912 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1990)
In 1972 Larry Kohlmeyer founded Metal-Prep of Houston, Inc., a Texas corporation that treated and painted steel coils used in the metal building industry.1
The coils consisted of strips approximately 2000 feet long, twenty-four to forty-two inches wide, and twelve to sixteen gauges thick.2 Metal-Prep operated a 250-foot processing line that unwound each coil, ran it through a wheelabrator, applied paint in a roll-coater, cured the paint in a gas oven, cooled the steel in a quench tank, slit it to width, and recoiled the finished product.3
On June 20, 1979, Barry & Sewall Industrial Supply Co. submitted quotation no. 1276 offering to design and manufacture a complete high-density infrared heating and control system for $112,176.4 Metal-Prep accepted the quotation on July 26, 1979, subject to three additions: incorporation of guides to protect the heating elements, written acknowledgment that no burned spots would occur when the line stopped, and written acknowledgment that coatings would be cured at 125 feet per minute on 16-gauge steel and 100 feet per minute on 14-gauge steel forty-eight inches wide.
Barry & Sewall responded on August 3, 1979, confirming the additions and stating that 14-gauge steel would run at 90 to 100 feet per minute and 16-gauge steel at approximately 115 to 120 feet per minute. Barry & Sewall shipped the infrared oven to Metal-Prep's facility in June 1980.5
From the outset the oven ran at slower line speeds than anticipated and the coil broke an inordinate number of infrared bulbs.6 After Metal-Prep reported the problems, Barry & Sewall inspected the oven and on July 1, 1980, promised various changes.7 On August 27, 1980, Barry & Sewall agreed to redesign and build a new infrared oven at no charge, but never delivered it after its sales engineer most involved in the project left the company in October 1980.
On March 3, 1981, Barry & Sewall sued Metal-Prep in Minnesota state court seeking the unpaid contract balance of $16,826.40 plus $27,446.64 for additional parts and materials.8 Metal-Prep had already paid $97,084.60 under a lease financing arrangement.9 Metal-Prep removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on March 20, 1981.10
On August 12, 1981, Metal-Prep sent a registered letter stating that it considered the system nonconforming, revoked acceptance, and demanded return of the purchase price plus incidental and consequential damages.11 On August 14, 1981, Metal-Prep filed its answer and counterclaimed for $767,083.42 in damages arising from alleged breaches of express and implied warranties.12
The district court bifurcated the proceedings.13 The first phase, tried in July 1985 before Judge Magnuson, addressed liability and resulted in a May 31, 1986 decision.14 The second phase on causation and damages began before Judge Magnuson in October 1987, was interrupted by his recusal on November 13, 1987, was reassigned to Judge Murphy, and concluded on November 1, 1988.
On June 28, 1989, Judge Murphy entered judgment awarding Metal-Prep $433,000 after offsets.15 Barry & Sewall appealed the judgment and Metal-Prep cross-appealed several rulings.
Whether Metal-Prep effectively revoked its acceptance of the infrared oven?16
Under Minnesota U.C.C. § 336.2-608, a buyer may revoke acceptance of goods whose nonconformity substantially impairs their value.17 Acceptance must have occurred on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be cured and it was not seasonably cured. Alternatively, acceptance may occur without discovery of the nonconformity if induced by difficulty of discovery or seller assurances. Revocation must occur within a reasonable time before substantial change in condition and is not effective until the seller is notified. Upon effective revocation the buyer has the same rights and duties as upon rejection. Continuing use after notice or failure to pursue revocation at trial renders it ineffective and shifts the buyer to breach of warranty remedies under § 336.2-714.
No. Metal-Prep sent a registered letter on August 12, 1981, stating that it considered the system nonconforming, revoked acceptance, and demanded return of the purchase price plus incidental and consequential damages.18 Metal-Prep proceeded to trial exclusively on its counterclaim for breaches of express and implied warranties rather than revocation.19 Neither district judge addressed the revocation letter.20 Metal-Prep continued using the oven for years after the letter while its business grew.21
Because the revocation was not treated as effective by the parties or the trial court and continuing use defeats the theory, the court treats the revocation as ineffective and analyzes the claim solely under the breach of warranty provisions of Minn. Stat. Ann. § 336.2-714.22
Metal-Prep did not effectively revoke its acceptance of the infrared oven.23
Whether Barry & Sewall breached an express warranty concerning line speeds?24
An express warranty is created by any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer that becomes part of the basis of the bargain under Minnesota U.C.C. § 336.2-313.25 Once created, the seller must deliver goods that conform to the warranty. Failure to do so constitutes a breach for which the buyer may recover damages under § 336.2-714.
