556 U.S. 662 (2009)
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the FBI dedicated more than 4,000 special agents and 3,000 support personnel to an investigation that by September 18 had received more than 96,000 tips or potential leads from the public.1 In the ensuing months the FBI questioned more than 1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks or to terrorism in general.2 Of those individuals, 762 were held on immigration charges, and a 184-member subset of that group was deemed to be of high interest to the investigation and held under restrictive conditions designed to prevent communication with the general prison population or the outside world.3
Javaid Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim, was arrested in November 2001 by agents of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service on charges of fraud in relation to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United States.4 Pending trial, he was housed at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York.5 In January 2002 he was designated a person of high interest and placed in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit, where detainees were kept in lock-down 23 hours a day and spent the remaining hour outside their cells in handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer escort.6
Iqbal pleaded guilty to the criminal charges, served a term of imprisonment, and was removed to Pakistan.7 He then filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against 34 current and former federal officials, including former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, as well as 19 John Doe corrections officers.8 The complaint concentrated on his treatment while confined to the ADMAX SHU and alleged that petitioners designated him a person of high interest on account of his race, religion, or national origin.9
The complaint alleged that the FBI under Mueller’s direction arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of the September 11 investigation, that the policy of holding post-September-11 detainees in highly restrictive conditions until cleared by the FBI was approved by Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in the weeks after September 11, and that petitioners each knew of, condoned, and willfully agreed to subject Iqbal to harsh conditions solely on account of his religion, race, and national origin.10 It named Ashcroft as the principal architect of the policy and identified Mueller as instrumental in its adoption, promulgation, and implementation.11
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state sufficient allegations showing their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct.12 The District Court denied the motion.13 Petitioners brought an interlocutory appeal, and while the appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.14 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the Court of Appeals had subject-matter jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine to review the District Court’s denial of petitioners’ motion to dismiss?17
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral-order doctrine, a district-court order is immediately appealable if it finally determines a claim of right separable from the merits, is too important to be denied review, and would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.18 An order denying qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage meets these criteria because it conclusively determines the official’s right not to stand trial or face discovery burdens.19
Yes. The District Court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds after accepting all allegations as true under the Conley standard.20 Petitioners took an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without questioning jurisdiction.21 The order turned on a pure question of law, rejected the immunity defense, and required petitioners to bear the burdens of litigation.22
These characteristics place the order within the narrow class of immediately appealable collateral orders.23 The Supreme Court therefore possessed jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals’ decision.24
The Court of Appeals possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal.25
Whether respondent’s complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief against petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)?26
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief.27 A complaint must plead sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim plausible on its face rather than merely consistent with liability.28 Legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of elements receive no presumption of truth; only well-pleaded facts are assumed true, after which the court determines whether they plausibly give rise to relief.29
No. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the FBI dedicated more than 4,000 special agents and 3,000 support personnel to an investigation that by September 18 had received more than 96,000 tips.30 In the ensuing months the FBI questioned more than 1,000 people, held 762 on immigration charges, and designated 184 as high-interest detainees subject to restrictive conditions. Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was arrested in November 2001 on fraud and conspiracy charges, housed at the Metropolitan Detention Center, designated high-interest in January 2002, and confined to the ADMAX SHU under 23-hour lockdown.
After pleading guilty and removal to Pakistan, Iqbal filed a Bivens action alleging that Ashcroft and Mueller adopted a policy of harsh confinement solely on account of race, religion, and national origin.31 The complaint asserted that Ashcroft was the principal architect and Mueller was instrumental in approving the policy of holding post-September-11 detainees in restrictive conditions until cleared. These statements are conclusory labels that mirror the formulaic recitals rejected in Twombly and receive no presumption of truth.32
The remaining factual allegations—that the FBI under Mueller arrested thousands of Arab Muslim men and that Ashcroft and Mueller approved restrictive conditions—are consistent with a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose of investigating the attacks perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers linked to al Qaeda.33 Because the well-pleaded facts do not plausibly suggest that petitioners acted with discriminatory purpose rather than for neutral investigative reasons, the complaint fails Rule 8.34
Respondent’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim against petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Souter
Justice Breyer agreed with the dissenting view that the Court’s interpretation of Twombly and Rule 8 was unnecessary.36 He emphasized that trial courts already possess case-management tools to protect high-level officials asserting qualified immunity.37 A district court can structure discovery by beginning with lower-level defendants before deciding whether to permit discovery concerning higher-level officials.38
In his view, neither the briefs nor the majority opinion demonstrated that these existing tools were inadequate to prevent unwarranted interference with governmental functions.39 For that reason, as well as the reasons set forth in Justice Souter’s opinion, Justice Breyer would have affirmed the Second Circuit.40
Whether the pleading standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly applies outside the antitrust context to this discrimination claim?41
Yes. Although Twombly arose in an antitrust setting, its interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) was not limited to that context.44 The rule itself applies to every civil action, and the plausibility standard derived from it therefore controls whether a complaint alleging unconstitutional discrimination by federal officials states a claim for relief.45
The Twombly pleading standard applies to this Bivens discrimination action.46