556 U.S. 332 (2009)
On August 25, 1999, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed responded to an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs by knocking on the front door and speaking with Rodney Gant, who identified himself and stated that he expected the owner to return later.1 The officers left and conducted a records check revealing that Gant's driver's license had been suspended and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license.2
When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it.3 After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia.4 Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived.5 Gant arrived in his car, parked at the end of the driveway, and got out.6 Officer Griffith recognized the car, confirmed Gant's identity with a flashlight, called to him, and arrested him 10 to 12 feet from the vehicle before handcuffing him.7
Because the other arrestees occupied the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup.8 When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle.9 After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car.10 One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.
Gant was charged with two offenses of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia.11 He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.12 The trial court denied the motion to suppress.13 A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment.14 After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of Gant's car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.15 The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari.16
Whether police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest?17
The Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.18 Circumstances unique to the automobile context also justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.19
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the backseat of a patrol car before the officers searched his vehicle.20 With five officers present and all arrestees secured in separate patrol cars, Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of the search.21 Additionally, the offense of arrest was a traffic violation for which police could not reasonably expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of the car.22
The search therefore was not authorized by either the reaching-distance rule or the evidentiary justification.23 This conclusion follows from the principle that if there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.24
The search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.25
Whether the search-incident-to-arrest exception authorizes a vehicle search after the arrestee has been handcuffed and secured in a patrol car with no possibility of access to the vehicle?26
The Chimel rationale authorizes a vehicle search incident to arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.
No. The facts establish that Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, with five officers on the scene securing all three arrestees in separate vehicles before the search began.27 Under these circumstances, there was no possibility that Gant could access his car to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.28 The broad reading of Belton that would allow such a search regardless of access is rejected because it untethers the rule from its justifications in officer safety and evidence preservation.29 The exception does not authorize the search in this case.30
The exception does not authorize the search in this case.
Whether circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle?31
Circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
Yes. This additional justification, drawn from Justice Scalia's concurrence in Thornton, allows a search even if the arrestee cannot access the vehicle if there is reason to believe evidence of the offense of arrest is in the vehicle.32 However, in this case, Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, an offense for which police could not reasonably expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment, unlike the drug offenses in Belton and Thornton.33 Therefore, this justification did not apply to authorize the search of Gant's car.34
The search was not justified on evidentiary grounds.35
The search was not justified on evidentiary grounds.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.36 He argued that historical practices provide inadequate guidance on vehicle searches incident to arrest.37 Traditional standards of reasonableness therefore govern.38 Those standards do not justify a rule permitting officers always to search an arrestee's vehicle to protect themselves from hidden weapons.39 When an arrest occurs during a roadside stop, officers have a less intrusive and more effective means of ensuring safety by ordering the arrestee from the vehicle, patting him down, handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad car.40
Justice Scalia would hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is reasonable only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made or of another crime that the officer has probable cause to believe occurred.41 He joined the opinion of the Court to avoid leaving the governing rule uncertain in a 4-to-1-to-4 decision.42
Whether stare decisis requires adherence to a broad reading of New York v. Belton that permits a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest even when the arrestee cannot access the vehicle at the time of the search?43
Stare decisis does not require adherence to a broad reading of Belton because the generalization underpinning that decision is unfounded and blind adherence would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches.44
No. Although Belton has been widely taught and relied upon by law enforcement for 28 years, the experience since then has shown that articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely within the area an arrestee might reach after being secured.45 The reliance interests do not outweigh the interest in protecting constitutional rights, and the Court has never relied on stare decisis to justify an unconstitutional police practice.46 The safety and evidentiary interests supporting the search in Belton are not present here, where multiple officers secured the arrestee for a traffic offense.47 Stare decisis does not compel upholding the search under a broad reading of Belton.48
Stare decisis does not compel upholding the search under a broad reading of Belton.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer dissented from the judgment.49 He agreed with Justice Alito that Belton is best read as setting forth a bright-line rule permitting a warrantless search of the passenger compartment incident to the lawful arrest of an occupant regardless of the danger the arrested individual in fact poses.50 He also agreed with Justice Stevens that the rule can produce results divorced from its underlying Fourth Amendment rationale.51 For that reason he would look for a better rule if the question were one of first impression.52
The matter is not one of first impression.53 The Belton rule has been followed by this Court in Thornton and by numerous other courts.54 Principles of stare decisis must apply.55 Those who wish the Court to change a well-established precedent where there has been considerable reliance bear a heavy burden.56 Justice Breyer had not found that burden met and therefore joined Justice Alito's dissenting opinion except as to Part II-E.57
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts And Justice Kennedy, With Justice Breyer Joining Except As To Part Ii-e
Justice Alito dissented.58 He argued that the Court effectively overruled Belton and Thornton even though respondent Gant had not asked the Court to do so.59 The precise holding in Belton was clear: when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may search the passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest.60
Justice Alito would follow Belton.61 Relevant factors for overruling precedent include reliance, changed circumstances, workability, consistency with later cases, and whether the decision was badly reasoned.62 These factors weigh in favor of retaining the Belton rule.63 The rule has been taught to police officers for more than a quarter century and many searches were conducted in scrupulous reliance on that precedent.64 The Court recognizes substantial reliance but counts it for nothing.65 Abandonment of the rule cannot be justified on changed circumstances because the dangers were well known in 1981.66