Yes. On July 26, 1979, Metal-Prep accepted quotation no. 1276 subject to written acknowledgment that coatings would be cured at 125 feet per minute on 16-gauge steel and 100 feet per minute on 14-gauge steel forty-eight inches wide. Barry & Sewall responded on August 3, 1979, confirming that 14-gauge steel would run at 90 to 100 feet per minute and 16-gauge steel at approximately 115 to 120 feet per minute, thereby creating an express warranty of line speeds that formed part of the basis of the bargain.26 The oven shipped in June 1980 operated from the outset at slower line speeds than warranted.
Barry & Sewall never delivered the promised replacement oven, establishing breach of the express warranty of line speeds.
Barry & Sewall breached an express warranty concerning line speeds.27
Whether the district court properly awarded damages for increased energy costs resulting from modifications to the oven?28
Under Minnesota U.C.C. § 336.2-714(3), incidental and consequential damages may be recovered in a proper case.29 Damages must be proved with reasonable certainty and must flow directly from the breach.30 Where the district court found no express warranty regarding energy costs and the buyer recognized that energy costs could at least double with the new electric oven, an award for increased energy costs from later-added heating units cannot be sustained.31
No. Judge Magnuson found that Metal-Prep did not refer to reduced energy costs in its purchase order and Barry & Sewall made no reference to energy costs in its August 3, 1979 response letter, with any negotiation discussions too vague to create an express warranty on energy costs.32 Judge Murphy awarded $210,000 after finding that extra heating units installed to increase line speeds raised the monthly energy bill by $5,000. The absence of any warranty promise on energy costs, combined with Kohlmeyer's recognition that energy costs could at least double, means the added units cannot provide the basis for an energy-use damages award traceable to the line-speed breach.33
The district court did not properly award damages for increased energy costs resulting from modifications to the oven.34
Whether Metal-Prep was entitled to consequential damages for lost profits from mid-1984 through 1985?35
Minnesota U.C.C. § 336.2-715(2)(a) permits consequential damages for loss resulting from general or particular requirements of which the seller had reason to know at contracting, provided the loss could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise. A buyer must act reasonably to mitigate its own loss.36 Failure to purchase a replacement oven when resources and financing were available bars recovery of lost profits that cover would have prevented.37
No. Judge Murphy found that Metal-Prep lost profits in excess of $200,000 from mid-1984 to November 1985 due to the oven's limited capacity.38 Metal-Prep had the resources and ability to purchase a $320,000 replacement oven by early 1984.39 Its gross profit rose from $345,923 in 1980 to $1,314,329 in 1984 and its debt-to-equity ratio was significantly reduced.40 Because Metal-Prep could have prevented the lost profits by cover in early 1984 but waited until November 1985, the evidence does not support the award of $200,000 in consequential damages for lost profits.41
Metal-Prep was not entitled to consequential damages for lost profits from mid-1984 through 1985.42
Whether the district court properly applied Minnesota law to the contract dispute?43
In a diversity case removed from state court, the forum state's choice-of-law rules determine which state's substantive law governs.44 The district court may apply Minnesota law when the contract was negotiated and performed in part in Minnesota, the seller is a Minnesota corporation, and the parties agreed to bifurcation under Minnesota procedural rules.45
Yes. The district court determined on March 19, 1985, that Minnesota law should apply rather than Texas law after considering the contacts with Minnesota, including Barry & Sewall's Minnesota operations, the negotiation of quotation no. 1276, and the shipment from Minnesota.46 Metal-Prep cross-appealed this ruling but the Eighth Circuit found the choice-of-law determination and all other cross-appeal arguments without merit after full review of the record.47
The district court properly applied Minnesota law to the contract dispute.48