463 U.S. 60 (1983)
Youngs Drug Products Corp. is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of contraceptives.1 It markets its products primarily through sales to chain warehouses and wholesale distributors, who in turn sell to retail pharmacists.2
In 1979 the Postal Service traced to a wholesaler of Youngs' products an allegation of an unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements.3 The Service warned the wholesaler that the mailing violated 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2).4 Subsequently, Youngs contacted the Service and furnished it with copies of Youngs' three types of proposed mailings, stating its view that the statute could not constitutionally restrict the mailings.5 The Service rejected Youngs' legal argument and notified the company that the proposed mailings would violate § 3001(e)(2).6 Youngs then brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming that the statute as applied to its proposed mailings violated the First Amendment.7 Youngs and its wholesaler were refraining from distributing the advertisements because of the Service's warning.8
The three types of mailings were multi-page, multi-item flyers promoting a large variety of products available at a drugstore, including prophylactics; flyers exclusively or substantially devoted to promoting prophylactics; and informational pamphlets discussing the desirability and availability of prophylactics in general or Youngs' products in particular. The District Court determined that § 3001(e)(2), by its plain language, prohibited all three types of proposed mailings.9 Finding all three types of materials to be commercial solicitations, the court considered the constitutionality of the statute within the framework established by this Court for analyzing restrictions imposed on commercial speech.10 The court concluded that the statutory prohibition was more extensive than necessary to the interests asserted by the Government, and it therefore held that the statute's absolute ban on the three types of mailings violated the First Amendment in 526 F. Supp. 823 (1981).11
Appellants brought this direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252.12 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.13 The statute originated in 1873 as part of the Comstock Act.14 As interpreted by Postal Service regulations, the statutory provision does not apply to unsolicited advertisements in which the mailer has no commercial interest.15 Violations can also trigger criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 1461.16 The informational pamphlets include one entitled "Condoms and Human Sexuality," a 12-page pamphlet describing the use, manufacture, desirability, and availability of condoms, and providing detailed descriptions of various Trojan-brand condoms manufactured by Youngs.17 Another pamphlet is entitled "Plain Talk about Venereal Disease," an eight-page pamphlet discussing at length the problem of venereal disease and the use and advantages of condoms in aiding the prevention of venereal disease, with the only identification of Youngs or its products at the bottom of the last page.18
Whether 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) prohibits the three types of unsolicited mailings proposed by Youngs Drug Products Corp.?19
Section 3001(e)(2) states that any unsolicited advertisement of matter which is designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception is nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by mail, and shall be disposed of as the Postal Service directs.20
Yes. The District Court determined that the statute by its plain language prohibited all three types of proposed mailings.21 The mailings consisted of multi-page, multi-item drugstore flyers promoting a large variety of products available at a drugstore, including prophylactics; flyers exclusively or substantially devoted to promoting prophylactics; and informational pamphlets discussing the desirability and availability of prophylactics.
The facts establish that Youngs furnished copies of these exact materials to the Postal Service after the Service traced an allegation of an unsolicited mailing to a wholesaler and issued a warning.22 The Service notified Youngs that the proposed mailings would violate the statute.23 The statute originated in the Comstock Act of 1873.24 As interpreted by Postal Service regulations, the statute does not apply to unsolicited advertisements in which the mailer has no commercial interest.25 Yet the three categories here all involve commercial promotion of contraceptives.
The statute prohibits the three types of unsolicited mailings proposed by Youngs Drug Products Corp.
Whether the proposed mailings constitute commercial speech entitled to First Amendment protection?26
Commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection if it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. Commercial speech receives less protection than noncommercial speech. The Central Hudson test requires that any regulation directly advance a substantial governmental interest and be no more extensive than necessary.
Yes. The mailings at issue consist of advertisements for condoms and other contraceptive products, informational pamphlets discussing the desirability and availability of condoms, and order forms for the purchase of condoms.27 The parties agree that these constitute commercial speech.28 The informational pamphlets, while containing some discussion of public issues such as venereal disease and family planning, are properly characterized as commercial speech.29
They are conceded to be advertisements and are mailed with order forms.30 The combination of reference to a specific product, economic motivation, and advertising format supports this classification under the facts of Youngs' proposed mass mailings to the public.31 The speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.32 Therefore it receives the qualified but substantial protection accorded to commercial speech.33
The proposed mailings constitute commercial speech entitled to First Amendment protection.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but expressed concern that the Court's opinion might create an impression of a fairly definite category of commercial speech protected by a fairly definite set of rules.34 He noted that advertisements may be complex mixtures of commercial and noncommercial elements.35 This is illustrated by the pamphlet Plain Talk about Venereal Disease which discusses symptoms, risks, and treatment of venereal disease with only brief identification of Youngs at the bottom.36
Stevens would focus on the nature of the challenged regulation rather than rigid labels.37 He would scrutinize the statute in the same manner as a prohibition on unsolicited mailings by an organization with no commercial interest because it restricts speech with a significant noncommercial component.38
Whether the governmental interest in shielding mail recipients from offensive materials justifies the statutory prohibition?
