473 U.S. 234 (1985)
Douglas James Scanlon suffers from diabetes mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In 1978, Atascadero State Hospital denied him employment as a graduate student assistant recreational therapist solely because of his physical handicaps. Scanlon filed this action in November 1979 against Atascadero State Hospital and the California Department of Mental Health in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. He alleged violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and state fair employment laws, seeking compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief.1
The District Court granted the petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint in January 1980 on the ground that the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in 1982, but on the different ground that Scanlon had failed to allege that a primary objective of the federal funds received by the defendants was to provide employment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone.2
On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment. It held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action because the State, by participating in and receiving funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, had implicitly consented to be sued. The decision conflicted with rulings from the First and Eighth Circuits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.3
Whether the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against states and state agencies seeking retroactive monetary relief under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?4
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State in federal court unless the State waives its immunity or Congress abrogates that immunity pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Yes. Scanlon filed this action against Atascadero State Hospital and the California Department of Mental Health seeking compensatory relief for the hospital's 1978 refusal to hire him as a graduate student assistant recreational therapist solely because of his handicaps, alleging a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.6
Section 504 prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.7 Section 505 makes available the remedies set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of federal assistance.8 The statutory text contains no unmistakable language indicating that Congress intended to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.9
The Eleventh Amendment bars Scanlon's suit against the state defendants seeking retroactive monetary relief.10
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, And Stevens
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the legislative history of section 504 confirms that Congress intended to impose a legal obligation on the States not to discriminate against the handicapped.11 He noted that Congress intended to make available against the States whatever remedies were available against other entities.12 Brennan argued that the Court's requirement of unmistakable statutory language is a special rule of statutory draftsmanship designed as a hurdle to keep disfavored suits out of federal court.13
The requirement is not a genuine effort to determine congressional intent.14 The doctrine rests on flawed premises and misguided history that improperly obstructs Congress's lawmaking power.15
Whether the State of California waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity through article III, section 5, of the California Constitution?16
A State's constitutional provision constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity only if it specifies the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.17
No. Article III, section 5, of the California Constitution provides that suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law.18
This provision does not specifically indicate the State's willingness to be sued in federal court.19 It appears simply to authorize the legislature to waive the State's sovereign immunity. In the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to federal-court jurisdiction, the provision does not constitute a waiver of the State's constitutional immunity.20
Article III, section 5, of the California Constitution does not waive California's Eleventh Amendment immunity.21
Whether Congress abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting the Rehabilitation Act?22
Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute itself.23
No. The Rehabilitation Act provides remedies for violations of section 504 by any recipient of federal assistance.24
Yet the statute contains no unmistakable expression of congressional intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.25 When Congress chooses to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically in the statutory language.26 A general authorization for suit against any recipient of federal assistance falls short of that requirement.27
Congress did not abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting the Rehabilitation Act.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissent in full.29 He added that the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases spring from the same soil as the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence recently abandoned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.30 Blackmun stated that the intuition underlying the majority's approach is no truer to the federal structure or to a proper view of congressional power than was the approach underlying National League of Cities v. Usery.31
The shield afforded the States cannot be reconciled with the federal system envisioned by the Constitution.32
Whether a state consents to suit in federal court by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act?33
A State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by participating in programs funded under a federal statute unless the statute manifests a clear intent to condition participation on the State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity.34
No. The Court of Appeals held that the State consented to suit by participating in and receiving funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act because the Act addresses the States as express intended recipients of federal assistance.35
The mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish consent to suit in federal court.36 The Rehabilitation Act falls far short of manifesting a clear intent to condition participation on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity.37
A State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act.38
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented and joined Justice Brennan's opinion.39 Further study persuaded him that both Edelman v. Jordan and Hans v. Louisiana can properly be characterized as egregiously incorrect.40 He explained that his earlier adherence to stare decisis had been overcome by the Court's own lack of restraint in expanding sovereign immunity.41
Additional study made clear that a fresh examination of the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence would produce benefits that far outweigh the consequences of further unraveling the doctrine of stare decisis.42
Joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, And Stevens
Justice Brennan further dissented on the consent issue by noting that the Court's doctrine improperly exempts States from compliance with laws that bind every other legal actor in the Nation.43 He maintained that the Eleventh Amendment does not impose a substantive limit on congressional power to create private rights of action against the States when acting within its Article I or other enumerated powers.44 The doctrine rests on a mistaken historical premise that the Constitution or the Eleventh Amendment embodied a principle of state sovereign immunity as a limit on federal judicial power.45
Recent research shows the Framers never intended to constitutionalize such immunity.46 The Amendment's narrow language was meant only to correct the state-citizen diversity interpretation in Chisholm v. Georgia.47 Brennan concluded that neither Article III nor the Eleventh Amendment limits Congress's ability to authorize suits against States for violations of federal law.48