536 U.S. 304 (2002)
Daryl Renard Atkins and William Jones abducted Eric Nesbitt at gunpoint from a convenience store parking lot in August 1996. They robbed him of cash on his person, drove him to an ATM in his pickup truck where cameras recorded additional withdrawals, and then took him to a deserted area where they shot him eight times despite his pleas for his life.1
Jones and Atkins both testified during the guilt phase of Atkins’s trial in Virginia state court. Each confirmed most details of the incident but blamed the other for firing the fatal shots; the jury found Jones’s more coherent and credible testimony sufficient to convict Atkins of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder.2
At the penalty phase, the defense presented forensic psychologist Dr. Christine S. H. Hammond, who had evaluated Atkins through interviews with people who knew him, a review of school and court records, and administration of a standard intelligence test yielding a full-scale IQ of 59, and who concluded that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded.3 The prosecution presented a psychiatrist who evaluated Atkins and concluded he was not mentally retarded but instead possessed average intelligence and suffered from antisocial personality disorder; the jury sentenced Atkins to death.4
The Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. At resentencing the same expert testimony was presented, the jury again imposed death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, finding the record supported the jury’s determination that Atkins was not mentally retarded.5
Whether the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded defendant violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments?6
The Eighth Amendment explicitly prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments and must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.7 The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.8 Since Penry v. Lynaugh, many States have enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons, and the large number of States prohibiting such executions provides powerful evidence that society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.9
Yes. The rule requires examination of legislative trends since Penry together with an independent assessment of culpability and procedural fairness.10 In the established facts Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder after the August 1996 incident in which he and William Jones abducted Eric Nesbitt, robbed him, and shot him eight times.11 At the penalty phase Dr. Christine S.
H. Hammond testified that Atkins had a full-scale IQ of 59 and was mildly mentally retarded.12 The state's expert concluded he possessed average intelligence.13 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence after a second hearing.14
Sixteen states enacted bans after Penry.15 The consensus that mentally retarded offenders possess diminished capacities in reasoning, judgment, and impulse control applies directly to Atkins.16 His documented impairments reduce both the retributive and deterrent value of the death penalty while increasing the risk of unreliable capital proceedings.17
The imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded defendant violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Scalia And Thomas
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that no national consensus deprives the states of power to impose the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders who remain competent to stand trial and understand their punishment.19 He maintained that the majority's assessment of legislative judgment more closely resembled a post hoc rationalization than an objective inquiry.20 Only legislation and jury practices constitute proper objective indicia.21
Rehnquist further objected to reliance on foreign laws, professional organizations, and opinion polls as inconsistent with federalism and precedent that treats American conceptions of decency as dispositive.22
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist And Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that the decision lacks support in the text, history, or current social attitudes regarding the Eighth Amendment.23 He argued that the count of eighteen states falls far short of the consensus required in prior cases.24 The recent vintage of the legislation undermines any claim of settled national judgment.25
The Court is simply substituting its own views for those of the people.26 Scalia also highlighted practical risks of feigned retardation, the traditional role of juries in weighing mental capacity as a mitigating factor, and the absence of any constitutional basis for converting a mitigating circumstance into a categorical exemption.27