445 U.S. 507 (1980)
The Rockland County, New York, public defender’s office was created in 1971.1 Respondent Aaron Finkel and another attorney were the first two assistants appointed by the incumbent public defender, who had been appointed by the Republican county chairman.2 At the time of their appointments neither respondent had any significant political affiliation, and both had been rated very highly by a committee of the Rockland County Bar Association.3 Respondent Alan Tabakman was appointed as an assistant in September 1975.4
In 1972 petitioner Peter Branti, a Democrat, was elected to the county legislature on the Democratic ticket.5 By 1977 control of the legislature had shifted to the Democrats.6 Petitioner Branti was appointed to replace the incumbent public defender when his term expired. The Democratic county committee recommended him and the county legislature formally appointed him on January 3, 1978.7 As soon as petitioner was formally appointed he began executing termination notices for six of the nine assistants then in office.8
Respondents Finkel and Tabakman were among those selected for termination.9 With one possible exception the nine who were to be appointed or retained were all Democrats and were all selected by Democratic legislators or Democratic town chairmen on a basis determined by the Democratic caucus.10 The District Court found that the sole grounds for the attempted removal of respondents were the facts that their political beliefs differed from those of the ruling Democratic majority.11 The Democratic majority had determined that Assistant Public Defender appointments were to be made on political bases.12 The court also found that both respondents had been satisfactorily performing their duties as Assistant Public Defenders.13
On January 4, 1978, respondents commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and obtained a temporary restraining order preserving the status quo.14 After hearing evidence for eight days the District Court entered detailed findings of fact and permanently enjoined petitioner from terminating respondents upon the sole grounds of their political beliefs.15 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
Whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect an assistant public defender who is satisfactorily performing his job from discharge solely because of his political beliefs?18
The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect independent public defenders, as well as classified civil servants, from discharge solely because of their political beliefs. In Elrod v. Burns, the Court decided that a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee cannot be discharged upon the sole ground of his political beliefs.19 The rule announced in Elrod is not limited to cases involving a patronage system.20
Yes. The Rockland County public defender's office was created in 1971. Respondents Finkel and Tabakman were appointed as assistants and rated very highly by the bar association with no significant political affiliation at appointment. Petitioner Branti, after appointment by the Democratic legislature on January 3, 1978, began executing termination notices for six assistants including the respondents. He acted solely because they were Republicans without Democratic sponsors. The District Court found after eight days of evidence that respondents were satisfactorily performing their duties. The sole grounds for termination were their political beliefs differing from the Democratic majority.
The primary responsibility of an assistant public defender is to represent individual citizens in controversy with the State rather than to make policy for the office.21 The loss of First Amendment freedoms even for minimal periods constitutes irreparable injury.22 Therefore the amendments protect the respondents from discharge on this basis alone.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect an assistant public defender who is satisfactorily performing his job from discharge solely because of his political beliefs.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that the respondents are lawyers.24 Their positions as assistants in the public defender's office require a close professional association instinct with mutual confidence and trust.25 The association is analogous to a private law firm.26
He concluded that the petitioner upon appointment as public defender was not constitutionally compelled to continue such an association with the respondents if he did not wish to do so.27 Therefore the Elrod judgment does not control because the respondents are not nonconfidential employees.28
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist.29 He argued that the Court continues the evisceration of patronage practices begun in Elrod.30 The Court promulgated a vague new standard that subjects governmental hiring to judicial oversight.31
The standard removes decisions essential to responsible governance from legislative and executive discretion.32 He maintained that patronage serves substantial governmental interests in building stable political parties.33 It facilitates policy implementation and allows voters to structure their government.34
The First Amendment does not incorporate a national civil service system.35 He would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.36
Whether party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the duties of an assistant public defender?37
No. The District Court found that respondents had very limited if any responsibility with respect to the overall operation of the public defender's office.40 They did not act as advisors or formulate plans for implementation of the broad goals of the office.41 They made decisions only in the context of specific cases.42 The primary if not the only responsibility of an assistant public defender is to represent individual citizens in controversy with the State.
Whatever policymaking occurs must relate to the needs of individual clients and not to any partisan political interests.43 Although assistants obtain access to confidential information from attorney-client relationships, that information has no bearing on partisan political concerns.44 Under these circumstances party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the office.45
Party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the duties of an assistant public defender.46
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell dissented on this issue by contending that the Court's new standard is framed in vague and sweeping language that will create vast uncertainty for elected and appointed officials at all levels.47 It will be difficult to say under the standard that partisan concerns are not relevant to the performance of duties for positions such as United States attorneys.48
He argued that the decision impairs the right of local voters to structure their government.49 It limits the ability of voters in Rockland County to delegate selection authority to legislators and the public defender on a partisan basis.50 The substantial governmental interests served by patronage justify the selection of assistant public defenders on the basis of political affiliation.51