494 U.S. 652 (1990)
In June 1985 Michigan scheduled a special election to fill a vacancy in the Michigan House of Representatives.1 The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, a nonprofit Michigan corporation comprising more than 8,000 members three-quarters of whom are for-profit corporations, sought to use its general treasury funds to place a newspaper advertisement supporting a specific candidate.2 The Chamber's general treasury is funded through annual dues required of all members and its bylaws set forth purposes including promoting economic conditions favorable to private enterprise, analyzing and disseminating information about laws of interest to the business community, training and educating members, fostering ethical business practices, and making expenditures for political purposes.34
The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibits corporations from making contributions and independent expenditures in connection with state candidate elections.5 Mich. Comp. Laws § 169.254(1) (1979). Corporations may make such expenditures only from a separate segregated fund funded by voluntary contributions from the corporation's employees, stockholders, or members.6 § 169.255. The Act defines an expenditure as a payment of money or anything of ascertainable monetary value for goods, materials, services, or facilities in assistance of or in opposition to the nomination or election of a candidate, and an independent expenditure as one not made at the direction of or under the control of another person.7
The Chamber had established and funded a separate political fund but wished to use general treasury funds for the advertisement, which would have constituted an independent expenditure.8 The Michigan Attorney General advised that the expenditure would violate the statute and be punishable as a felony under § 169.254(5).9 The Chamber brought suit in Federal District Court seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the Act and arguing that the restriction violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments both on its face and as applied to the Chamber.10
The District Court upheld the statute.11 643 F. Supp. 397 (WD Mich. 1986). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.12 856 F. 2d 783 (1988). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and granted certiorari.1314
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Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the First Amendment protects the right of all speakers to express their views and that the identity of the speaker should not matter.15 He contended that the Michigan statute is a direct restriction on core political speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny and that the state's interest in leveling the playing field is not a compelling interest but rather an impermissible interest in restricting speech based on the wealth of the speaker.16
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Scalia, dissented on the ground that the Court's decision rests on the flawed premise that the government may restrict speech based on the speaker's corporate identity.17 He argued that the Michigan statute is a content-based restriction on political speech that must be subjected to strict scrutiny and that the statute cannot survive that scrutiny because the state has not shown that the statute is necessary to prevent corruption. He also noted that the PAC option does not save the statute because it imposes significant burdens on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
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Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's opinion and wrote separately to explain his views.18 He noted that the Michigan law is not an across-the-board prohibition on political participation by corporations but merely requires those corporations wishing to make independent expenditures in support of candidates to do so through segregated funds or political action committees rather than directly from their corporate treasuries. He emphasized that the requirement is designed to avert the danger that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace and that the resources in the treasury of a business corporation are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas.
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Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion to emphasize that the First Amendment does not protect the right of corporations to participate in elections on the same terms as natural persons.19 He noted that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to extend the full panoply of constitutional rights to artificial entities and that the use of the corporate form to amass wealth and then deploy that wealth in the political process poses unique dangers that justify regulation. He also observed that the distinction between individual expenditures and individual contributions that the Court identified in Buckley v. Valeo should have little, if any, weight in reviewing corporate participation in candidate elections.