478 U.S. 714 (1986)
On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.1 The statute sets a maximum deficit amount for each fiscal year from 1986 through 1991.2 It requires across-the-board cuts in specified federal programs if the deficit exceeds the target by more than a specified sum.3 These cuts, called sequestrations, are made by the President on the basis of a report prepared by the Comptroller General.4
The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors' reports, then reports his conclusions to the President.5 The Comptroller General must use the more pessimistic of the two sets of estimates, may make adjustments he deems appropriate, and must specify the precise reductions required on a program-by-program basis.6 The President is then required to issue a sequestration order that incorporates the Comptroller General's report without modification.7
The Comptroller General is an officer of the Legislative Branch. He is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 15-year term.8 The Comptroller General is the head of the General Accounting Office (GAO), which is an independent office in the legislative branch of the Government.9 He is removable not only by impeachment, but also by joint resolution of Congress at any time for permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.10
He is required to make such investigations and reports as shall be ordered by either House of Congress or by any committee of either House.11 He is to make recommendations to the Congress and to the heads of Federal agencies on legislation and other measures to improve the efficiency and economy of Government operations.12 Within hours of the Act's signing, Congressman Mike Synar, who had voted against it, and eleven other Members of Congress filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional.13 The National Treasury Employees Union filed a parallel action alleging injury to its members from suspended cost-of-living benefit increases.14
A three-judge District Court, appointed pursuant to 2 U. S. C. § 922(a)(5), invalidated the reporting provisions.15 The District Court held that the role of the Comptroller General in the deficit reduction process violated the Constitution's command that Congress may not retain the power to remove an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment.16 The court therefore held that the reporting requirements of the Act were unconstitutional.17 It declared the presidential sequestration order based on those reports to be without force and permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Treasury from implementing the sequestration order.18 The parties appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction and expedited consideration.19
Whether the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 unconstitutionally assigns executive functions to the Comptroller General?20
Yes. The Act requires the Comptroller General to review estimates from the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office, select the more pessimistic set, make adjustments he deems appropriate, interpret the statute, and specify precise program-by-program reductions.23 These tasks constitute execution of the law because they involve the exercise of judgment to implement legislative mandates.24 The President must then issue a sequestration order that incorporates the Comptroller General's determinations without any modification or recalculation.25
The Comptroller General heads the General Accounting Office, an office within the legislative branch, and reports to Congress on his work.26
The Act unconstitutionally vests executive power in the Comptroller General.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment but grounds his conclusion on the Comptroller General's status as an agent of Congress due to longstanding statutory duties to investigate expenditures, report to congressional committees, and assist Congress in evaluating programs.28 He emphasizes that when Congress or its agent seeks to make policy that binds the Nation, it must follow Article I procedures of bicameral passage and presentment rather than delegating such authority to a legislative agent.29 The constitutional defect is the assignment of executive functions to an officer of the Legislative Branch.30
Whether the Act's grant of executive authority to the Comptroller General violates separation of powers because Congress may remove him by joint resolution for specified causes?31
Yes. The Comptroller General may be removed by joint resolution for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance, grounds broad enough to encompass policy disagreements with Congress.34 This removal authority creates a here-and-now subservience that allows Congress to influence how the Comptroller General performs his executive functions under the Act.35 Precedents such as Myers and Chadha establish that direct congressional participation in removal of officers executing the laws, outside of impeachment, is impermissible.36
The removal provision renders the grant of executive authority unconstitutional.37
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice White dissents on the ground that the Comptroller General is independent of Congress because removal is permitted only for specified cause after a hearing and is subject to judicial review.38 He argues that the functions assigned are not executive in any sense that threatens separation of powers and that Congress could have performed the calculations itself or assigned them to a commission.39 White contends that the majority's formalistic approach unduly restricts Congress's ability to address the national crisis of budget deficits through innovative legislation.40
Justice Blackmun dissents and joins Justice White. He argues that even assuming a constitutional incompatibility between the removal provision and the delegation of authority, the proper remedy is to invalidate the removal provision rather than the central provisions of the Deficit Control Act.41 Blackmun emphasizes that the removal power has never been exercised and that striking down the Act's core mechanism frustrates congressional objectives far more than preserving the Act while disabling the unused removal authority.42