563 U.S. 125, 140–43 (2011)
Arizona enacted section 43-1089 of the Arizona Tax Code, which allows taxpayers to claim dollar-for-dollar tax credits of up to $500 per person and $1,000 per married couple for contributions to school tuition organizations.1
STOs must be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, may not limit scholarships to a single school, and must allocate at least ninety percent of annual revenue to educational scholarships or tuition grants for students at qualified private schools in Arizona that do not discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status, or national origin.2
Respondents, a group of Arizona taxpayers, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the director of the Arizona Department of Revenue.3 They alleged that the tax credit program violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 This is because it permits STOs to use tax revenues to pay tuition at religious schools, some of which discriminate on the basis of religion in selecting students.5 Respondents sought an injunction against the issuance of tax credits for contributions to religious STOs.6
Before the federal action, different Arizona taxpayers challenged the same statute in state court under both the United States and Arizona Constitutions. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected those claims on the merits in Kotterman v. Killian.7 The federal district court initially dismissed the present suit under the Tax Injunction Act. The Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that reversal in Hibbs v. Winn.8
On remand, the Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization and other interested parties intervened as defendants. The district court again dismissed the complaint, this time for failure to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed, and the full court denied en banc review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.9
Whether Arizona taxpayers have standing under Article III to challenge a state tax credit program for contributions to school tuition organizations that award scholarships to students at religious schools solely on the basis of their status as taxpayers?10
Under Article III, plaintiffs must establish a concrete and particularized injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.11 Taxpayers ordinarily lack standing to challenge government expenditures or tax measures because their interest is generalized and shared with other citizens, as set forth in Frothingham v. Mellon.12 The narrow Flast v. Cohen exception applies only when a logical link exists between taxpayer status and a legislative enactment under the taxing and spending power.13 There must also be a nexus between that status and an Establishment Clause violation involving the extraction and spending of tax money in aid of religion.14
No. Respondents, a group of Arizona taxpayers, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona challenging section 43-1089 as a violation of the Establishment Clause.15 The general rule against taxpayer standing applies because their interest in the state treasury is shared with millions of other citizens and is too remote to constitute a particularized injury.16 The Flast exception requires a logical link between taxpayer status and a legislative enactment under the taxing and spending power as well as a nexus to the Establishment Clause violation involving extraction and spending of tax money.17 Here the tax credit allows private contributions to STOs rather than government extraction from the treasury, so the Madisonian concern with compelled support of religion is not implicated.18 Speculation about budget effects or tax increases does not satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability under Article III.19
The distinction between tax credits and direct expenditures is key to the analysis.20 When the government declines to impose a tax, there is no connection between the dissenting taxpayer and the alleged establishment.21 Private citizens create the STOs and make the contributions, so the injury is not traceable to government action.22
Respondents lack standing under Article III, and the suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurs in the judgment.24 He maintains that Flast v. Cohen is an anomaly in the jurisprudence that is irreconcilable with Article III restrictions on federal judicial power.25 He would repudiate that misguided decision entirely and enforce the Constitution's limits rather than struggle with its application.26
Nevertheless he joins the majority opinion because it finds respondents lack standing by applying Flast rather than distinguishing the case away on unprincipled grounds.27
Justice Kagan dissents.28 She contends that the Arizona tax credit program is the functional equivalent of a direct government subsidy to religious schools because it provides dollar-for-dollar credits for contributions to STOs that fund religious education.29 In her view the majority's distinction between tax credits and expenditures is artificial and unpersuasive since both mechanisms result in the transfer of funds to support religion.30
She would hold that taxpayers have standing under Flast to challenge this use of their tax dollars and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.31