327 U.S. 251 (1946)
Petitioners, the owners of the Jackson Park motion picture theatre in Chicago, filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on July 28, 1942, against several motion picture distributors and exhibitors, including RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., Loew's, Inc., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, Paramount Pictures, Inc., Vitagraph, Inc., Balaban & Katz Corporation, and Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corporation.1 The complaint alleged that the respondents had conspired since a date prior to November 1, 1936, to distribute feature films so that theatres affiliated with the respondents obtained earlier and more desirable runs than independent theatres such as petitioners' Jackson Park Theatre.2
The release system gave Loop theatres owned by respondents the first run for one week or longer, followed by a three-week clearance, then A, B, and C pre-release weeks, with general release occurring ten weeks after the Loop run.3 Petitioners were limited to the first week of general release regardless of the rental price offered, while competing theatres operated by respondents received the earlier pre-release runs.4
To prove damages over the five-year period from July 27, 1937, to July 27, 1942, petitioners compared their net receipts with those of the competing Maryland Theatre, which had access to the C pre-release run and exceeded petitioners' receipts by $115,982.34.5 Petitioners also compared their receipts during the five-year period with those from the preceding four years, showing a decline of $125,659 after adjusting for the end of Bank Night promotions, a change that coincided with the advent of double features preventing access to unexhibited films.6
The district court tried the case on damages alone after reserving the injunction issue, and the jury awarded $120,000, which the court trebled.7 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed on the ground that the damage evidence was insufficient and directed judgment for the respondents.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the sufficiency of the damage proof.9
Whether the evidence of damage is sufficient to support the verdict?10
In antitrust damage actions under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, when the defendant's unlawful conduct has made more precise proof of damages impossible, the jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data, and the wrongdoer bears the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created. This principle was applied in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359, and Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, where comparisons of profits before and after the restraint, or between affected and unaffected operations, sufficed even though exact counterfactual profits could not be shown.11
Yes.
Petitioners, owners of the Jackson Park motion picture theatre in Chicago, brought suit on July 28, 1942, in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against several motion picture distributors and exhibitors.12 They alleged a conspiracy dating back before November 1, 1936, to distribute films so that affiliated theatres got earlier runs than independents like Jackson Park.13
The release system allowed Loop theatres owned by respondents the first run, followed by three weeks clearance, then A, B, and C pre-release weeks, with general release ten weeks after.14 Petitioners could only get films in the first week of general release, while competitors got pre-release runs.15
To prove damages for the period July 27, 1937 to July 27, 1942, petitioners showed that the Maryland Theatre, a competitor with C pre-release access, had net receipts exceeding theirs by $115,982.34.16 They also showed a decline in their receipts of $125,659 compared to the prior four years, after adjusting for Bank Night, coinciding with double features that eliminated access to unshown films.17
The district court reserved the injunction and tried damages, resulting in a $120,000 jury verdict that was trebled.18 The Seventh Circuit reversed for insufficient damage evidence, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari.19
The Court applied the rule to these facts by holding that the two classes of evidence—comparison of petitioners' receipts with those of the Maryland Theatre and comparison of petitioners' receipts before and after the advent of double features—each independently tended to show that petitioners' inability to obtain films before they had been shown elsewhere adversely affected their receipts.20 The jury could reasonably infer damage from the decline in profits not shown to be attributable to other causes.21 Respondents could not complain of the resulting uncertainty because their own unlawful distribution system had prevented petitioners from proving more precise counterfactual earnings.22
The evidence of damage was sufficient to support the verdict, so the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.23
Related opinions on this issue
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented.24 He agreed that Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359, and Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, should guide the disposition of this case.25 But he concluded that the decisive distinction made in those cases had not been observed in deciding this case.26
He emphasized that proof of legal injury to the individual plaintiff remains the plaintiff's burden and is not automatically established by proof of a public restraint.27 This necessarily involves substantial proof that the petitioners' business would have been more profitable if the distribution of movie films in Chicago had been a free-for-all and if no factor of the scheme that constituted an illegal conspiracy had been in operation, than it was under the conditions that actually prevailed.28
Frankfurter viewed the comparisons as wholly speculative on the question whether petitioners suffered legal injury at all, as opposed to uncertainty merely in the amount of damages once injury is shown.29 It was wholly speculative, as the Circuit Court of Appeals properly held in applying the rule in the Story Parchment Co. case, whether the intake of petitioners would have been more profitable if the distribution of films in Chicago had been left wholly to the haggling of a free market, 150 F.2d 877.30