradict the exclusivity principle that underpins the workers' compensation system.28
Marathon is not vicariously liable to Anderson.29
Related opinions on this issue
Senior Circuit Judge Swygert contends that Chicago Economic Fuel Gas Co. v. Myers remains good law.30 It imposes a nondelegable duty on principals when work is inherently dangerous or involves a peculiar risk of injury to the contractor's employees.31
The majority's reliance on workers' compensation exclusivity is misplaced.32 A nondelegable duty, if found, would permit recovery regardless of compensation coverage.33 Swygert further argues that the plaintiffs presented sufficient expert testimony on the extreme silica concentrations inside the small tanks and the inadequacy of the desert hood to create a jury question on inherent danger.34
The directed verdict therefore should have been reversed.35
Whether sandblasting in confined spaces qualifies as an abnormally dangerous activity that prevents a principal from shifting responsibility to its independent contractor?36
No. The record contains no evidence that sandblasting cannot be rendered safe through proper equipment.39 The established facts indicate that Anderson used only a desert hood lacking any fresh-air supply.40 Yet the plaintiffs offered nothing to show that a correctly designed hood with an external air hose would fail to protect the worker.41 Absent precedent or data demonstrating that adequate protection is impracticable, sandblasting inside tanks does not meet the legal standard for abnormal dangerousness.42
Therefore the exception that would impose vicarious liability on Marathon does not apply.43
Sandblasting in confined spaces is not abnormally dangerous on this record.44
Whether a principal owes a direct duty of care to its independent contractor's employees after learning that the contractor is providing inadequate safety equipment?45
No. Marathon supervisors saw Anderson emerge from tanks with dust on his face and knew Tri-Kote supplied only the inadequate desert hood.49 These facts might support a claim by an injured third party for negligent retention.50 Yet the established facts identify Anderson solely as Tri-Kote's employee.51 Illinois precedent and the majority view in other jurisdictions hold that an employee of the independent contractor cannot recover common-law damages from the principal on a negligent-retention theory.52
Workers' compensation remains the exclusive avenue of relief.53 Federal courts sitting in diversity should not adopt an innovative expansion of state tort law.54
Marathon owes no direct tort duty to Anderson that would support recovery beyond workers' compensation.55