487 U.S. 500 (1988)
On April 5, 1983, David A. Boyle, a United States Marine helicopter copilot, was killed when the CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter he was flying crashed into the ocean off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia, during a training exercise.1 Boyle and one other crew member were trapped inside the sinking helicopter and drowned, while three others escaped.2 His father, the petitioner, brought a diversity action against the helicopter's manufacturer, respondent United Technologies Corporation (Sikorsky Division), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.3
The petitioner alleged under Virginia tort law that the manufacturer had defectively designed the copilot's emergency escape system because the hatch opened outward rather than inward and its release mechanism was obstructed.4 The petitioner also alleged that the manufacturer had negligently failed to warn the Navy of dangers in the escape hatch and system.5 The jury returned a general verdict in the petitioner's favor and awarded $725,000.6 The District Court denied the manufacturer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.7
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment for the manufacturer.8 It held that the state-law tort action was barred by the government contractor defense it had recognized in McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., under which a contractor is not liable for design defects if the United States approved reasonably precise specifications, the equipment conformed to those specifications, and the supplier warned the United States about dangers known to the supplier but not to the United States.9 The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of the third condition.10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the propriety of the government contractor defense and to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.11 The case reached the Court after the Fourth Circuit's 1986 decision in 792 F.2d 413, following the 1983 crash and the subsequent district court trial.12
Whether federal common law recognizes a government contractor defense that shields manufacturers from state tort liability for design defects in military equipment?13
Federal common law recognizes a government contractor defense when the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment constitutes a discretionary function under the FTCA's discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), creating a significant conflict with federal policy if state tort liability is imposed.14
Yes. The selection of the appropriate design for military equipment is a discretionary function.15 This is demonstrated by the Navy's approval of the escape hatch and emergency escape system specifications for the CH-53D helicopter.16 The federal interests embodied in the discretionary function exception are directly implicated.17 The design was not left to the private contractor's discretion but was specifically approved by the Navy.18 Imposing Virginia tort liability on United Technologies Corporation would create a significant conflict with federal policy.19
Federal common law recognizes the government contractor defense.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall And Blackmun
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the discretionary function exception is a statutory limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the FTCA.21 It has no place in suits between private parties such as the Boyle family and the contractor.22 He argued that the Feres doctrine and the discretionary function exception do not support shielding contractors.23
Those policies concern the special relationship between soldiers and the Government or the prevention of judicial second-guessing of policy decisions.24 Neither applies to a private manufacturer's liability for design defects.25
Justice Stevens dissented separately. He agreed with Justice Brennan that the government contractor defense recognized by the Court is not supported by the policies underlying the Feres doctrine or the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.26 In his view, the Court had created a new immunity for government contractors that is not justified by any federal statute or by the Constitution.27
The creation of such an immunity is a matter for Congress, not the courts.28 He emphasized that when judges are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture involving a novel question of policy, they should carefully consider whether they or a legislative body are better equipped to perform the task.29 The novel question here involves balancing the conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a massive governmental program and the protection of individual rights, a function more appropriately left to Congress.30
Whether the scope of any such government contractor defense is limited to cases in which the United States approved reasonably precise specifications, the equipment conformed to those specifications, and the supplier warned the United States about dangers known to the supplier but not to the United States?31
The scope of the government contractor defense is limited to cases satisfying three conditions. First, the United States must have approved reasonably precise specifications. Second, the equipment must have conformed to those specifications. Third, the supplier must have warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier or should have been known to the supplier.32
Yes. The first two conditions assure that the suit is within the area of the policy judgment that the discretionary function exception is intended to protect.33 The Navy approved reasonably precise specifications for the CH-53D helicopter's escape hatch.34 The equipment was manufactured to those specifications.35 The third condition is necessary because, in its absence, the defense would be broader than the scope of the policy judgment.36 The supplier must warn about dangers known or that should have been known.37
The scope of the defense is limited to those three conditions, with the warning element adjusted to include dangers the supplier should have known.38
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall And Blackmun
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the Court's formulation of the defense is breathtakingly sweeping.39 It applies not only to military equipment like the CH-53D helicopter, but to any made-to-order gadget that the Federal Government might purchase after previewing plans.40 The contractor may invoke the defense in suits brought not only by military personnel like Lt.
Boyle, or Government employees, but by anyone injured by a Government contractor's negligent design.41 It applies even if the Government has not intentionally sacrificed safety for other interests like speed or efficiency.42 The defense is invocable regardless of how blatant or easily remedied the defect, so long as the contractor missed it and the specifications approved by the Government, however unreasonably dangerous, were reasonably precise.43
Whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit correctly applied its formulation of the government contractor defense to the facts of this case?44
A court applying the government contractor defense must use the proper formulation. The formulation must be limited to the discretionary function exception's scope. It requires reasonably precise specifications rather than mere conformity. It requires a warning of dangers the supplier knew or should have known rather than only those known to the supplier.45
No. The Court of Appeals applied its McKay test without the necessary modifications to the third condition and without ensuring the specifications were reasonably precise.46 The evidence at trial concerned the CH-53D helicopter's escape hatch design that the Navy had approved.47 That design allegedly caused Boyle's death when he could not escape the sinking aircraft.48 The part of the test requiring conformity does not adequately capture the predicate that specifications be reasonably precise.49 The warning condition was overly narrow.50
The Court of Appeals did not correctly apply the defense, and the case requires remand for clarification on whether the evidence suffices under the proper test.51