520 U.S. 154 (1997)
The Klamath Project is a series of lakes, rivers, dams, and irrigation canals in northern California and southern Oregon.1 It was undertaken pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902.2 The project is administered by the Bureau of Reclamation.3 In 1988 the Lost River Sucker and Shortnose Sucker were listed as endangered.4 In 1992 the Bureau notified the Fish and Wildlife Service that operation of the project might affect the two species.5 After formal consultation, the Service issued a biological opinion.6 It concluded that long-term operation of the Klamath Project was likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the suckers.7 The opinion identified reasonable and prudent alternatives that included maintenance of minimum water levels on Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs.8 The Bureau later notified the Service that it intended to operate the project in compliance with the biological opinion.9
Petitioners are two Oregon irrigation districts that receive Klamath Project water and the operators of two ranches within those districts. They filed suit against the director and regional director of the Service and the Secretary of the Interior.10 The complaint alleges that the Bureau has followed essentially the same procedures for storing and releasing water from the reservoirs throughout the twentieth century.11 No scientifically or commercially available evidence shows the sucker populations have declined or will decline as a result of project operations.12 No such evidence shows the water-level restrictions will benefit the fish.13 The complaint further states that petitioners use the reservoirs and related waterways for recreational, aesthetic, commercial, and irrigation purposes.14 The restrictions recommended in the biological opinion will substantially reduce the quantity of available irrigation water and irreparably damage those uses.15
The complaint sets forth three relevant claims for relief.16 The first and second claims allege that the Service's jeopardy determination and the minimum water levels violated section 7 of the ESA.17 The third claim alleges that the imposition of minimum water elevations constituted an implicit critical-habitat determination that violated section 4 of the ESA because it failed to take economic impact into account.18 Each claim also asserts that the action violated the APA prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful agency action.19
The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that petitioners' recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the ESA.20 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that only plaintiffs who allege an interest in the preservation of endangered species fall within that zone.21 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.22
Whether the zone-of-interests test applies to claims brought under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA?23
The zone-of-interests test is a prudential limitation on standing that applies unless Congress expressly negates it.24 The ESA citizen-suit provision in 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) uses the phrase 'any person' and includes fee-shifting and intervention provisions that demonstrate intent to expand standing to the full extent permitted by Article III.25
No. The Supreme Court examined the text of 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) and compared it to narrower formulations in other environmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act.26 The broad authorization for 'any person' to sue, combined with the elimination of amount-in-controversy requirements and the provision for recovery of litigation costs, shows that Congress intended to negate the zone-of-interests limitation for ESA citizen suits.27 This textual and structural evidence applies equally to claims alleging over-enforcement as to claims alleging under-enforcement.28
The zone-of-interests test does not apply to claims brought under the ESA citizen-suit provision.29
Whether petitioners have standing under the zone-of-interests test to challenge the biological opinion when their interests are economic rather than environmental?30
Under the zone-of-interests test as articulated in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, a plaintiff's interest is within the zone if it is arguably protected or regulated by the particular statutory provision whose violation forms the basis of the complaint.31 The test looks to the specific provision rather than the overall purpose of the statute.32
Yes. Petitioners' economic interest in Klamath Project irrigation water is protected by the requirement in 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) that agencies use the best scientific and commercial data available.33 This provision is intended in part to prevent erroneous jeopardy determinations that cause needless economic dislocation.34 The complaint alleges that no scientific evidence supports the jeopardy finding or the minimum water levels.35 Those restrictions will substantially reduce available irrigation water for petitioners' recreational, aesthetic, commercial, and irrigation uses.36
Petitioners possess standing under the zone-of-interests test because their economic interests fall within the zone protected by the best-data provision of section 7 of the ESA.37
Whether petitioners satisfy the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability requirements of Article III standing?38
Article III requires a concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent, a causal connection fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.39 At the pleading stage, general factual allegations suffice and specific facts are presumed.40
Yes. Petitioners allege that they receive irrigation water from Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs. The Bureau will abide by the minimum water levels in the biological opinion. Those levels will substantially reduce the quantity of available irrigation water and irreparably damage their uses.41
The biological opinion has a powerful coercive effect on the Bureau.42 It alters the legal regime.43 It supplies an incidental take statement that functions as a permit.44 It exposes the Bureau and its employees to civil and criminal penalties for unauthorized takes.45
Therefore the injury is fairly traceable to the Service's opinion and would likely be redressed by setting the opinion aside.46
Petitioners satisfy the Article III requirements of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.47
Whether the ESA citizen-suit provision authorizes judicial review of claims that the Secretary violated section 1536?48
Section 1540(g)(1)(A) authorizes suit against any person alleged to be in violation of the ESA.49 Subsection (C) separately authorizes suit against the Secretary only for failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under section 1533.50 The term 'violation' in subsection (A) does not encompass the Secretary's maladministration of the statute.51
No. Petitioners' first and second claims allege violations of section 1536 by the Service in issuing the biological opinion.52 Allowing such claims under subsection (A) would render subsection (C) superfluous. It would contradict the careful limitation of subsection (C) to duties under section 1533.53 The structure of the citizen-suit provision therefore precludes review of the Secretary's implementation of section 1536 under subsection (A).54
The ESA citizen-suit provision does not authorize judicial review of petitioners' section 1536 claims.55
Whether the ESA citizen-suit provision authorizes judicial review of claims that the Secretary failed to consider economic impacts when designating critical habitat under section 1533?56
Section 1540(g)(1)(C) permits suit against the Secretary for failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under section 1533.57 Section 1533(b)(2) imposes a categorical requirement that the Secretary take into consideration economic impact when designating critical habitat, even though the ultimate decision whether to exclude an area is discretionary.58
Yes. Petitioners' third claim alleges that the biological opinion's minimum water levels constituted an implicit critical-habitat determination that failed to consider economic impact as required by section 1533(b)(2).59 The duty to consider economic impact is nondiscretionary.60 The omission of required procedures is therefore reviewable under subsection (C).61
The ESA citizen-suit provision authorizes judicial review of petitioners' section 1533 claim.62
Whether the biological opinion constitutes final agency action reviewable under the APA?63
Agency action is final for APA purposes when it marks the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process and when rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will flow.64 A biological opinion with an incidental take statement alters the legal regime by authorizing takes that comply with its terms and conditions and exposing noncompliant action agencies to penalties.65
Yes. The biological opinion and incidental take statement at issue here are the consummation of the Service's consultation process. They carry direct legal consequences because they supply a permit-like authorization for incidental takes.66 They impose nondiscretionary terms that the Bureau must follow or risk substantial civil and criminal liability.67 This distinguishes the opinion from purely advisory reports that lack binding effect on the action agency.68
The biological opinion constitutes final agency action reviewable under the APA.69