377 U.S. 360 (1964)
In 1962 approximately 64 members of the faculty, staff, and student body at the University of Washington filed a class action in federal district court against the university president, members of the board of regents, and the state attorney general.1
The plaintiffs sought a declaration that two Washington statutes were unconstitutional and an injunction against their enforcement.2 The statutes required state employees and teachers to execute specific oaths as a condition of employment.3
The first statute, enacted in 1931, applied to teachers and required them to swear to support the constitutions and laws of the United States and Washington, promote respect for the flag and institutions, and maintain undivided allegiance to the government.4 The second statute, from 1955, applied to all state employees and incorporated definitions from the 1951 Subversive Activities Act, requiring them to disclaim being a subversive person or member of subversive organizations, including the Communist Party.5
On May 28, 1962, the university president issued a memorandum requiring employees to take one of two oath forms.6 Oath Form A for teaching personnel included the 1931 oath and disclaimers under the 1955 act, while Oath Form B applied to other employees.7 Both forms subjected the statements to perjury penalties.8
A three-judge district court was convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.9 After trial, the court dismissed the action, upholding the 1955 oath but declining to adjudicate the 1931 oath without prior state court interpretation.10 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.11
The case followed earlier challenges to the 1955 oath by some of the same appellants in Nostrand v. Little proceedings, which had reached the Supreme Court multiple times but did not address the vagueness issue presented here.12
Whether the oath requirements imposed by Chapter 377, Laws of 1955, and the underlying statutory definitions from the Washington Subversive Activities Act of 1951 are unconstitutionally vague on their face?13
A statute that forbids or requires conduct in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.14 The Court held this principle in Connally v. General Construction Co.15 It applied the principle to loyalty oaths in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction where the oath lacked terms susceptible of objective measurement.1617
Yes. The 1955 statute requires the approximately 64 University of Washington appellants who are faculty, staff, and students to execute Oath Form A or Oath Form B as directed in the May 28, 1962 memorandum.18
They must disclaim being a subversive person under definitions that reach any person who advises, teaches, abets, or advocates any act intended to overthrow or alter the constitutional form of government by revolution, force, or violence.19 The statute declares the Communist Party a subversive organization.20
These terms as applied to the University employees could reasonably be read to encompass teaching or advising known members of the Party.21 They could also reach attending international scholarly conventions with participants from Communist countries or supporting causes also backed by the Party.22 The statute provides no objective standard for what conduct is forbidden.23 The same vagueness that invalidated the Cramp oath therefore invalidates this one because the statutory language fails to inform those required to take the oath what the State actually commands or forbids.24
The 1955 oath requirements and their underlying statutory definitions are unconstitutionally vague on their face.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Harlan
Justice Clark dissented on the merits of the 1955 oath.26 He argued that the statutory language is not unconstitutionally vague.27 The language is identical to that upheld against vagueness challenges in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections.28
It is also similar to the Smith Act language sustained in Dennis v. United States.29 The majority's parade of hypothetical coverage reaches fanciful interpretations that the text does not support.30 The oath proscribes only knowing advocacy or assistance in violent overthrow.31
Whether the oath requirements imposed by Chapter 103, Laws of 1931, are unconstitutionally vague on their face?32
A statute that forbids or requires conduct in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held this principle in Connally v. General Construction Co. It applied the principle to loyalty oaths in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction where the oath lacked terms susceptible of objective measurement.
Yes. The 1931 statute requires teaching personnel at the University of Washington to swear that they will by precept and example promote respect for the flag and institutions of the United States and Washington.33
They must also maintain undivided allegiance to the government.34 These terms as applied to the appellants through Oath Form A could reach a teacher who refuses to salute the flag for religious reasons.35 They could reach a teacher who criticizes the design of the state flag.36 They could reach a teacher who advocates repeal of constitutional amendments or abolition of federal agencies such as the House Committee on Un-American Activities.37 The oath therefore fails to provide an ascertainable standard.38 It abuts upon sensitive First Amendment freedoms in the same manner condemned in Cramp.39
The 1931 oath requirements are unconstitutionally vague on their face.40
Whether a federal court should abstain from adjudicating the constitutionality of the 1931 oath statute pending an authoritative construction by the Washington state courts?41
Abstention is a discretionary exercise of equity powers.42 It is not automatic whenever a federal court faces a doubtful issue of state law.43 Abstention is inappropriate when construction of the state statute would not avoid or fundamentally alter the federal constitutional question.44 It is also inappropriate when delay would prejudice rights protected by the First Amendment.45
No. The issue whether the oath's terms such as 'precept,' 'example,' 'allegiance,' and 'institutions' have one or several alternative meanings does not turn on a choice between one or several alternative meanings.46
It instead involves an indefinite number of possible interpretations of those terms.47 An abstract declaratory judgment construction by the Washington courts would not eliminate the vagueness.48 It would likely require extensive adjudications under varied factual situations before constitutional certainty could be achieved.49
The prior Nostrand v. Little proceedings already demonstrate that remitting the litigants to state court would further protract a case already pending for nearly two years.50 The vagueness continues to inhibit the exercise of First Amendment freedoms by the University of Washington employees.51
A federal court should not abstain from adjudicating the constitutionality of the 1931 oath statute.52
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Harlan
Justice Clark dissented on the abstention question.53 He would have affirmed the district court's decision to decline adjudication of the 1931 oath.54 He noted the absence of a concrete factual showing of actual injury.55
He would have first afforded the Washington Supreme Court an opportunity to construe the statute.56 He agreed with the district court that equitable and declaratory relief against state action is committed to the sound discretion of the federal court.57 He concluded that abstention was proper here.58