141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021)
Arizona law generally makes it very easy to vote. Voters may cast their ballots on election day in person at a traditional precinct or a voting center in their county of residence. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-7411(B)(4). Arizonans also may cast an early ballot by mail up to 27 days before an election, §§ 16-541, 16-542(C), and they also may vote in person at an early voting location in each county, §§ 16-542(A), (E). These cases involve challenges under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) to aspects of the State's regulations governing precinct-based election-day voting and early mail-in voting.
The challengers alleged that both the State's refusal to count ballots cast in the wrong precinct and its ballot-collection restriction had an adverse and disparate effect on the State's American Indian, Hispanic, and African American citizens in violation of § 2 of the VRA, and that the ballot-collection restriction was enacted with discriminatory intent and thus violated both § 2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment. The District Court rejected the claims. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the en banc court reversed, concluding that both rules imposed disparate burdens on minority voters and that the ballot-collection law was enacted with discriminatory intent.
The Supreme Court held that Arizona's out-of-precinct policy and HB 2023 do not violate § 2 of the VRA, and HB 2023 was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose.
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in an effort to end the denial of the right to vote based on race. Despite the Fifteenth Amendment, the right of African Americans to vote was heavily suppressed for nearly a century by measures such as poll taxes, literacy tests, property qualifications, white primaries, and grandfather clauses. Some blatant efforts reached this Court and were held to violate the Fifteenth Amendment, but many discriminatory practices persisted into the mid-1960s.
Invoking its enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress enacted the VRA and amended it in the 1970s and 1980s to address vote dilution and other practices that diminished minority voting strength. As originally enacted, § 2 barred voting qualifications or procedures imposed to deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color. After Mobile v. Bolden, Congress amended § 2 in 1982 to focus on results rather than intent and added § 2(b), which requires consideration of the totality of circumstances and provides that liability exists where the political processes leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a protected class in that they have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate and to elect representatives of their choice.
The Court first construed the amended § 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, a vote-dilution case, where it set out three threshold requirements and provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether § 2 had been violated. The essence of a § 2 claim is that a particular electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in opportunities between minority and non-minority voters.
The present dispute concerns two features of Arizona voting law. Arizona permits no-excuse early voting by mail for 27 days before an election and in-person early voting at county locations. Counties may conduct election-day voting either by traditional precincts or by county-wide voting centers. The challenged regulations govern precinct-based election-day voting and early mail-in voting. Under Arizona law, voters who choose to vote in person on election day in a county that uses the precinct system must vote in their assigned precincts; if a voter casts a ballot in the wrong precinct, that vote is not counted. For early mail voters, HB 2023 made it a crime for any person other than a postal worker, an elections official, or a voter's caregiver, family member, or household member to knowingly collect an early ballot.
In 2016 the Democratic National Committee and affiliates sued, alleging that both the out-of-precinct policy and the ballot-collection restriction adversely and disparately affect Arizona's American Indian, Hispanic, and African American citizens in violation of § 2, and that the ballot-collection restriction was enacted with discriminatory intent. After a 10-day bench trial, the District Court made extensive findings of fact and rejected all the plaintiffs' claims, concluding that the out-of-precinct policy had no meaningfully disparate impact and that the ballot-collection restriction was unlikely to cause a meaningful inequality and was not enacted with discriminatory intent. A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed, but the en banc court reversed, concluding that both rules imposed disparate burdens and that the ballot-collection law was enacted with discriminatory intent under a cat's-paw theory.
Two preliminary matters require attention. First, the Court rejects the contention that no petitioner has Article III standing to appeal as to the out-of-precinct policy. Only one party with standing is required, and Attorney General Brnovich, as an authorized representative of the State (which intervened below), has standing to appeal. Second, the Court declines to announce a single, comprehensive test to govern all § 2 challenges to time, place, or manner voting rules; it is sufficient to identify guideposts that lead to the decision in these cases.
The Court's statutory interpretation starts with the text of § 2. Section 2(a) prohibits the imposition or application of a voting practice in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color. Section 2(b) establishes the showing required: based on the totality of circumstances, a violation is shown where the political processes leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a protected class in that they have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate and to elect representatives of their choice.
The core of § 2(b) is the requirement that voting be equally open. The phrase in § 2(b)—"in that"—specifies the respect in which the political processes are not equally open; equal opportunity explains equal openness. The term "open" connotes absence of restrictions as to who may participate or requiring no special status for participation. The statute's reference to equal "opportunity" may stretch the concept to include a person's ability to use the means that are equally open, but equal openness remains the touchstone.
Another important feature of § 2(b) is its totality-of-the-circumstances requirement. Any circumstance that has a logical bearing on whether voting is equally open and affords equal opportunity may be considered. The Court mentions several important circumstances without attempting an exhaustive list.
