180 P.2d 888 (Cal. 1947)
Gene Autry was a motion picture actor dramatizing western or cowboy roles.1 Republic Productions, Inc. was a producer of western photoplays.2
On September 22, 1938, the parties entered into a written agreement.3 The defendant engaged the plaintiff's services as an actor in ten photoplays during one year commencing July 1, 1938.4 The plaintiff was to receive $6,000 for each of the first two and $10,000 for each of the remaining eight.5 Four successive one-year options were granted to the defendant to extend the contract.6 Each option year required eight photoplays annually with an annual increase of $1,000 per picture.7
The defendant exercised the first three options.8 This brought the expiration of employment under the third option to March 6, 1943.9 On May 11, 1942, the parties executed a further written agreement.10 That agreement granted the defendant an additional option for one year at $15,000 per photoplay.11 It contained paragraph 24 providing that in the event the artist should be required to serve in the armed forces pursuant to the Selective Service Act the parties would agree upon their mutual rights and obligations in view of such military service.12
Autry was ordered to report for physical examination on April 20, 1942.13 He enlisted in the Army on July 26, 1942.14 At that time five plays remained to be photographed under the third option.15 The defendant exercised the fourth option of the 1938 agreement and the additional option of the 1942 agreement.16 On March 3, 1944, the defendant notified the plaintiff that it elected to extend performance under the fourth option for a period equal to that of the plaintiff's military service.17
On June 17, 1944, the plaintiff served notice of termination of the agreements by reason of military service.18 While still serving in the armed forces he filed the present action on June 27, 1944 for a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties under their agreements.19 The trial court's decision was rendered in February 1945 and entered March 20, 1945.20 The plaintiff's discharge from military service took place in July 1945.21 The trial court entered judgment declaring that the contracts had not been terminated.22 Military service suspended performance for a time equal to the period of service.23 After discharge the plaintiff would be bound to perform the remaining photoplays under the third and fourth options of the 1938 agreement and the additional option of the 1942 agreement.24 The plaintiff appealed from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California.25
Whether the plaintiff's military service terminated the employment contracts between the parties?26
Temporary impossibility due to military service suspends rather than terminates performance under Restatement of Contracts sections 454 and 462.27 This rule applies unless the parties have expressly contracted otherwise with respect to that contingency.28 In that case the special provision controls over general option or suspension clauses.29
Yes. The established facts show that Autry enlisted on July 26, 1942, after the May 11, 1942 agreement inserted paragraph 24 specifically addressing military service and requiring the parties to agree on mutual rights and obligations.30 The defendant exercised the fourth option and the additional option.31 On March 3, 1944 the defendant notified Autry of an extension equal to the period of service.32
Autry served notice of termination on June 17, 1944.33 Because the parties had foreseen and contracted regarding military service in paragraph 24, the doctrine of temporary impossibility does not apply to revive the original terms after failure to agree.34
Whether paragraph 24 of the May 11, 1942 agreement required the parties to reach a new agreement regarding their rights and obligations upon the plaintiff's entry into military service?37
A contractual provision that the parties will agree upon rights and obligations in the event of a specified contingency is not a naked agreement to agree.38 When part of an integrated contract it must be given the meaning and effect the written words and parties' conduct plainly indicate.39 It operates as a modification that abrogates prior inconsistent terms upon occurrence of the contingency.40
Yes. The established facts establish that the May 11, 1942 agreement was executed after Autry was placed in Class 1-A.41 It contained paragraph 24 stating that in the event of military service the parties would agree upon their mutual rights and obligations in view of such service.42 Prior to execution the parties conferred.43
Autry proposed a termination clause that was rejected.44 Paragraph 24 was accepted as a compromise to leave the question open.45 Their subsequent conduct, including attempts to photograph plays during service and later negotiations for a new contract upon discharge, confirms that paragraph 24 was intended to control and to require a fresh agreement rather than automatic continuation of the 1938 terms.46
Whether the defendant's March 3, 1944 notice validly extended the term of the 1938 contract?49
An option to extend performance upon the artist's failure or incapacity applies only to voluntary refusal or to specifically enumerated disabilities such as illness or physical impairment.50 It does not encompass military service when the parties have inserted a separate, specific provision addressing that contingency.51
No. The established facts show that the March 3, 1944 notice purported to extend the fourth option for a period equal to Autry's military service.52 Yet paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 of the 1938 agreement addressed suspension for war, disability, or voluntary failure to perform.53 None of which the defendant invoked or could invoke for military service.54 Paragraph 24 of the later agreement was the specific provision governing military service and therefore controlled.55
It rendered the general extension notice ineffective once the parties failed to agree under paragraph 24.56
The defendant's March 3, 1944 notice did not validly extend the term of the 1938 contract because paragraph 24 superseded the general option provisions.57
Whether delayed performance of the contracts after the plaintiff's discharge would impose a substantially greater burden upon him?58
Even if military service creates temporary impossibility, revival of a personal-service contract is inequitable and will not be ordered when time is of the essence to the artist's peak popularity and earning capacity.59 Economic conditions have materially changed.60 The parties expressly provided for renegotiation of terms upon the contingency of military service.61
No. The established facts demonstrate that Autry was at the peak of his popularity as a western actor when he enlisted.62 The contracts recognized the unique and time-limited nature of his services.63 The defendant held annual options precisely to protect against changes in popularity or conditions.64 Paragraph 24 was inserted to allow both parties to reassess equities after military service, including the diminished purchasing power of the dollar.65
The trial court's finding that delayed performance imposed no substantially greater burden ignored these factors and the parties' own recognition that time and economic change were material.66