366 U.S. 599 (1961)
Appellants are merchants in Philadelphia who engage in the retail sale of clothing and home furnishings within the proscription of the statute in issue. Each of the appellants is a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith. Their faith requires the closing of their places of business and a total abstention from all manner of work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each Saturday.1
In 1959 Pennsylvania enacted a criminal statute that proscribes the Sunday retail sale of enumerated commodities.2 Appellants had previously kept their places of business open on Sunday. Each had done a substantial amount of business on Sunday, compensating somewhat for their closing on Saturday.3 They instituted a suit seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of the 1959 statute. Their complaint alleged that Sunday closing would impair their ability to earn a livelihood and would render appellant Braunfeld unable to continue in business, thereby losing his capital investment.4
A three-judge district court dismissed the complaint on the authority of the Two Guys From Harrison case. On appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.5
Appellants also presented questions regarding whether the statute is a law respecting an establishment of religion and whether the statute violates equal protection. Those questions had already been answered in the negative in a companion case involving the same statute.6
Whether the Pennsylvania criminal statute proscribing the Sunday retail sale of certain enumerated commodities is a law respecting an establishment of religion?7
Questions regarding whether a statute is a law respecting an establishment of religion have already been answered in the negative in a companion case involving the same statute.8
No. The statute is not a law respecting an establishment of religion because both this question and the equal protection question, in reference to this very statute, have already been answered in the negative in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, and appellants present nothing new regarding them.910
The Pennsylvania criminal statute is not a law respecting an establishment of religion.11
Whether the statute violates equal protection?12
Questions regarding whether a statute violates equal protection have already been answered in the negative in a companion case involving the same statute.13
No. The statute does not violate equal protection.1415 Both this question and the establishment question, in reference to this very statute, have already been answered in the negative in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley.16 Appellants present nothing new regarding them. The three-judge district court therefore properly dismissed the equal-protection claim on the authority of that companion decision.17
The statute does not violate equal protection.
Whether the statute interferes with the free exercise of appellants’ religion?18
The freedom to act, even when the action is in accord with one’s religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions. If the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.19
No. The statute regulates a secular activity.20 As applied to appellants, it operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive.21 Appellants are merchants in Philadelphia who engage in the retail sale of clothing and home furnishings within the proscription of the statute in issue. Each of the appellants is a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith. Their faith requires the closing of their places of business and a total abstention from all manner of work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each Saturday. The statute does not make unlawful any religious practices of appellants.22
The alternatives open to appellants may well result in some financial sacrifice to observe their religious beliefs.23 Still, the option is wholly different than when the legislation attempts to make a religious practice itself unlawful.24
The statute does not interfere with the free exercise of appellants’ religion.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissents from the disposition of the free exercise claim.26 He argues that the appropriate standard of constitutional adjudication requires more than a substantial state interest.27 Freedoms of worship may not be infringed on slender grounds but only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect.28
Brennan states that the laws put appellants to a choice between their business and their religion.29 This creates a state-imposed burden on Orthodox Judaism with the same economic effect as a tax on religious literature.30 He concludes that the mere convenience of having everyone rest on the same day does not constitute a compelling interest sufficient to justify the substantial indirect limitation.31
An exemption for those observing another day of rest would satisfy the state's interest without the burden.32
Justice Stewart agrees with substantially all that Justice Brennan has written.33 He emphasizes that Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic survival.34 Stewart views this as a cruel choice that no State can constitutionally demand.35
For him this is not something that can be swept under the rug and forgotten in the interest of enforced Sunday togetherness.36 Stewart concludes that the impact of this law upon these appellants grossly violates their constitutional right to the free exercise of their religion.37