First, the size of the burden imposed by a challenged voting rule is highly relevant. Voting necessarily requires some effort and compliance with rules; the concept of a voting system that is equally open must tolerate the usual burdens of voting. Mere inconvenience is insufficient to demonstrate a § 2 violation.
Second, the degree to which a voting rule departs from what was standard practice when § 2 was amended in 1982 is relevant. The burdens associated with rules then in effect are useful benchmarks for gauging whether a challenged rule's burdens prevent voting from being equally open. Widespread current use is also relevant.
Third, the size of disparities in a rule's impact on different racial or ethnic groups is an important factor. Neutral regulations may result in disparities due to differences in employment, wealth, and education, but the mere existence of some disparity does not necessarily mean a system is not equally open; the size of any disparity matters and small disparities should not be magnified artificially.
Fourth, courts must consider the opportunities provided by the State's entire system of voting when assessing a burden imposed by a challenged provision; when a State provides multiple ways to vote, burdens associated with one option cannot be evaluated without considering the other means available.
Fifth, the strength of the State's interests served by a challenged voting rule is an important factor. Strong state interests—such as preventing election fraud and ensuring votes are cast freely without intimidation—make it less likely that a rule violates § 2 when considered under the totality of the circumstances.
Some factors identified in Gingles were designed for vote-dilution cases and are plainly inapplicable to challenges to facially neutral time, place, or manner voting rules. While § 2(b)'s totality language permits consideration of certain Gingles factors, their relevance in such neutral-rule cases is typically to show past discrimination and persistent effects. The disparate-impact model employed in Title VII and the Fair Housing Act is not useful here, and § 2 does not impose a strict necessity or least-restrictive-means requirement.
Applying these principles, neither Arizona's out-of-precinct policy nor its ballot-collection law violates § 2.
Having to identify one's polling place and travel there to vote does not exceed the usual burdens of voting. The State made extensive efforts to reduce the impact of the out-of-precinct policy, for example by sending a sample ballot to each household that includes a voter's proper polling location and by providing online tools, mailings, and trained poll workers to redirect voters who arrive at the wrong precinct. The burden of identifying and traveling to one's assigned precinct is modest when considering the State's political processes as a whole: Arizona offers multiple easy ways to vote, including no-excuse early ballots, permanent early voter lists, drop-off at any polling place, and county early voting locations.
The racial disparity allegedly caused by the out-of-precinct policy is small in absolute terms. In counties reporting out-of-precinct ballots in the 2016 general election, slightly over 1% of Hispanic, African American, and Native American election-day voters cast out-of-precinct ballots, compared with about 0.5% for non-minority voters. A procedure that works for 98% or more of voters is unlikely to render a system unequally open.
Appropriate weight must be given to the important state interests furthered by precinct-based voting: distributing voters among polling places, placing polling places close to voter residences, and ensuring voters receive ballots listing only the candidates and issues for which they are eligible. Precinct-based voting has a long pedigree and the policy of not counting out-of-precinct ballots is widespread.
The Court of Appeals discounted the State's interests because it found no evidence that less restrictive alternatives would threaten precinct-based voting, but § 2 does not require the State to show that its chosen policy is absolutely necessary or that less restrictive means would be inadequate. Considering the modest burdens, the small disparate impact, and the State's justifications, the out-of-precinct rule does not violate § 2.
Arizona's HB 2023 also passes muster under § 2. Arizonans can submit early ballots by mailbox, post office, early ballot drop box, an authorized election official's office, or by dropping off at any polling place on election day; these options entail the usual burdens of voting. Assistance from an authorized proxy is available, and special provisions exist for voters unable to use the early voting system. The plaintiffs were unable to show the extent to which HB 2023 disproportionately burdens minority voters.
Even if plaintiffs had demonstrated a disparate burden, the State's interest in preserving the integrity of its election procedures suffices to avoid § 2 liability. Prevention of fraud is not the only legitimate interest; third-party ballot collection can lead to pressure and intimidation, and a State may act to prevent fraud without waiting for it to occur within its borders. Considering the record, HB 2023 does not violate § 2.
The District Court correctly found that HB 2023 was not enacted with a discriminatory purpose. Appellate review of that conclusion is for clear error. The District Court considered the historical background and the legislative sequence that led to HB 2023, any departures from the normal legislative process, relevant legislative history, and the law's impact on different racial groups under the Arlington Heights framework. The court found proponents sincerely believed ballot collection increased the risk of early-voting fraud and that the law resulted from sincere legislative debate over the wisdom of early mail voting. It distinguished between partisan and racial motives and found the evidence supported its conclusion. The Court of Appeals erred by applying a cat's-paw theory from employment discrimination to a legislative body; that theory has no application to legislatures, which are not agents of bill sponsors.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurred. He joined the Court's opinion in full but noted one issue the Court did not decide: whether § 2 of the Voting Rights Act furnishes an implied cause of action. The Court need not and does not address that issue because no party argued the plaintiffs lacked a cause of action and the existence of a cause of action does not go to subject-matter jurisdiction.
