542 U.S. 656 (2004)
In 1998 Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act after the Supreme Court had invalidated the Communications Decency Act in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.1 COPA imposes criminal penalties of a $50,000 fine and six months in prison on any person who knowingly posts for commercial purposes World Wide Web content that is harmful to minors.2 The statute defines material harmful to minors through a three-part test that incorporates contemporary community standards, patently offensive depictions of sexual acts or lewd exhibitions, and a lack of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.3 It supplies an affirmative defense to anyone who restricts minors' access by requiring credit cards, adult access codes, digital age certificates, or other feasible reasonable measures.4
Respondents, a group of Internet content providers and organizations concerned with free speech, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and sought a preliminary injunction.5 After receiving testimony from witnesses on both sides, the District Court in 1999 granted the injunction.6 The court found that COPA would burden some protected adult speech and that blocking and filtering software constituted a plausible less restrictive alternative that might prove at least as effective.7
The Government appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed the injunction, initially on the ground that COPA's community-standards language rendered the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed that holding in Ashcroft I, and remanded for further consideration.9 On remand the Third Circuit again affirmed, this time concluding that COPA was not narrowly tailored, was overbroad, and was not the least restrictive means available.10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time.11 The record before the District Court included a 1999 factfinding that no evidence had been presented on the percentage of time filtering technology was over- or underinclusive.12 It also included an estimate that roughly 40 percent of harmful-to-minors content originated overseas.13 A congressionally created Commission on Child Online Protection report issued in 2000 assigned higher effectiveness scores to server- and client-based filters than to credit-card or adult-ID verification. The District Court's findings were made in February 1999, and the case reached the Supreme Court after two trips through the Court of Appeals.14
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the District Court's grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of COPA?15
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumed invalid under the First Amendment, and the Government bears the burden of proving that any such restriction is narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means of serving a compelling interest.16 On review of a preliminary injunction, appellate courts apply the abuse of discretion standard; if the Government fails to show that proposed less restrictive alternatives would be less effective, the injunction must be upheld to avoid chilling protected speech.17
Yes. The Government failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that COPA is the least restrictive means available.18 The record established that blocking and filtering software could restrict minors' access to harmful material at least as effectively.19 It imposed far fewer burdens on protected adult speech.20 The District Court specifically found that filters operate at the receiving end.21 They allow adults to disable them.22 They reach foreign-origin content that COPA cannot reach.23 They avoid any criminal penalties or chilling effect on speakers.24 The Commission report confirmed that filters received higher effectiveness ratings than age-verification methods.25 Because the Government introduced no evidence showing that filters would be less effective, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.26 The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed that decision.27
Substantial practical considerations also supported upholding the injunction.28 The five-year gap between the District Court's 1999 findings and Supreme Court review meant the factual record was outdated.29 Remand would permit updating on current technology and additional statutes such as the Dot Kids domain.30 Allowing the injunction to stand pending trial therefore preserved the status quo without disrupting any prosecutions while requiring the Government to meet its full constitutional burden.31
The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the District Court's grant of a preliminary injunction because the Government failed to prove that COPA is the least restrictive means of protecting minors from harmful online material.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but emphasized two additional constitutional defects.33 He maintained that COPA's reliance on contemporary community standards is independently fatal.34 The least tolerant community could dictate what is criminal for the entire World Wide Web audience.35 He further stressed that COPA's criminal penalties of up to $50,000 fines and six months imprisonment per violation, coupled with only an affirmative defense for age screening, impose an especially heavy burden on protected speech.36
Even full compliance with verification measures cannot guarantee immunity from prosecution.37 Attaching criminal sanctions to the nebulous category of material harmful to minors chills legitimate expression far more than civil regulation would.38 Stevens joined the majority's less-restrictive-means analysis while underscoring that criminal enforcement is an inappropriate substitute for parental oversight.39
Justice Scalia dissented, contending that strict scrutiny should not apply at all.40 He argued that the commercial pornography regulated by COPA constitutes pandering, which receives no First Amendment protection.41 Because the statute targets only material deliberately designed to appeal to the prurient interest for profit, and because such pandering could be banned entirely without constitutional difficulty, COPA's more limited restrictions raise no serious First Amendment concern.42
Scalia therefore would have upheld the statute without requiring the Government to prove it is the least restrictive means.43
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist And Justice O'connor
Justice Breyer dissented, concluding that COPA satisfies strict scrutiny when properly construed.44 He maintained that the statute's definitions limit its reach to legally obscene material.45 They reach only a narrow band of borderline-obscene content.46 This imposes at most a modest burden on adults through age-verification screens.47 The screens cost little and are already standard industry practice.48 Breyer argued that filtering software, part of the status quo, suffers from underblocking.49 It imposes high cost to families.50 It cannot protect children outside the home.51 It overblocks valuable material.52
Adding COPA's age-verification requirement would therefore significantly advance the compelling interest in protecting minors without imposing substantial burdens.53 He criticized the majority for demanding proof that no imaginable alternative exists and for undervaluing Congress's careful response to prior precedent.54