342 U.S. 337, 72 S. Ct. 329, 96 L. Ed. 367 (1952)
The petitioner, Boyce Motor Lines, a motor carrier, faced criminal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 835 for allegedly violating a regulation issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission.1 That regulation directed drivers of vehicles carrying explosives, inflammable liquids, or similar dangerous articles to avoid congested thoroughfares, places where crowds assemble, streetcar tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings so far as practicable and, where feasible, through prearrangement of routes.2
The indictment set forth three separate counts corresponding to three occasions on which a Boyce truck transported carbon bisulphide, described as a dangerous and inflammable liquid, from Cascade Mills, New York, to Brooklyn, New York.3 In each instance the truck entered the Holland Tunnel, a congested thoroughfare. The third such shipment exploded inside the tunnel, resulting in injuries to approximately sixty persons.4
The indictment further recited that other available and more practicable routes existed for transporting the shipment and that Boyce knew the use of the Holland Tunnel violated the Commission regulation.5 No allegation addressed the feasibility of prearranging routes in advance.6 The regulation itself had been promulgated in 1934 and amended in 1940 after extended study and participation by the trucking industry.7
The District Court dismissed the counts based on the regulation, finding its phrasing impermissibly vague.8 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reinstated the counts.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.10
Whether the Interstate Commerce Commission regulation is invalid because the words 'so far as practicable, and, where feasible' are so vague and indefinite as to make the standard of guilt conjectural?11
A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged with its violation.12 Few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols.13 Most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations.14 The practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions.15 Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.16 Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.17 In Sproles v. Binford, words like 'shortest practicable route' were upheld as not too vague to be understood when they find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.18
No. The regulation challenged here is the product of a long history of regulation of the transportation of explosives and inflammables.19 It was promulgated in 1934 and amended in 1940 after more than three years of study with trucking industry participation.20
The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation.21 This requirement of culpable intent does much to destroy any force in the argument that the Regulation is invalid.22
To sustain a conviction, the Government must prove that the petitioner could have taken another route which was both commercially practicable and appreciably safer than the one it did follow.23 It must also be shown that petitioner knew such a route existed yet deliberately took the more dangerous route through the tunnel or willfully neglected to inquire into an alternative route.24 The indictment alleged that other available and more practicable routes existed for the shipments of carbon bisulphide and that Boyce knew the use of the Holland Tunnel violated the regulation.25 The District Court dismissed the counts on vagueness grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Black And Frankfurter
Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Black and Frankfurter, dissented.29 He argued that when Congress delegates the federal crime-making power to an agency like the Interstate Commerce Commission, considerable precision is required in the exercise of that power.30 The regulation leaves all routes equally open and all equally closed without a definite standard from which one can start in calculating duty.31 This differs from the shortest practicable route standard in Sproles v. Binford that used distance as a basic benchmark.32
Expert testimony cannot supply the missing standard because there is no benchmark to direct, confine, or test such opinions or to guide a jury between conflicting experts.33 The knowing violation requirement provides no protection because the knowledge required is factual rather than legal, and ignorance of the regulation would not be a defense.34 The regulation prescribes no duty in terms of any degree of care that must be exercised.35
Jackson concluded that the vague regulation should be pronounced invalid so that intelligible standards can be framed for this dangerous traffic.36