Justice Kagan, with whom Justices Breyer and Sotomayor join, dissented. She began by emphasizing the importance of the Voting Rights Act, which marries democracy and racial equality and guarantees equal voting opportunities across racial groups. She explained the Act's historical genesis, including the failures after the Fifteenth Amendment and the brutal suppression of black voting that persisted into the 20th century, culminating in civil rights struggles that led to the VRA's enactment.
Kagan described the VRA's broad purpose and how Congress, by amending § 2 in 1982, directed courts to focus on effects rather than intent. Section 2(a) bars voting qualifications, prerequisites, standards, practices, or procedures imposed in a manner that results in denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race. Section 2(b) sets out the showing required under the totality of the circumstances that the political processes are not equally open to participation in that members of a protected class have less opportunity than others to participate and elect representatives of their choice.
She argued that the majority unduly narrows § 2. The text is broad and Congress intended an effects-based, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry to root out both overt and subtle devices that diminish minority voting opportunity. Section 2 covers all kinds of voting rules and procedures, addresses abridgment as well as outright denial, and applies to facially neutral rules that produce disparate effects given local social and historical conditions.
Kagan set out her view of the proper § 2 analysis: courts should evaluate whether a rule makes it harder for members of one racial group than others to cast a vote, considering law and background conditions together. The totality inquiry should include the rule's interaction with historic, social, and economic conditions, and courts should weigh state interests while recognizing that authorities often offer nonracial rationalizations. Where a less discriminatory alternative exists that would not significantly impair the State's interest, the discriminatory rule must fall.
She criticized the majority for inventing extra-textual guideposts that narrow § 2's scope. The majority's purportedly relevant considerations—“usual burdens of voting,” deference to practices common circa 1982, and the availability of multiple ways to vote—improperly dilute the statute. The “mere inconvenience” or “usual burdens” exception is nowhere found in § 2; distinguishing between ordinary burdens and meaningful abridgements is not a textual command and invites ad hoc judgments. Considering other ways to vote does not excuse a law that makes one method of voting uniquely difficult for a protected group. And elevating historical commonality to a shield for contemporary practices subverts Congress's purpose to change an unequal status quo.
Kagan also challenged the majority's treatment of state interests, arguing that the majority refuses to require adequate means-ends scrutiny. Under precedent, a State's asserted interests do not excuse race-based burdens where a less discriminatory alternative would serve the State's goals without significantly impairing them. The majority's more permissive approach risks preserving discriminatory rules wrapped in claims of election integrity.
Applying her textual and historical approach to Arizona, Kagan concluded both challenged provisions violate § 2. First, Arizona's out-of-precinct rule discards ballots cast outside a voter's assigned precinct, and Arizona discards out-of-precinct ballots at rates far higher than other States. Between 2008 and 2016 Arizona discarded almost 40,000 out-of-precinct ballots, numbers large enough to affect outcomes in close races. The policy disproportionately affects minorities: in 2016 Hispanics, African Americans, and Native Americans were about twice as likely as whites to have ballots discarded. The disparities are statistically significant and are explained in part by county practices such as frequent polling-place relocations that disproportionately affect minority neighborhoods, and by longer travel distances to assigned precincts for minority voters. The State's asserted interest in precinct-based administration does not justify the racially disparate effect; other States count portions of out-of-precinct ballots without imperiling precinct-based systems, and administrative feasibility was acknowledged by the District Court.
Second, Kagan concluded that HB 2023, the near-blanket ban on third-party ballot collection, also violates § 2 because it interacts with unique local conditions to impose a meaningful burden on Native American voters, many of whom lack reliable home mail delivery and must travel long distances to access postal facilities. Those voters historically relied on third-party collection—often by fellow clan members—to return ballots. Arizona already has criminal prohibitions against tampering and a signature-verification regime that protect ballot integrity and there was no evidence of fraud in Arizona. Arizona could have adopted narrower measures or provided exceptions for clan or kinship networks. The ban, in effect, prevents many Native Americans from making effective use of mail voting and is not justified by a demonstrated need.
Kagan concluded that the majority's narrowing of § 2 undoes Congress's carefully calibrated, expansive statutory protection, and that the Court lacks the authority to rewrite the law to restrict its reach. She would affirm the en banc Ninth Circuit's judgment as to the § 2 results claims and would reverse the District Court's intent finding only if clearly erroneous; she concluded that the District Court was not clearly erroneous as to intent. She therefore dissented from the Court's judgment reversing the Ninth Circuit with respect to the § 2 results claims and from the majority's acceptance of the District Court's intent conclusion.