543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989)
Miguel Braschi resided with Leslie Blanchard in a rent-controlled apartment at 405 East 54th Street from the summer of 1975 until Blanchard's death in September 1986.1
Stahl Associates Company owned the apartment building.2 In November 1986, Stahl Associates served Braschi with a notice to cure, claiming he was a mere licensee with no right to occupy the apartment because only Blanchard was the tenant of record.3 In December 1986, Stahl Associates served a notice to terminate, giving Braschi one month to vacate.4
Braschi initiated an action for a permanent injunction and a declaration of his entitlement to occupy the apartment.5 He moved for a preliminary injunction.6 The Supreme Court found that the long-term interdependent nature of the ten-year relationship fulfilled the definitional criteria of family and issued the preliminary injunction.7 The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the regulation protects only family members within traditional, legally recognized familial relationships.8
Braschi appealed. The two men had lived together as permanent life partners for more than ten years.9 They regarded one another as spouses, their families were aware of the relationship, and they attended family functions together.10 Braschi listed the apartment as his address on his driver's license and passport.11 They shared all financial obligations, maintained joint checking and savings accounts, and Blanchard executed a power of attorney in Braschi's favor and named him beneficiary of his life insurance policy and primary legatee of his estate.12
Whether Miguel Braschi qualifies as a member of Leslie Blanchard's family under New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations 9 NYCRR 2204.6 (d) so as to be entitled to seek noneviction protection after Blanchard's death?13
The term family as used in 9 NYCRR 2204.6 (d) should not be rigidly restricted to those who have formalized their relationship by marriage or adoption.14 Instead it includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence.15 The definition finds its foundation in the reality of family life.16
Yes. Miguel Braschi resided with Leslie Blanchard in a rent-controlled apartment at 405 East 54th Street from the summer of 1975 until Blanchard's death in September 1986. In November 1986 Stahl Associates served Braschi with a notice to cure claiming he was a mere licensee and in December 1986 served a notice to terminate.17 Braschi moved for a preliminary injunction after initiating suit.18
The facts show the two men lived together as permanent life partners for more than ten years, regarded one another as spouses, attended family functions together, shared all financial obligations through joint accounts, and Blanchard executed a power of attorney in Braschi's favor while naming him beneficiary of his life insurance policy and primary legatee of his estate.19 These circumstances establish the long-term emotional and financial commitment and interdependence required by the regulation.20
Braschi qualifies as a member of Blanchard's family under 9 NYCRR 2204.6 (d) and is entitled to seek noneviction protection.21
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Bellacosa concurs in reversal on a narrower ground limited to the preliminary injunction stage.22 He concludes that the anti-eviction public policy is fulfilled by protecting this petitioner who shared the apartment as his home for ten years with the deceased tenant of record.23 Because the regulation uses the unqualified remedial term family and legislative intent is indecipherable, generous construction favors inclusion of petitioner as a tenant in fact without need for a broader definitional pronouncement.24
Courts should decide cases interstitially when a fragmented court cannot fashion a majoritarian rule.25
Joined by Judge Hancock, Jr.
Judge Simons dissents and would affirm the Appellate Division.26 He maintains that family in the regulation must be limited to traditional relationships based on blood, marriage or adoption to align with the legislative scheme of rent regulation, the roommate law, and the rent stabilization code's explicit definition.27 Expanding the term to include emotional and financial commitment creates an unworkable subjective test that undermines the goal of gradual transition to a free market.28
The regulation's language links family with spouse, a word of clearly defined legal content, indicating an intent to use ordinary and commonly accepted meanings related to customary legal relationships.29
Was the order of the Appellate Division, which reversed the Supreme Court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief, properly made?30
When the Appellate Division denies preliminary injunctive relief on an issue of law alone, and makes clear that no question of fact or discretion entered its decision, the denial presents a question of law reviewable by the Court of Appeals.31
The order of the Appellate Division was not properly made.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Judge Hancock, Jr.
Judge Simons would affirm the Appellate Division order.35 He reasons that the regulation's language and the broader rent-control scheme require limiting family to relationships of blood, marriage or adoption, and that the Appellate Division correctly applied that standard to deny Braschi noneviction protection.36
The plurality's approach produces an unworkable subjective test subject to abuse and runs counter to the legislative goal of eventually eliminating rent control while maintaining stability in the residential housing market.37
The interests of landlords in regaining possession under less onerous rent-stabilization laws must be balanced against those of occupants, and only objectively verifiable relationships based on blood, marriage or adoption achieve that balance without drawn-out litigation over intangibles.38