476 U.S. 693 (1986)
Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller are Native American descendants of the Abenaki Tribe.1 They applied for and received benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and the Food Stamp program for their household, which included their two-year-old daughter Little Bird of the Snow.2
Roy and Miller refused to furnish a Social Security number for the daughter.3 They stated that obtaining one would violate their religious beliefs that the unique identifier would rob her spirit of uniqueness and power and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual strength.4 The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC and medical benefits payable on the child's behalf.5 It also reduced the level of food stamps the household received.6
Roy and Miller filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.7 They sued the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Agriculture.8 In their complaint they alleged that the sole basis for the denial of benefits was Roy's refusal to obtain a Social Security number for Little Bird of the Snow.9 They requested injunctive relief, damages, and restoration of benefits.10 The parties stipulated that Little Bird of the Snow did not have a Social Security number at the time the suit was filed.11
At trial Roy testified that he had developed a religious objection after conversations with an Abenaki chief.12 He explained that technology robs the spirit and that the uniqueness of a Social Security number applied solely to his daughter would harm her spiritual development.13 On the final day of trial a federal officer determined during a recess that Little Bird of the Snow had in fact been assigned a Social Security number at birth under the name Little Bird of the Snow Roy.14 Roy was recalled and testified that harm would result only from use of the number, not from its mere assignment.15 The District Court found the case was not moot on that basis.16
After receiving testimony from government experts on the administrative necessity of Social Security numbers for preventing fraud and duplication in programs serving millions of recipients, the District Court denied damages and benefits.17 It entered an injunction that permanently restrained the Secretary of Health and Human Services from making any use of or disseminating the assigned number.18 The injunction also enjoined the federal and state defendants from denying benefits to the child until her sixteenth birthday because of the parents' refusal to provide a Social Security number.19 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.20
Whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment compels the Government to accommodate a religiously based objection to the statutory requirement that state agencies shall utilize Social Security numbers in administering AFDC and Food Stamp benefit programs?
The Free Exercise Clause protects individual belief absolutely.21 It does not require the Government itself to behave in ways that further an individual's spiritual development.22 It also does not require the Government to conduct its internal affairs in ways that comport with particular religious beliefs.23 The Clause constrains what government may do to individuals rather than what individuals may extract from government.24
No. Roy's objection targets the statutory command that state agencies shall utilize Social Security numbers.25 He believes such use may harm his daughter's spirit.26 This objection addresses only the Government's own recordkeeping and computer systems.27 It does not address any restriction on Roy's beliefs or conduct.28
The established facts show that Roy and Miller applied for and received benefits.29 They refused to furnish a number for Little Bird of the Snow on religious grounds.30 The District Court found harm would flow only from governmental use of the number.31 Under the rule, such internal governmental procedures stand outside the Clause's protection.32
An objection to the color of government filing cabinets would likewise fail.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun joined Parts I and II of the Chief Justice's opinion.36 He agreed that the injunction against governmental use of the preexisting number must be vacated.37 He concluded that the Free Exercise Clause does not stretch so far as to require the Government to refrain from acting in ways that appellees believe will harm their daughter's spiritual development.38
Blackmun noted that the argument has some facial appeal but ultimately rejected it for the reasons stated in Part II.39 He observed that the claim stretches the Clause too far.40 Blackmun also addressed whether the furnishing issue remained live on remand.41
He indicated that the record was ambiguous on whether appellees retained an independent religious objection to providing the number themselves.42
Justice Stevens joined the holding that the claim against governmental use of the number fails.43 He concluded that the Free Exercise Clause does not give an individual the right to dictate the Government's method of recordkeeping.44 Stevens emphasized the unusual procedural posture created by the late discovery that Little Bird of the Snow already possessed a Social Security number.45
He argued that once the injunction against use of the preexisting number is vacated, nothing remains of the case.46 Stevens viewed the second claim as either moot or not ripe because the record contains no findings on whether Roy would still object to providing the number when the Government already possesses it.47 He also noted that regulations provide assistance to applicants unable to furnish required information.48
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice O'Connor joined Parts I and II of the Chief Justice's opinion.49 She would vacate only the portion of the injunction preventing governmental use or dissemination of the number already in its possession.50 O'Connor agreed that appellees cannot pursue a free exercise claim based solely on the Government's internal actions with respect to a number already assigned.51
She emphasized that eight members of the Court believed the District Court's injunction was overbroad in preventing the Government from using information already in its possession.52 O'Connor concluded that the case was not moot because the District Court had also enjoined denial of benefits.53 She reserved the furnishing issue for separate analysis under the traditional Sherbert standard.54
Whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment compels the Government to accommodate a religiously based objection to the statutory requirement that applicants for or recipients of AFDC and Food Stamp benefits shall furnish Social Security numbers as a condition of eligibility?
