478 U.S. 385 (1986)
The North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, a division of the School of Agriculture and Life Sciences at North Carolina State University, delivered programs in agriculture, home economics, 4-H youth development, and community resource development through a hierarchy of state, district, and county personnel.1
Until August 1, 1965, the Service maintained two racially separate branches, with the Negro branch employing only black agents who served only black farmers, homemakers, and youth while the white branch employed no black agents.2 Salaries for all agents were set jointly by the Extension Service and the county boards of commissioners, with funding shared among federal, state, and county sources, and the Extension Service screened applicants and prepared budget requests for county shares.3
On August 1, 1965, the two branches merged in response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, yet salary disparities between white and black employees that had existed before the merger continued afterward.4 In 1971 private petitioners, consisting of Extension Service employees, recipients of its services, Extension Homemaker Club members, and parents of 4-H youths, filed suit against Extension Service officials and county commissioners from three counties alleging racial discrimination in employment and services under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 2000d, and 7 U.S.C. § 341 et seq.5
The United States intervened in April 1972 under Title VI and Title IX.6 It later amended its complaint to add Title VII claims.7 The private petitioners amended on the eve of trial to add Title VII as well.8
The District Court declined to certify proposed plaintiff and defendant classes on three separate occasions.9 After a lengthy trial that examined virtually every aspect of the Extension Service's employment practices and service delivery, the District Court entered judgment for respondents in all respects, finding that petitioners had not proved a pattern or practice of discrimination and ruling against each individual claim.10 Both the private petitioners and the United States appealed only selected issues, including salaries, promotions to county chairman, merit-pay procedures, the racial composition of 4-H and Extension Homemaker Clubs, and class certification.11 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court in full in 1984.12
Petitioners had presented multiple regression analyses for the years 1974, 1975, and 1981 that used variables such as race, education, tenure, and job title and showed average annual salary shortfalls for black employees of $331 in 1974 and $395 in 1975.13 They also introduced Extension Service regressions from 1971 and 1974, individual salary comparisons, and evidence that post-merger equalization efforts had not eliminated the gaps.14 Statistics on the clubs showed that in 1980, 39.1 percent of 4-H Clubs remained all white and, in racially mixed communities, 880 single-race clubs persisted with only a 1.3 percent decline since 1972.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1985.16
Whether the Extension Service had a duty under Title VII to eradicate salary disparities between white and black employees that originated prior to March 1972?17
Each week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII. This holds regardless of the fact that the pattern began prior to the effective date of Title VII. A pattern or practice that would have constituted a violation of Title VII, but for the fact that the statute had not yet become effective, became a violation upon Title VII's effective date. To the extent an employer continued to engage in that act or practice, it is liable under that statute.18
Yes. The North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service maintained two racially separate branches until the August 1, 1965 merger, after which salary disparities between white and black employees continued.19 The Extension Service became subject to Title VII on March 24, 1972, yet the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's finding by holding that pre-1972 disparities imposed no duty of eradication.20 The Extension Service admitted it had not made all adjustments necessary to eliminate the disparity, and evidence showed that post-merger equalization efforts proved insufficient.21
Because the Extension Service continued the pre-Act discriminatory pay structure after Title VII's effective date, liability attached under the statute even though recovery for pre-1972 acts remained unavailable.22
The Extension Service had a duty under Title VII to eradicate salary disparities between white and black employees that originated prior to March 1972.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by All Other Members Of The Court
Justice Brennan's concurrence emphasized that the Court of Appeals plainly erred in holding that the pre-Act discriminatory difference in salaries did not have to be eliminated.24 The concurrence noted that the Extension Service was under an obligation to eradicate salary disparities based on race that began prior to the effective date of Title VII.25 The Court of Appeals' conclusion on this point undermined the rest of its analysis of the District Court opinion.26
The error was too obvious to warrant extended discussion because perpetuating pre-Title VII discrimination after the statute's effective date exposed the Extension Service to liability under Title VII.27
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding petitioners' statistical regression analyses on the ground that they reflected pre-Title VII salary disparities or omitted variables such as county-to-county pay differences?28
While the omission of variables from a regression analysis may render the analysis less probative than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for the major factors must be considered unacceptable as evidence of discrimination.29 Normally, failure to include variables will affect the analysis' probativeness, not its admissibility.30 A plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not prove discrimination with scientific certainty. Rather, his or her burden is to prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.31
Yes. Petitioners presented multiple regression analyses for 1974, 1975, and 1981 using variables of race, education, tenure, and job title that showed average annual salary shortfalls for black employees of $331 in 1974 and $395 in 1975.32 The Court of Appeals rejected these regressions because they reflected pre-Act discrimination and omitted county-to-county variations.33 The Extension Service's own 1971 and 1974 regressions produced similar results, and respondents' 1975 regression using the same model yielded a statistically significant racial effect of $384 that increased to $475 when quartile rank was added.34
The Court of Appeals' insistence on inclusion of every measurable variable was erroneous because such regressions remain admissible and probative when they account for major factors.35
The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding petitioners' statistical regression analyses on the ground that they reflected pre-Title VII salary disparities or omitted variables such as county-to-county pay differences.36
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring petitioners' evidence beyond the regression analyses when reviewing the District Court's salary findings?37
If the defendants have not succeeded in having a case dismissed on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case, and have responded to the plaintiffs' proof by offering evidence of their own, the factfinder then must decide whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated a pattern or practice of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.38 This determination is subject to the clearly-erroneous standard on appellate review.39
