140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020)
The three cases consolidated before the Supreme Court arose when employers fired long-time employees shortly after the employees revealed their homosexual or transgender status.1
Gerald Bostock worked for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare advocate whose leadership earned the county national awards.2 After a decade with the county, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Influential community members then made disparaging comments about his sexual orientation, and he was fired for conduct unbecoming a county employee.
Donald Zarda worked as a skydiving instructor at Altitude Express in New York for several seasons. After mentioning that he was gay, he was fired days later.
Aimee Stephens worked at R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes in Michigan, presenting as male when hired. After two years she began treatment for gender dysphoria and wrote a letter stating she planned to live and work full-time as a woman. The funeral home fired her before she left for vacation.3
Each employee sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex.4 The Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit employers from firing employees for being gay and dismissed Bostock's suit as a matter of law. The Second Circuit allowed Zarda's claim to proceed on the ground that sexual orientation discrimination violates Title VII. The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Stephens's case regarding transgender status.
Both Zarda and Stephens passed away during the proceedings, but their estates continued to press the claims.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the courts of appeals over the scope of Title VII's protections for homosexual and transgender persons.6
Whether an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual violates Title VII?7
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual because of such individual's sex.8 The ordinary public meaning of the statute's terms at the time of enactment establishes that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex.9 Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex.10
Yes. The rule applies directly to the established facts of these cases. Gerald Bostock worked for Clayton County as a child welfare advocate whose leadership earned national awards.11 After he began participating in a gay recreational softball league, influential community members made disparaging comments about his sexual orientation and he was fired for conduct unbecoming a county employee.12
Donald Zarda worked as a skydiving instructor at Altitude Express for several seasons before mentioning that he was gay and being fired days later.13 Discrimination on the basis of homosexuality requires the employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex, as when an employer fires a male employee for being attracted to men while tolerating the same trait in a female employee.14 Therefore, the terminations of Bostock and Zarda constitute discrimination because of sex under Title VII.15
An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual violates Title VII.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Alito dissented on the ground that the Court's decision constitutes legislation rather than interpretation.17 He argued that in 1964 the term sex referred to biological distinctions between male and female.18 Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not inherently entail discrimination because of sex, as an employer could implement a policy against hiring gays without knowing any applicant's sex.19
Alito emphasized that Congress has repeatedly considered but failed to add sexual orientation to Title VII.20 The Court's approach improperly updates the statute based on current policy views rather than the ordinary meaning at enactment.21
Justice Kavanaugh dissented separately, contending that the proper role of the judiciary is to apply the law as written rather than to amend it.22 He stressed that sexual orientation discrimination has long been understood as distinct from sex discrimination in common parlance, federal statutes, executive orders, state laws, and this Court's precedents.23 Congress, not the Court, should decide whether to prohibit it under Title VII.24
Kavanaugh noted that the first ten courts of appeals to address the issue unanimously concluded that Title VII does not reach sexual orientation discrimination.25
Whether an employer who fires an individual for being transgender violates Title VII?26
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual because of such individual's sex. The ordinary public meaning of the statute's terms at the time of enactment establishes that an employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex. Discrimination on the basis of transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex.27
Yes. The rule applies directly to the established facts of these cases. Aimee Stephens worked at R. G.
& G. R. Harris Funeral Homes presenting as male when hired.28 After beginning treatment for gender dysphoria she wrote a letter stating she planned to live and work full-time as a woman.29
The funeral home fired her before she left for vacation. Discrimination on the basis of transgender status requires the employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex, as when an employer fires a person identified as male at birth for traits it tolerates in a person identified as female at birth.30 Therefore, the termination of Stephens constitutes discrimination because of sex under Title VII.31
An employer who fires an individual for being transgender violates Title VII.32
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Alito dissented on the ground that the Court's decision constitutes legislation rather than interpretation. He argued that in 1964 the term sex referred to biological distinctions between male and female. Discrimination because of transgender status does not inherently entail discrimination because of sex, as the concept of gender identity was essentially unknown at the time of enactment.33
Alito emphasized that Congress has repeatedly considered but failed to add gender identity to Title VII. The Court's approach improperly updates the statute based on current policy views rather than the ordinary meaning at enactment.
Justice Kavanaugh dissented separately, contending that the proper role of the judiciary is to apply the law as written rather than to amend it. He stressed that gender identity discrimination has long been understood as distinct from sex discrimination in common parlance, federal statutes, executive orders, state laws, and this Court's precedents. Congress, not the Court, should decide whether to prohibit it under Title VII.