A facially neutral and uniformly applicable statutory condition for receiving governmental benefits does not violate the Free Exercise Clause when the Government demonstrates that the requirement is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.55 The distinction between denial of benefits under a neutral rule and affirmative compulsion or prohibition by penal sanction is constitutionally significant.56 The strict scrutiny of Sherbert and Thomas applies only when a mechanism for individualized exemptions suggests possible discrimination.57
No. The requirement that each applicant shall furnish a Social Security number is wholly neutral in religious terms.58 It applies uniformly to all applicants.59 It advances the legitimate interest in preventing fraud and duplication in programs serving millions of recipients through computer matching that relies on unique numerical identifiers.60 The established facts show that Roy and Miller refused to furnish the number for Little Bird of the Snow.61
The District Court found Social Security numbers essential to proper payment and fraud detection.62 Exempting even these appellees could permit one or a few fraudulent claims.63 Congress made no provision for individual exemptions.64 The requirement is reasonable.65
The Government therefore satisfies its burden without needing to prove a compelling interest or least restrictive means.66
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun would apply Sherbert, Thomas, and Yoder on remand if the furnishing issue remained live.69 He agreed with Justice O'Connor that the Government may not deny assistance solely because religious convictions prevent supplying the number.70 Blackmun noted that the record was ambiguous concerning whether appellees retained an independent religious objection to providing the number themselves once governmental use was permitted.71
He observed that the District Court had found Roy felt compelled by religious belief to avoid any use of the number.72 Blackmun concluded that the question required only a straightforward application of established precedent if it proved necessary to reach the issue on remand.73
Justice Stevens concluded that once the injunction against governmental use of the preexisting number is vacated the second claim is either moot or not ripe.74 He reasoned that the record contains no findings on whether Roy would still object to providing the number when the Government already possesses it.75 Stevens also noted that regulations provide assistance to applicants unable to furnish required information.76
He emphasized that the Government itself suggested the case had become moot as soon as it learned a Social Security number already existed.77 Stevens argued that the District Court had not made findings about the extent to which other exceptions and assistance are available.78 He would decide nothing more than necessary to dispose of the precise dispute before the Court.79
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice O'Connor would apply the Sherbert-Thomas-Yoder standard requiring the Government to show an especially important interest pursued by narrowly tailored means.80 She concluded that the District Court findings demonstrated the Government had not shown that refusing a religious exemption was essential to preventing welfare fraud.81 O'Connor stated that administrative inconvenience alone cannot justify the burden on free exercise.82
She found that granting an exemption to Little Bird of the Snow and the handful of others who might object would not demonstrably diminish the Government's ability to combat welfare fraud.83 O'Connor rejected the Chief Justice's proposed rational-basis test as having no basis in precedent and relegating a serious First Amendment value to minimal scrutiny.84
Justice White dissented on the ground that Thomas and Sherbert control the case.85 He would have required the Government to demonstrate a compelling reason for denying the requested exemption from the furnishing requirement.86 White stated simply that he could not join the Court's opinion and judgment because those precedents governed the outcome.87
He viewed the statutory conditions at issue as creating a mechanism for individualized exemptions that triggered strict scrutiny when religious hardship was denied accommodation.88 White's brief dissent underscores his position that the majority had improperly departed from established free exercise doctrine applicable to benefit conditions.89