Yes. In addition to the regressions, petitioners introduced evidence of pre-Act salary discrimination, respondents' ineffectual post-merger equalization attempts, and individual salary comparisons between similarly situated black and white employees.40 The United States presented unrebutted evidence that black employees were not located disproportionately in low-contributing counties.41 Witness testimony confirmed continued disparities.42
The Court of Appeals focused solely on the regressions and failed to examine this additional evidence in light of the entire record.43
The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring petitioners' evidence beyond the regression analyses when reviewing the District Court's salary findings.44
Whether, on remand, the Court of Appeals must examine all record evidence relating to salary disparities under the clearly-erroneous standard?45
Yes. The Court of Appeals must examine all record evidence relating to salary disparities under the clearly-erroneous standard because the District Court's conclusion that petitioners failed to prove a pattern or practice of discrimination is reviewable only for clear error.48 The appellate court previously concentrated its analysis solely on the quartile ranking system and the regressions while disregarding pre-Act discrimination and additional evidence.49 On remand it must consider the entire evidence, including the regressions, individual comparisons, and testimony, to decide whether the District Court's findings were clearly erroneous.50
On remand, the Court of Appeals must examine all record evidence relating to salary disparities under the clearly-erroneous standard.51
Whether the reasons given by the Court of Appeals for refusing to certify a class of black Extension Service employees support denial of certification?52
The claims here were not asserted solely against the counties; they were asserted also against the Extension Service.53 As against the Extension Service, at least, it is clear that the claims of the named plaintiffs were typical of other black employees who may have been paid less or denied promotion to chairman.54
No. The Court of Appeals held that because salaries derive from federal, state, and county sources the claim of a potential plaintiff against one county would not be typical of the claim of another potential plaintiff against a different county.55 This reasoning does not support denial because the claims were asserted against the Extension Service as well as the counties.56 The District Court found that salaries are determined jointly by the Extension Service and the county boards, and the Memorandum of Understanding confirms that all appointments are worked out jointly.57 The claims of the named plaintiffs were therefore typical of other black employees with respect to the Extension Service.58
The reasons given by the Court of Appeals for refusing to certify a class of black Extension Service employees do not support denial of certification.59
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly refused to certify a class of defendant counties?60
To have a proper class of defendants in a case such as this there must be either a statewide rule or practice so that relief is available if the rule or practice is invalid, or the adjudication with respect to a member of a defendant class must as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members of the class as provided in FRCP 23(b)(1)(B).61 Whether an individual county acted intentionally with the Extension Service in setting salaries or in selecting County Chairmen in a discriminatory manner is an issue that once decided with respect to a particular county could not be dispositive of the interests of the other members of the class.62
Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly refused to certify a class of defendant counties because there was no evidence of any standardized practice among the one hundred separate counties to deprive anyone of rights solely because of race.63 Adjudication with respect to one county could not be dispositive of the interests of the other members of the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), and the private petitioners suggested no theory to support a different result.64
The Court of Appeals correctly refused to certify a class of defendant counties.65
Whether the Constitution or applicable Department of Agriculture regulations require the Extension Service to take steps beyond adopting a neutral admissions policy to disestablish segregation in its 4-H and Extension Homemaker Clubs?66
In administering a program regarding which the recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or national origin, the recipient must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination.67 The mere continued existence of single-race clubs does not make out a constitutional violation when the Service has discontinued its prior discriminatory practices and has adopted a wholly neutral admissions policy.68
No. Prior to 1965 the Extension Service maintained segregated 4-H and Extension Homemaker Clubs.69 After the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the Service discontinued its segregated club policy and opened any club to any otherwise eligible person regardless of race.70 The District Court found no evidence of discrimination since that time in either services or membership and concluded that any racial imbalance was the result of wholly voluntary and unfettered choice of private individuals.71 The Service instructs agents to encourage formation of new clubs without regard to race, publishes its policies in the media, and conducts all club work above the local level on a fully integrated basis.72
Neither the Constitution nor the regulations require more than these steps to disestablish segregation in the Clubs.73
Neither the Constitution nor applicable Department of Agriculture regulations require the Extension Service to take steps beyond adopting a neutral admissions policy to disestablish segregation in its 4-H and Extension Homemaker Clubs.74
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Powell, Justice Rehquist, And Justice O'connor
Justice White's concurrence affirmed the Court of Appeals in rejecting the allegations of discrimination in the operation of 4-H and Homemaker Clubs.75 The concurrence stressed that the Service discontinued its segregated club policy and opened any club to any otherwise eligible person regardless of race.76 The District Court found that any racial imbalance was the result of wholly voluntary and unfettered choice, and the mere continued existence of single-race clubs does not make out a constitutional violation.77
The concurrence concluded that neither the Constitution nor the regulations require more than what the District Court and the Court of Appeals found the Service has done.78
Joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, And Justice Stevens
Justice Brennan's dissent in part argued that the Court rejects the private petitioners' claim that the Extension Service had a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment and the regulations promulgated under Title VI to desegregate the 4-H and Extension Homemaker Clubs.79 The dissent maintained that the USDA regulation requiring affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination is not satisfied by a mere neutral admissions policy.80 The Constitution requires no less than affirmative steps to eliminate the vestiges of official discrimination, including the legacy of single-race Clubs that still exist.81