429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), on remand 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.1977)
In 1971 Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation applied to the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, for rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to multiple-family classification.1 Using federal financial assistance under section 236 of the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and moderate-income tenants.2 The Village denied the rezoning request.3 MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.4
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located about 26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop.5 Most land in the Village is zoned for detached single-family homes.6 The Clerics of St. Viator own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights that includes a high school, a novitiate building, and vacant land.7 Since 1959 all land surrounding the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3 for single-family use with relatively small minimum lot-size requirements.8
In 1970 MHDC entered into a 99-year lease and accompanying agreement of sale covering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property.9 The agreement set a bargain purchase price of $300,000 with the sale contingent upon securing zoning clearances and section 236 housing assistance.10 MHDC's plans for the Lincoln Green project called for 20 two-story buildings containing 190 units with a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom configurations and a large portion of the site left open.11 The development did not conform to the Village zoning ordinance and required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification.12 MHDC filed a petition for rezoning with the Village Plan Commission accompanied by supporting materials that included an affirmative marketing plan designed to assure racial integration.13 MHDC consulted with Village staff and incorporated every recommended change into the plans.14
During the spring of 1971 the Plan Commission considered the proposal at three public meetings that drew large crowds.15 Opponents focused on the zoning aspects.16 They argued that the area had always been single-family.17 They also argued that the buffer policy adopted in 1962 called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family development and commercial or manufacturing districts.18 At the close of the third meeting the Plan Commission recommended denial.19 On September 28, 1971, the Village Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote.20
In June 1972 MHDC and three Black individuals filed suit against the Village.21 A second nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent intervened.22 After a bench trial the District Court entered judgment for the Village in 1974.23 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1975.24 The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certiorari in 1975.25
Whether MHDC has standing to challenge the Village's denial of its rezoning application?26
Yes. MHDC expended thousands of dollars preparing plans and studies for the Lincoln Green project on the Viatorian site.29 The Village's denial created an absolute barrier to construction because the sale agreement was contingent on rezoning.30 An injunction removing that barrier would leave only routine financing and subsidy steps that courts need not speculate about when the project is as detailed as this one.31
MHDC has standing to assert its own rights in the rezoning dispute.32
Whether an individual plaintiff has standing to assert an Equal Protection claim arising from the denial of rezoning?33
An individual plaintiff satisfies standing by showing that official action has thwarted a specific housing opportunity.34 Relief would create a substantial probability of obtaining the desired housing nearer employment without relying on generalized grievances or speculation about third-party actions.35
Yes. Respondent Ransom, a Black resident working in Arlington Heights, alleged he would qualify for and likely move to Lincoln Green because it is closer to his job than his current home twenty miles away in Evanston.36 The denial directly prevented that opportunity, and a favorable ruling would create a substantial probability the project would proceed.37
The individual plaintiff has standing to assert the Equal Protection claim.38
Whether the Village's denial of the rezoning request violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?39
Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to establish an Equal Protection violation.40 Disproportionate impact alone is insufficient, though it may serve as a starting point.41 Courts must examine the historical background, sequence of events, procedural and substantive departures, and legislative history to determine whether discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor.42
No. The decision bore a heavier impact on minorities who comprised forty percent of eligible income groups yet only eighteen percent of the area population.43 Yet the area had been zoned R-3 since 1959, the rezoning followed ordinary procedures with extra hearings granted, the buffer policy had been applied consistently in prior cases, and no statements by officials indicated racial motivation.44 The evidence therefore failed to show discriminatory purpose as a motivating factor.45
The Village's denial did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.46
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall concurred in Parts I-III of the Court's opinion.47 He believed the proper result would be to remand this entire case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and today's opinion.48 The Court of Appeals is better situated than this Court to reassess the significance of the evidence developed below in light of the standards set forth.49
It can also determine whether the interests of justice require further District Court proceedings directed toward those standards.50
Justice White dissented from the decision to reverse rather than remand.51 He noted that the Court of Appeals had decided the case before Washington v. Davis and therefore lacked the benefit of that precedent.52 In his view the Court should have vacated the judgment and remanded so the lower court could apply the new standard in the first instance.53
A remand was especially appropriate because a remand was already required on the Fair Housing Act claim in any event.54