548 U.S. 331 (2006)
On December 19, 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent observed respondent Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-way street in front of the police station.1 The officer stopped respondent and asked to see his driver's license.2 After respondent told the officer that his license had been suspended, the officer asked respondent to step out of the car.3 When respondent complied, the officer entered respondent's name and date of birth into a computer data terminal located in his patrol car.4 The computer inquiry indicated that there was an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for respondent's arrest.5
While the officer was writing out a citation for driving with a suspended license and an arrest warrant for the misdemeanor, respondent was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car.6 When the officer searched respondent's car, he discovered a bag of marijuana.7
At the suppression hearing in the Superior Court, the parties stipulated that the sole cause of respondent's arrest was the computer record of the outstanding warrant.8 The parties also stipulated that the record was inaccurate because a Phoenix justice court had quashed the warrant three weeks prior to the arrest, that the court's computer had not been updated to reflect the change, and that the error was caused by a court employee.9 The Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified that standard procedure required a clerk to call the Sheriff's Office warrant section after a warrant was quashed and to note the call in the file.10 Respondent's file contained no such notation.11 The Sheriff's Office had no record of any call.12
The trial court granted the motion to suppress because the evidence was obtained incident to an arrest that was based on an erroneous computer record.13 The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed.14 It held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by excluding evidence obtained when the officer acted in reliance on a computer record that was erroneous due to a clerical error of a court employee.15 The Arizona Supreme Court reversed.16 It held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was inapplicable because the error occurred in the court's recordkeeping procedure rather than in the police function.17 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
Whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized incident to an arrest that was based on an inaccurate computer record of an outstanding warrant resulting from a clerical error by a court employee?19
The exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect.20 However, the issue of exclusion is separate from whether the Amendment has been violated.21 Exclusion is appropriate only where the rule's remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.22 The same analytical framework that this Court used in United States v. Leon applies here.23
No.24 The parties stipulated that the error was caused by a court employee.25 Officer Sargent reasonably relied on the computer record indicating the warrant.26 The recordkeeping function was performed by a court, not the police.27 Excluding the evidence can have no deterrent effect on court employees.28
Excluding the evidence would have little, if any, deterrent effect on the future behavior of arresting officers, who would have no reason to disregard the computer's information.29 The Arizona Supreme Court's reliance on the distinction between police and court errors is misplaced.30
The exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence.31
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Souter And Justice Breyer
The evidence in this case strongly suggests that it was a court employee's departure from established record keeping procedures that caused the record of respondent's arrest warrant to remain in the computer system after the warrant had been quashed.32
Prudently, then, the Court limits itself to the question whether a court employee's departure from such established procedures is the kind of error to which the exclusionary rule should apply.33 The Court holds that it is not such an error, and I agree with that conclusion and join the Court's opinion.34
The Court's holding reaffirms that the exclusionary rule imposes significant costs on society's law enforcement interests and thus should apply only where its deterrence purposes are most efficaciously served.35 In limiting itself to that single question, however, the Court does not hold that the court employee's mistake in this case was necessarily the only error that may have occurred and to which the exclusionary rule might apply.36 While the police were innocent of the court employee's mistake, they may or may not have acted reasonably in their reliance on the record keeping system itself.37
Joined by Justice Breyer
In joining the Court's opinion, I share Justice O'Connor's understanding of the narrow scope of what we hold today.38
To her concurrence, which I join as well, I add only that we do not answer another question that may reach us in due course.39 That question is how far, in dealing with fruits of computerized error, our very concept of deterrence by exclusion of evidence should extend to the government as a whole, not merely the police, on the ground that there would otherwise be no reasonable expectation of keeping the number of resulting false arrests within an acceptable minimum limit.40
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review the Arizona Supreme Court's decision when that decision may rest on an adequate and independent state ground?41
Under Michigan v. Long, when a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law and the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, the Court will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.42
Yes.4344 In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that while it may be inappropriate to invoke the exclusionary rule where a magistrate has issued a facially valid warrant based on an erroneous evaluation of the facts, the law, or both, it is useful and proper to do so where negligent record keeping results in an unlawful arrest.45 Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court's decision to suppress the evidence was based squarely upon its interpretation of federal law.46 Nor did it offer a plain statement that its references to federal law were being used only for the purpose of guidance and did not themselves compel the result that it reached.47
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision.48
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stevens
The Long presumption, as I see it, impedes the States' ability to serve as laboratories for testing solutions to novel legal problems.49 I would apply the opposite presumption and assume that Arizona's Supreme Court has ruled for its own State and people, under its own constitutional recognition of individual security against unwarranted state intrusion.50
Accordingly, I would dismiss the writ of certiorari.51 This case portrays the increasing use of computer technology in law enforcement; it illustrates an evolving problem this Court need not, and in my judgment should not, resolve too hastily.52
Justice Ginsburg has written an important opinion explaining why the Court unwisely departed from settled law when it interpreted its own jurisdiction so expansively in Michigan v. Long.53 I join her dissent and her conclusion that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.54
Because the Court has addressed the merits, however, I add this comment on its holding.55 The Long presumption interferes prematurely with state-court endeavors to explore different solutions to new problems facing modern society.56 Restoring a main rule denying jurisdiction where there is uncertainty would stop this Court from asserting authority in matters belonging, or at least appropriately left, to the States' domain.57
Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when the recordkeeping error was committed by court employees rather than police personnel?58
The good-faith exception applies when an officer conducts a search in objectively reasonable reliance on a record that is later determined to be invalid due to clerical error by court employees.59 Court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, so the threat of exclusion of evidence could not be expected to deter such individuals from failing to inform police officials that a warrant had been quashed.60
Yes. If court employees were responsible for the erroneous computer record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction.61 First, the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees.62 Second, respondent offers no evidence that court employees are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.63
Finally, and most important, there is no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a significant effect on court employees responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been quashed.64 Application of the Leon framework supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees.65
The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when the recordkeeping error was committed by court employees rather than police personnel.66
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Souter And Justice Breyer
The evidence in this case strongly suggests that it was a court employee's departure from established record keeping procedures that caused the record of respondent's arrest warrant to remain in the computer system after the warrant had been quashed.
Prudently, then, the Court limits itself to the question whether a court employee's departure from such established procedures is the kind of error to which the exclusionary rule should apply. The Court holds that it is not such an error, and I agree with that conclusion and join the Court's opinion.