512 U.S. 687 (1994)
The village of Kiryas Joel in Orange County, New York, is a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of a strict form of Judaism.1 In 1977, the Satmars incorporated the village within the town of Monroe after negotiating boundaries that included only the 320 acres they owned and inhabited.2 The village has a population of about 8,500 today, and its residents interpret the Torah strictly, segregate the sexes outside the home, speak Yiddish primarily, and educate their children in private religious schools, with boys attending the United Talmudic Academy and girls attending Bais Rochel.3
These private schools do not offer special education services to handicapped children, who are entitled to such services under state and federal law.4 Starting in 1984, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District provided these services at an annex to Bais Rochel, but ended the arrangement in 1985 following the Supreme Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Felton and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball.5 Handicapped children from Kiryas Joel were then sent to public schools outside the village, leading most parents to withdraw them due to the children's panic, fear, and trauma from the cultural differences, with some seeking administrative review.6
By 1989, only one child from Kiryas Joel attended Monroe-Woodbury's public schools.7 In response, the New York Legislature passed Chapter 748 of the 1989 New York Laws, which constituted the village of Kiryas Joel as a separate school district with all the powers of a union free school district.8 The new district currently operates only a special education program for handicapped children, serving just over 40 full-time students, while other village children remain in parochial schools.9
Several months before the new district began operations, the New York State School Boards Association and respondents Grumet and Hawk brought an action challenging Chapter 748 under the National and State Constitutions.10 The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs on summary judgment, finding the statute unconstitutional under the Lemon test.11 A divided Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the federal Establishment Clause question while reserving the state constitutional issue.12 The Supreme Court stayed the mandate and granted certiorari.13
Whether the New York statute creating the Kiryas Joel Village School District violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?14
Yes. Chapter 748 delegates the State's discretionary authority over public schools to the qualified voters of the village of Kiryas Joel.18 This group is defined by its character as a religious community of Satmar Hasidim.19 The village boundaries were negotiated to exclude all but Satmars.20
The legislature passed a special Act creating the district despite the state's trend toward consolidating school districts rather than dividing them.21 The resulting district serves primarily Satmar children and has an exclusively Hasidic board.22 This arrangement is tantamount to an allocation of political power on a religious criterion.23 It fails to guarantee neutral employment of governmental power and creates a symbolic union of church and state.24
The New York statute violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurs that the statute violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.26 He emphasizes that the decision rests on the criteria set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, specifically the entanglement and primary effect prongs as applied in Larkin v. Grendel's Den.27 He rejects any suggestion that the ruling signals a departure from those principles.28
Blackmun notes that the opinion relies upon several decisions that explicitly rested on the Lemon criteria.29 He remains convinced of the general validity of the basic principles stated in Lemon, which have guided the Court's Establishment Clause decisions in over thirty cases.30
Joined by Blackmun, Ginsburg
Justice Stevens concurs that the statute establishes religion rather than merely accommodating it.31 He explains that the State responded to the Satmar parents' concerns by creating a school district that supports the sect's interest in segregating itself and preventing its children from associating with neighbors whose ways are different.32 This official support increases the likelihood that the children will remain faithful adherents of their parents' religious faith.33
Stevens observes that the isolation of the children, while protecting them from panic and trauma, also cements their attachment to a particular faith.34 He notes that two-thirds of the school's full-time students are Hasidic handicapped children from outside the village, serving a population defined less by geography than by religion.35
Justice O'Connor concurs in part and in the judgment.36 She concludes that the law singles out a particular religious group for favorable treatment by creating a school district based on religion rather than through neutral criteria applicable to all groups.37 She notes that neutral accommodations are permissible and urges reconsideration of Aguilar v. Felton to allow on-site services at sectarian schools.38
O'Connor stresses that the statute benefits one group based on its religion, making it a legislatively drawn religious classification.39 She explains that the nature of the legislative process makes it impossible to be sure of future neutrality without general legislation.40 O'Connor adds that the 1984 scheme discontinued after Aguilar would be a permissible accommodation if reinstated.41
Justice Kennedy concurs in the judgment on narrower grounds.42 He agrees that the district violates the Establishment Clause because the State drew political boundaries on the basis of religion when it created the district coterminous with the Satmar village.43 He rejects the broader suggestion that an accommodation for a particular religious group is invalid merely because of the risk that the legislature will not grant similar treatment to other groups in the future.44
Kennedy emphasizes that the real vice is the use of religion as a criterion to draw political lines.45 He notes that the village itself was formed under a religion-neutral incorporation scheme, but the school district was created by specific legislation with direct state involvement in religious segregation.46
Joined by Rehnquist, Thomas
Justice Scalia dissents.47 He argues that the statute is a permissible accommodation of the Satmars' cultural and religious practices that does not confer governmental power on a religious institution as such.48 He criticizes the majority for abandoning text and history, for displaying hostility to religion, and for imposing novel procedural requirements that demand up-front assurances of future legislative neutrality.49
Scalia contends that the difference between conferring power on a religious institution and on citizens who share a religion is one of substance, not mere form.50 He maintains that the legislature had a clear secular basis in addressing the unique educational needs of the handicapped Satmar children and that the facially neutral statute should not be invalidated without evidence of religious motivation.51