83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872)
Mrs. Myra Bradwell, a resident of the State of Illinois, submitted an application to the judges of the Supreme Court of Illinois seeking a license to practice law.1 She included the standard certificate from a lower court confirming her good moral character and successful completion of the required examination demonstrating her qualifications.2
In support of her application, she provided an affidavit indicating that she had been born in Vermont, had previously been a citizen of that state, was a citizen of the United States, and had lived for many years in Chicago, Illinois.3 Along with the affidavit, Mrs. Bradwell submitted a statement claiming that these facts entitled her to the license by virtue of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution and the fourteenth article of amendment.4
The Illinois statute provided that no person could practice as an attorney without first obtaining a license from two justices of the Supreme Court, following receipt of a certificate of good moral character from a county court.5 The Supreme Court of Illinois initially refused the license, explaining that as a married woman Mrs. Bradwell would not be bound by her contracts with clients.6
Following this decision, she acknowledged her married status and filed a printed argument asserting her right to admission.7 The court responded with a written opinion detailing its reasoning.8 The opinion referenced common law traditions under which women had not been admitted to the bar in England.9 It also noted the apparent intent of the legislature not to extend the privilege to women.10
Mrs. Bradwell then pursued review in the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to the statutes providing for review by this Court.11 The record presented her claims founded on the federal constitutional provisions concerning privileges and immunities of citizens.12
Whether the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution applies to a citizen of the state whose action she complains of?13
No. Mrs. Bradwell resided in Chicago for many years and therefore became a citizen of Illinois under the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of her license application.16 The clause offers no shield to a citizen complaining of her own state's action, as the record shows through her affidavit and the Illinois Supreme Court's denial of the license on state-law grounds.17
The second section of the fourth article of the Constitution does not apply to Mrs. Bradwell's claim.18
Whether the right to practice law in the state courts is a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment?19
Privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the United States as such are the only ones protected against state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The right to admission to a state's bar is not among them because it does not depend on United States citizenship and has never been treated as turning on that status.21
No. The right to practice law in state courts bears no necessary relation to citizenship of the United States.22 This is evidenced by the admission of prominent lawyers who were not citizens of the United States or of any state.23 The principles announced in the Slaughter-House Cases establish that regulation of bar admission remains a state power outside federal control under the Fourteenth Amendment.24
The right to practice law in the state courts is not a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Bradley concurred in the judgment affirming the Illinois Supreme Court's denial but rested on distinct grounds from the majority opinion.26 He reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment claim presupposes a fundamental right of every citizen, including women, to pursue any lawful occupation.27 Yet history and the common law have never recognized such a right for women.28
The civil law and nature itself mark a wide difference in the respective spheres of the sexes, assigning the domestic sphere to woman as wife and mother.29 The legislature retains authority under the police power to adapt rules of civil society to these general conditions rather than to exceptional cases.30
Whether the power of a state to prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is affected by the Fourteenth Amendment?31
No. The Illinois Supreme Court acted within its statutory discretion when it declined to license Mrs. Bradwell, relying on common-law traditions that excluded women from the bar and on the legislature's presumed intent. The Slaughter-House Cases confirm that this state regulatory authority remains untouched by the Fourteenth Amendment.34
The power of a state to prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of its own courts is unaffected by the Fourteenth Amendment.35