548 U.S. 521 (2006)
Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections maintains the Long Term Segregation Unit to house its roughly forty most incorrigible inmates.1 Inmates enter at level 2, the stricter of the unit's two tiers, and may advance to level 1 after ninety days depending on behavior.2 Level 2 inmates remain confined to their cells twenty-three hours each day, receive one family visit per month, make phone calls only in emergencies, and have no commissary privileges.3 Under the challenged policy they also receive no newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs, though they may keep legal and personal correspondence, religious and legal materials, two library books, and writing paper.4 Level 1 inmates regain access to one newspaper and five magazines.5
In 2001 Ronald Banks, then held in LTSU level 2, filed a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.6 Banks claimed the level 2 policy violated the First Amendment.7 The district court certified a plaintiff class of similarly situated inmates and assigned the case to a magistrate for discovery.8
Banks's counsel deposed Deputy Superintendent Joel Dickson.9 The parties introduced prison policy manuals and related documents into the record.10 The Secretary moved for summary judgment and filed a statement of undisputed facts together with the Dickson deposition.11 Banks filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that relied on the same undisputed facts, did not contest any of the Secretary's factual assertions, and did not request a trial.12
The magistrate recommended granting the Secretary's motion and denying Banks's.13 The district court accepted the recommendation.14 The Third Circuit reversed the award of summary judgment to the Secretary.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether a Pennsylvania prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to inmates in Long Term Segregation Unit level 2 violates the First Amendment?17
Under Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, restrictive prison regulations are permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and courts owe substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators as noted in Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U. S. 126.18
No. The Secretary demonstrated a valid rational connection between the policy and the legitimate penological interest of motivating better behavior among particularly difficult prisoners by depriving them of the last remaining privileges.19 This connection is set forth in the undisputed facts statement and Dickson's deposition describing the incentives for inmate growth and discouraging backsliding.20 The record shows that level 2 inmates are the worst of the worst who have flunked out of other programs, and the policy applies only to them, with the possibility of advancement after ninety days.21 Banks failed to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, instead filing a cross-motion relying on the same facts.22
The Third Circuit placed too high an evidentiary burden on the Secretary while offering too little deference to prison officials' judgment.23 Therefore, the policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and does not violate the First Amendment.24
The Pennsylvania prison policy does not violate the First Amendment.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment while rejecting the Turner framework entirely in favor of the approach he outlined in his Overton concurrence.26 He emphasized that judicial scrutiny of prison regulations carries grave risks, as illustrated by subsequent violence after Johnson v. California.27 Under his view, a term of imprisonment in Pennsylvania carries an implied delegation to prison officials to impose disciplinary restrictions, and the history of incarceration as punishment supports the conclusion that the sentence terminated any unfettered right to magazines, newspapers, and photographs.28
Because the regulations fall within the Department's discretion and align with traditional conceptions of imprisonment, respondent's challenge must fail.29
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the record remains insufficient to establish as a matter of law that the challenged policy is reasonably related to either security or rehabilitation.30 He stressed that the deprivation theory of rehabilitation lacks any limiting principle and would justify virtually any restriction.31 The indefinite duration of LTSU-2 confinement, with most inmates remaining there for over two years, indicates an exaggerated response rather than a measured one.32
Because reasonable minds could differ on the connection between the ban and the asserted goals, and because the policy approaches state-sponsored mind control by isolating inmates from news and personal memories, a full trial is required before summary judgment can be granted.33
Justice Ginsburg dissented separately to highlight the plurality's misapplication of summary judgment standards.34 She noted that the Secretary's evidentiary showing is too slim and conclusory to demonstrate entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, consisting only of rote assertions about behavior modification.35 Traditional deference to prison officials does not permit courts to abdicate their duty to protect retained constitutional rights, and all inferences must still favor the nonmoving party.36
By allowing prison officials to prevail through bare professional judgment statements, the plurality effectively insulates regulations from meaningful review and denies prisoners a fair opportunity to test the rationality of severe deprivations.37