The governmental interest in shielding recipients of mail from materials that they may find offensive is not sufficient to justify a broad suppression of speech. Recipients have the right to opt out under 39 U.S.C. § 3008. The First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the captive audience cannot avoid objectionable speech.
No. The interest in shielding recipients from offensive material carries little weight.39 Under 39 U.S.C. § 3008 recipients can request that their names be removed from mailing lists.40 The Post Office must honor such requests.41 Individuals can avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes or transferring the material from mailbox to trash can.42
The facts show that the statute imposes a total prohibition on the mailing of contraceptive advertisements.43 Parents already exercise substantial control over mail once it enters their mailboxes.44 The short journey from mailbox to trash can is an acceptable burden.45 This renders the blanket ban more extensive than necessary under the established facts of Youngs' proposed mailings.46
The governmental interest in shielding mail recipients from offensive materials does not justify the statutory prohibition.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment but reasoned that the home mailbox has features distinguishing it from traditional public forums.47 Several people within a family may have free access including minor children.48 Not every piece of mail has been solicited.49
He found both asserted interests substantial.50 These include preventing material the recipient may find offensive from entering the home on an unsolicited basis.51 Yet he concluded that the restriction is more extensive than necessary.52
Individuals can avoid the information after one exposure under § 3008.53 A mailed advertisement is significantly less intrusive than a daytime broadcast.54 On balance the restriction on Youngs' commercial speech has not been adequately justified.55
Whether the governmental interest in protecting minors from information about contraceptives justifies the statutory prohibition?56
The governmental interest in protecting minors from information about contraceptives is substantial. A statute is not a narrowly tailored means of serving that interest if it prohibits all unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives regardless of whether they are directed at minors or adults. Less restrictive alternatives such as requiring advertisements to be placed in envelopes would serve the interest without unduly burdening protected speech.
No. Although the interest in aiding parents' efforts to control the manner in which their children become informed about birth control is undoubtedly substantial, the statute provides only the most limited incremental support.57 Parents already exercise substantial control over mail and must cope with external stimuli.58 The ban purges all mailboxes of material entirely suitable for adults.59 This violates the principle that the government may not reduce the adult population to reading only what is fit for children.60
The facts of the three types of proposed mailings, including informational pamphlets on venereal disease prevention, demonstrate that the prohibition is overbroad.61 Narrower restrictions such as those suggested by the District Court would fully serve the interest without the sweeping suppression imposed by the statute.62
The governmental interest in protecting minors from information about contraceptives does not justify the statutory prohibition.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment and emphasized that the statute is also unconstitutional on its face because it is substantially overbroad.63 He agreed that the statute prohibits the mailing of all unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives.64 This includes those not directed at minors and those containing only truthful nonmisleading information.65
The statute therefore sweeps too broadly and chills protected speech.66 Brennan further agreed that the interest in protecting minors while substantial cannot justify the broad suppression at issue here.67 The statute is not the least restrictive means of serving that interest.68
Whether the statute denies addressees the right to receive information that senders have a right to send?69
The addressee's right to receive information is protected by the First Amendment. A blanket prohibition on the mailing of contraceptive advertisements cannot be justified as a means of protecting the addressee's privacy when the sender has a right to send the information.
Yes. The statute is defective because it denies the addressee the right to receive the information that the sender has a right to send.70 The addressee's right to receive mail is protected by the First Amendment.71 The blanket prohibition cannot be justified as a means of protecting privacy when recipients may simply avert their eyes or use the opt-out mechanism under § 3008.72
The facts establish that Youngs and its wholesaler were refraining from distributing the advertisements because of the Service's warning.73 This prevented the flow of truthful information relevant to important social issues such as family planning and the prevention of venereal disease.74 The First Amendment interest served by such speech makes it paramount.75
The statute denies addressees the right to receive information that senders have a right to send.