459 U.S. 519, 103 S. Ct. 897, 74 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1983)
The California State Council of Carpenters and the Carpenters 46 Northern Counties Conference Board filed a class-action complaint.1 The suit was brought together with numerous affiliated local unions and district councils.2 The defendants included Associated General Contractors of California, Inc., approximately 250 of its named contractor members, and 1,000 unidentified co-conspirators.3
The two named plaintiffs were affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO.4 They represented more than 50,000 workers employed in carpentry, drywall, piledriving, and related trades throughout California.5 For over twenty-five years the Union and Associated had been parties to successive multiemployer collective-bargaining agreements.6 The wages and benefits under those agreements exceeded $750 million per year.7 Roughly 3,000 additional contractors had signed separate memorandum agreements binding them to the same master contracts.8
The amended complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to abrogate and weaken the collective-bargaining relationship.9 Paragraph 24 specifically charged that the defendants advocated and induced nonmembers to refuse collective-bargaining relationships with the Union.10 It also charged that defendants coerced owners of land and construction contracts to hire non-signatory contractors and subcontractors.11 Defendants further induced members and memorandum contractors to enter subcontracts with nonunion firms.12
Paragraph 25 asserted that the purpose and effect of these activities were to weaken the trade of unionized contractors and to restrain the free exercise of the Union's own business activities.13 The plaintiffs sought $25 million in damages.14 After receiving two sets of briefs and hearing lengthy oral argument, including argument following the Supreme Court's decision in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, the District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the federal antitrust claim.15 The order was filed August 4, 1975, and an amended order was entered September 10, 1975.16 The Union filed its notice of appeal on October 9, 1975, without seeking to amend the complaint further.17 More than five years later, on November 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the antitrust claim.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard argument on October 5, 1982.19
Whether the unions' amended complaint sufficiently alleges that they were injured in their business or property by reason of an antitrust violation within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act?20
Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes treble damages for any person injured in business or property by reason of an antitrust violation, but recovery is limited by factors drawn from common-law proximate cause principles, including the nature of the plaintiff's injury and whether it matches the type Congress sought to redress, the directness or indirectness of the causal chain, the speculative character of damages, the risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment, and the presence of more direct victims better positioned to enforce the laws.21
No. The unions were neither consumers nor competitors in the restrained construction contracting market.22 Their organizational and representational interests as a bargaining representative are not necessarily served by the competition the Sherman Act protects.23 The alleged injury arose only indirectly through coercion directed at landowners and contractors that first affected unionized subcontractors and only then reached the unions' business activities.24 Damages remained highly speculative because the complaint contained no allegations that any collective-bargaining agreement ended, that union firms lost aggregate market share, that union membership declined, or that dues revenues fell.25 More direct victims, such as the coerced landowners and the affected unionized contractors, existed and could have brought their own actions, reducing the need for remote plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general.26
Allowing the unions' claim would therefore require courts to untangle overlapping harms and apportion damages among multiple levels of the distribution chain.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the plain language of section 4 extends to any person injured by an antitrust violation.30 The unions fit comfortably within that language as the intended victims of the alleged restraint.31 He argued that common-law tort principles permit recovery by the intended victim of an intentional wrong even when the harm travels through intermediate steps.32
No risk of duplicative recovery existed here because lost union dues constitute a distinct injury not recoverable by either the unionized firms or their employees.33 Marshall further contended that any difficulty in proving the amount of damages or the precise causal link does not justify dismissal on the pleadings.34 Plaintiffs need only produce a reasonable estimate.35
Summary judgment remains available if evidence ultimately fails to support the claim.36