468 U.S. 420 (1984)
On the evening of March 31, 1980, Trooper Williams of the Ohio State Highway Patrol observed respondent's car weaving in and out of a lane on Interstate Highway 270.1 After following the car for two miles, Williams forced respondent to stop and asked him to get out of the vehicle. When respondent complied, Williams noticed that he was having difficulty standing. At that point, Williams concluded that respondent would be charged with a traffic offense and therefore his freedom to leave the scene was terminated.2 Williams then asked respondent to perform a field sobriety test, commonly known as a balancing test, which respondent could not do without falling.3
While still at the scene of the traffic stop, Williams asked respondent whether he had been using intoxicants. Respondent replied that he had consumed two beers and had smoked several joints of marijuana a short time before.4 Respondent's speech was slurred, and Williams had difficulty understanding him. Williams thereupon formally placed respondent under arrest and transported him in the patrol car to the Franklin County Jail.5
At the jail, respondent was given an intoxilyzer test to determine the concentration of alcohol in his blood. The test did not detect any alcohol whatsoever in respondent's system.6 Williams then resumed questioning respondent to obtain information for the Alcohol Influence Report. Respondent answered affirmatively a question whether he had been drinking. When then asked if he was under the influence of alcohol, he said, "I guess, barely."7 Williams next asked respondent to indicate on the form whether the marihuana he had smoked had been treated with any chemicals.8 In the section of the report headed "Remarks," respondent wrote, "No ang[el] dust or PCP in the pot. Rick McCarty."9
At no point in this sequence of events did Williams or anyone else tell respondent that he had a right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, and to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one.10 Respondent was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4511.19, a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to six months with mandatory incarceration for a minimum of three days.11 Respondent moved to exclude the incriminating statements he had made to Trooper Williams regarding his consumption of alcohol and marijuana on the ground that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to his interrogation.12 When the trial court denied the motion, respondent pleaded "no contest" and was found guilty. He was sentenced to 90 days in jail, 80 of which were suspended, and was fined $300, $100 of which were suspended.13
On appeal to the Franklin County Court of Appeals, the court rejected respondent's constitutional claim and affirmed his conviction, relying on a prior decision by the Ohio Supreme Court holding that the rule announced in Miranda is not applicable to misdemeanors.14 The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed respondent's appeal on the ground that it failed to present a substantial constitutional question.15 Respondent then filed an action for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which dismissed the petition.16 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
Whether Miranda v. Arizona governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation by a suspect accused of a misdemeanor traffic offense?19
The Miranda doctrine requires that a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation be warned of the right to remain silent, that any statement may be used against him, and of the right to counsel, and these safeguards apply whenever a person is taken into custody and questioned, regardless of whether the offense is classified as a misdemeanor or felony.20
Yes. The rule that Miranda warnings must precede custodial interrogation applies without regard to offense severity because the inherent coercion of custody does not diminish for lesser crimes.21 In the established facts, after Trooper Williams formally arrested respondent and transported him to the Franklin County Jail, Williams questioned respondent about drinking and influence without any warnings, eliciting affirmative answers and the written remark about the marijuana. These post-arrest facts at the jail establish a custodial setting requiring warnings, rendering the statements inadmissible.22
The post-arrest statements made at the jail were inadmissible because respondent received no Miranda warnings before the custodial interrogation there.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment on the misdemeanor issue.24 The Court answers that question in the affirmative and explains why that answer requires that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be affirmed.25 He declines to join the discussion of roadside questioning.26
That discussion is not necessary to the disposition of the case.27 The Court of Appeals did not pass on the question.28 The certiorari petition was limited to the misdemeanor issue.29
Stevens stresses the cardinal rule that a court should not pass on a constitutional question in advance of the necessity of deciding it.30
Whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop constitutes custodial interrogation for the purposes of the doctrine enunciated in Miranda?31
A motorist detained in a routine traffic stop is not in custody for Miranda purposes because the detention is presumptively temporary and brief, occurs to some degree in public view, involves only one or two officers, and does not exert the police-dominated pressures of stationhouse interrogation, so warnings are not required until the motorist is formally arrested or subjected to equivalent restraints.32
No. The rule that ordinary traffic stops are not custodial applies here.33 The stop lasted only a short time.34 A single officer asked a modest number of questions and requested a balancing test visible to passing motorists.35 Williams never told respondent his detention would continue.36
In the established facts, respondent was stopped for weaving, performed the test poorly, admitted drinking and marijuana use at the scene, and was then arrested.37 Nothing prior to the formal arrest created restraints comparable to custody.38 These facts show the prearrest roadside statements were admissible.39
Respondent was not in custody for Miranda purposes until formally arrested, so the statements made at the scene of the traffic stop were admissible against him.40