373 U.S. 83 (1963)
Brady and his companion Boblit were found guilty of murder in the first degree and were sentenced to death following separate trials in Maryland, with Brady tried first.1 At his trial Brady took the stand and admitted his participation in the crime but claimed that Boblit did the actual killing.2 Prior to the trial Brady's counsel requested the prosecution to allow him to examine Boblit's extrajudicial statements.3 Several of those statements were shown to him.4
One statement dated July 9, 1958, in which Boblit admitted the actual homicide, was withheld by the prosecution and did not come to Brady's notice until after he had been tried, convicted, and sentenced and after his conviction had been affirmed.5 Brady moved the trial court for a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence that had been suppressed by the prosecution.6 His appeal from a denial of that motion was dismissed by the Court of Appeals without prejudice to relief under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act.7
The petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court.8 On appeal the Court of Appeals held that suppression of the evidence by the prosecution denied petitioner due process of law and remanded the case for a retrial of the question of punishment, not the question of guilt. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.9
The crime was murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery.10 In Maryland punishment for that crime is life imprisonment or death, the jury being empowered to restrict the punishment to life by addition of the words "without capital punishment."11 By reason of the state constitution the jury in a criminal case are the judges of law as well as of fact.12
Whether the prosecution's suppression of Boblit's July 9, 1958 statement denied Brady due process of law?13
The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. This holds irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.14
Yes. Brady's counsel requested Boblit's extrajudicial statements prior to trial, yet the prosecution withheld the July 9, 1958 statement in which Boblit admitted committing the homicide.15 That statement was favorable to Brady and material to punishment because the jury, as judges of law and fact under the Maryland constitution, could have considered it when deciding whether to add the words without capital punishment and impose life imprisonment instead of death. The Court of Appeals itself recognized that the withholding was prejudicial on the punishment issue.16
The prosecution's suppression of Boblit's July 9, 1958 statement denied Brady due process of law.17
Whether Brady was denied a federal right when the Court of Appeals of Maryland restricted the new trial to the question of punishment only?18
Maryland decisions establish that it is the court, not the jury, that passes on the admissibility of evidence pertinent to the issue of the innocence or guilt of the accused, and the Court of Appeals ruled that nothing in the suppressed confession could have reduced Brady's offense below murder in the first degree.19
No. The Court of Appeals held that nothing in Boblit's withheld confession could have reduced Brady's offense below murder in the first degree and therefore limited the new trial to punishment.20 Under Maryland law the trial court determines admissibility of evidence on guilt or innocence, so the restriction did not deprive Brady of any federal constitutional right to a new trial on guilt as well.21
Brady was not denied a federal right when the Court of Appeals restricted the new trial to the question of punishment only.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Black
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the case presented only the single federal question whether the order granting a new trial limited to punishment violated equal protection.23 He could not read the Court of Appeals opinion as clearly holding that the Boblit statement would have been inadmissible on the issue of guilt.24 Uncertainty in Maryland case law on the admissibility of the Boblit statement on the issue of guilt was compounded by the State's concession at oral argument that the statement would have been admissible on guilt.25
He would have vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of the equal protection issue.26