483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987)
In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, working as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo.1
Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug.2 When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a "gentleman friend" who had some questions to ask about the cocaine.3 In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality of the drug and the price.4 Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase.5 They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse's car to the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car.6
Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned.7 FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner's car in the hotel parking lot.8 In petitioner's car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash.9 Petitioner was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.10 Petitioner was also charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).11 The Government introduced, over petitioner's objection, Angelo Lonardo's telephone statements regarding the participation of the "friend" in the transaction.12
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed.13 The court also found that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.14 Accordingly, the trial court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay.15 Petitioner was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 15 years.16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the admission of the recorded statements and related evidentiary and constitutional questions.18
Whether the Confrontation Clause requires a court to determine the admissibility of a co-conspirator’s hearsay statement under an independent standard of proof that the statement was made?19
The “indicia of reliability” requirement for the admission of hearsay statements not falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception is satisfied when the hearsay statement falls within such an exception.20 Since the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence, no independent inquiry into reliability is required under the Confrontation Clause.21
No. The Court applied the rule from Ohio v. Roberts that no separate reliability inquiry is needed when evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.22 It determined that the co-conspirator exception qualifies as firmly rooted because it has been accepted in American jurisprudence since United States v. Gooding in 1827 and reaffirmed in cases such as Glasser v. United States and United States v. Nixon.23 In the present case the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed between Lonardo and the petitioner after considering both the events in the hotel parking lot and Lonardo’s recorded telephone statements.24 The court then admitted those statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as nonhearsay.25
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.26 The Supreme Court held that this procedure satisfied the Confrontation Clause without any additional independent standard of proof.27 The petitioner’s argument that an independent reliability determination was constitutionally required was therefore rejected because the firmly rooted status of the exception itself supplies the necessary indicia of reliability.28
The Confrontation Clause does not require a court to determine the admissibility of a co-conspirator’s hearsay statement under an independent standard of proof that the statement was made.29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Blackmun joined all but Part III of the majority opinion.30 He agreed that the Confrontation Clause does not require exclusion of the recorded statements at issue in this case.31 He nevertheless dissented from the decision to abandon the corroboration requirement that had long been part of the co-conspirator exception.32
He warned that removal of this safeguard would eliminate one of the few protections against unreliable hearsay offered by the government in conspiracy prosecutions.33
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that a co-conspirator’s statement should not be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) unless it is corroborated by independent evidence of the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy.34 He maintained that the agency rationale underlying the exception breaks down when the statement is used to prove the existence of the conspiracy itself.35 He argued that allowing the statement to bootstrap itself into evidence creates a serious risk of unfair prejudice inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause’s guarantee of reliability in the admission of hearsay evidence.36
Whether the Confrontation Clause requires that a co-conspirator’s statement be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) only if it is corroborated by independent evidence?37
The Confrontation Clause does not require that a co-conspirator’s statement be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) only if it is corroborated by independent evidence.38
No. The Court held that the Confrontation Clause imposes no corroboration requirement beyond the preponderance standard already applied by the trial court under Rule 104(a).39 In this case the District Court explicitly found that the government had established by a preponderance of the evidence both the existence of the conspiracy and that Lonardo’s statements were made in the course and furtherance of it.40 The court relied on the parking-lot events together with the recorded conversation.41 The Court of Appeals affirmed that finding as not clearly erroneous.42
The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court’s determination satisfied constitutional standards without any additional independent-evidence mandate.43 The petitioner’s reliance on Glasser v. United States was rejected because the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 104(a), permit the court to consider the statement itself when making preliminary admissibility determinations.44
The Confrontation Clause does not require that a co-conspirator’s statement be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) only if it is corroborated by independent evidence.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Blackmun dissented from the abandonment of the independent-evidence requirement.45 He contended that the common-law co-conspirator exception had always required proof aliunde and that Rule 801(d)(2)(E) was intended to preserve that safeguard.46 He argued that allowing the statement itself to help establish the conspiracy would eliminate a traditional protection against unreliable hearsay.47
He warned that this change would undermine the exception’s claim to being firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes.
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that independent corroboration of the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy is constitutionally necessary before a co-conspirator’s statement may be admitted.48 He maintained that without this requirement a defendant could be convicted solely on the basis of a single unreliable hearsay statement.49 He argued that this result is inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause’s guarantee of reliability in the admission of hearsay evidence.50
Whether a court may consider the co-conspirator’s statement itself, along with independent evidence, in determining the admissibility of the statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)?51
In determining the admissibility of a co-conspirator’s statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), a court may consider the statement itself, along with independent evidence.52
Yes. The Court interpreted Rule 104(a) to permit the trial judge to consider any evidence, including the hearsay statement itself, when resolving preliminary questions of fact such as the existence of a conspiracy.53 In the present case the District Court considered both the events in the parking lot and Lonardo’s recorded statements when it found by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed and that the statements were made in furtherance of it.54 The Court of Appeals upheld that finding.55
The Supreme Court affirmed that the plain language of Rule 104(a) and Rule 1101(d)(1) authorizes consideration of the statement itself.56 The Court further noted that individual pieces of evidence insufficient in isolation may become probative when corroborated.57 The trial court’s conclusion that the government had established the conspiracy by a preponderance was not clearly erroneous.58
A court may consider the co-conspirator’s statement itself, along with independent evidence, in determining the admissibility of the statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).59
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Blackmun dissented from the holding that Rule 104(a) permits consideration of the statement itself.60 He argued that the legislative history of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) demonstrates Congress intended to retain the common-law independent-evidence requirement unchanged.61 He warned that permitting the statement to be used in this manner would remove a critical safeguard against unreliable hearsay.62
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to clarify that Glasser v. United States still requires some proof aliunde.63 He maintained that the statement may be considered only together with other support, not as the sole basis for its own admissibility. He viewed the Court’s holding as consistent with this limited reading of the bootstrapping rule.64
Whether the admission of nonhearsay evidence of a co-conspirator’s statement violates the Confrontation Clause?65
The admission of nonhearsay evidence of a co-conspirator’s statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause.66
No. The Court held that once a statement qualifies as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) it falls outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause’s protections against hearsay.67 In this case the District Court properly determined that Lonardo’s recorded statements were nonhearsay because they were made by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.68 The Supreme Court affirmed that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of such nonhearsay evidence.69 The Court relied on Tennessee v. Street for the proposition that the Clause is not implicated when the evidence is not hearsay.70
The petitioner’s Sixth Amendment challenge was therefore rejected because the statements were properly classified as nonhearsay.71
The admission of nonhearsay evidence of a co-conspirator’s statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Whether the trial court’s finding that the defendant and the declarant were co-conspirators was clearly erroneous?72
The trial court’s finding that the defendant and the declarant were co-conspirators must be reviewed for clear error, and the finding is upheld if the record contains sufficient evidence to support it by a preponderance.73
No. The Court reviewed the District Court’s factual determination under the clearly erroneous standard.74 It concluded that the record contained sufficient independent evidence, when considered together with Lonardo’s statements, to support the finding that a conspiracy existed and that the petitioner was a participant.75 The evidence included the petitioner’s arrival at the prearranged hotel parking lot at the prearranged time.76 It also included his acceptance of the kilogram of cocaine from Lonardo.77
The discovery of more than $20,000 in cash in his car further supported the finding.78 The District Court had found by a preponderance that the conspiracy existed.79 The Court of Appeals affirmed that finding.80 The Supreme Court held that the determination was not clearly erroneous.81
The petitioner’s conviction was therefore properly based on admissible evidence.82
The trial court’s finding that the defendant and the declarant were co-conspirators was not clearly erroneous.83