413 U.S. 601 (1973)
In 1959, Oklahoma enacted Section 818 of its Merit System of Personnel Administration Act to restrict the political activities of the State's classified civil servants.1 The section prohibits employees from directly or indirectly soliciting contributions for any political organization, candidacy or other political purpose.2 It also bars them from being members of national, state or local committees of a political party, officers or members of committees of partisan political clubs, or candidates for nomination or election to any paid public office.3 Additionally, the provision forbids taking part in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign, except to exercise the right as a citizen privately to express an opinion and to cast a vote.4
Three employees of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, who are subject to the proscriptions of Section 818, were charged by the State Personnel Board with patent violations of § 818 arising from their active participation in the 1970 re-election campaign of a Corporation Commissioner who was their superior. The charges alleged that the employees asked other Commission employees individually and in groups to do campaign work or to give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign.5 Most of these requests were made at district offices of the Commission's Oil and Gas Conservation Division.6 Two of the appellants were charged with soliciting money for the campaign from Commission employees.7 One was also charged with receiving and distributing campaign posters in bulk.8
Shortly before appellants commenced their action in the District Court, they were charged by the State Personnel Board with patent violations of § 818. The three employees brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 before a three-judge Federal District Court in the Western District of Oklahoma.9 They sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against enforcement of the sixth and seventh paragraphs of Section 818.10 They alleged that the provisions were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on their face and as applied to them.11 After a hearing, the District Court upheld the provisions and denied relief in a decision reported at 338 F. Supp. 711.12
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal at 409 U. S. 1058 so that the appellants' claims could be considered together with those of their federal counterparts in CSC v. Letter Carriers.13 The appellants concede that their charged conduct falls within the hard core of the statute's proscriptions.14 They concede that the statute would be constitutional as applied to that conduct.15 They maintain that the statute reaches protected expression such as the wearing of political buttons or displaying bumper stickers.16
Whether Section 818 of the Oklahoma Merit System of Personnel Administration Act is unconstitutionally vague?17
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give fair warning of what activities it proscribes. It must also set out explicit standards for those who must apply it. Men of common intelligence must not necessarily guess at its meaning.18
No. The language of Section 818, which prohibits classified employees from taking part in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign except to exercise the right as a citizen privately to express his opinion and to cast his vote, is sufficiently clear to give fair warning.19 The appellants, three employees of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, were charged with actively participating in the 1970 re-election campaign of their superior by asking other employees to do campaign work and soliciting money.20 This conduct falls squarely within the hard core of the statute's proscriptions.21 The Court has previously upheld similar language in the Hatch Act as not vague.22
The same conclusion applies here because the terms are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with.23
Section 818 is not unconstitutionally vague.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissents on the ground that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.25 He argues that the language is so broad that it could be used to punish employees for engaging in core political speech that is at the heart of the First Amendment.26 He contends that the State has no legitimate interest in prohibiting employees from expressing their political views when they are not acting in their official capacities.27
He maintains that the emphasis on private expression means public expression is not tolerated.28 He would reverse the judgment below.29
Whether the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face?30
No. Although the appellants assert that the statute reaches protected expression such as the wearing of political buttons or displaying bumper stickers, the Court concludes that the statute is not substantially overbroad.33 The statute is directed at political expression but seeks to regulate it in an even-handed and neutral manner.34 It regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is manifestly subject to state regulation.35 The appellants concede that the statute is constitutional as applied to their conduct of soliciting campaign contributions and work from coworkers.36
Any potential improper applications should be cured through case-by-case analysis rather than facial invalidation.37
The statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.38
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stewart And Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissents on the ground that the critical phrase of the Oklahoma Act is left almost wholly undefined.39 He argues that the reservation of the right to express one's views in private could be thought to mean that any public expression of views is forbidden.40 He maintains that the statute is a dragnet that sweeps within its prohibitions a wide range of protected political activity.41
Whatever one's view of the desirability or constitutionality of legislative efforts to restrict the political activities of government employees, one must regard today's decision as a wholly unjustified retreat. The decision upholds § 818 of the Oklahoma Merit System of Personnel Administration Act despite previously well-established First and Fourteenth Amendment principles.42 He would reverse the judgment of the District Court.
Whether litigants whose own conduct falls within the statute's legitimate sweep may maintain a facial overbreadth challenge?43
Although constitutional rights are personal and a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not normally be heard to challenge it on the ground that it may be applied unconstitutionally to others.44 In the First Amendment area the Court has altered traditional rules of standing to permit attacks on overly broad statutes to prevent chilling effects on protected expression.45 This exception is limited when the behavior moves from pure speech toward conduct and the overbreadth is not substantial.46
Yes. The appellants, whose conduct of participating in the campaign by soliciting money and work from coworkers is conceded to be within the legitimate sweep, are permitted to bring the facial challenge because of the First Amendment context.47 However, the Court holds that the overbreadth doctrine may not be invoked to strike down the statute because the overbreadth is not substantial in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.48
The appellants concede that their charged conduct falls within the hard core of the statute's proscriptions and that the statute would be constitutional as applied to that conduct.49
Litigants whose own conduct falls within the statute's legitimate sweep may maintain a facial overbreadth challenge, but only if the overbreadth is substantial.50
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas would reverse the judgment below.51 He maintains that the case should be governed by considerations set forth in his dissent in the Letter Carriers case.52 He argues that government cannot deprive its employees of the right to speak, write, assemble, or petition once the office is closed.53
He contends that public discussion of local, state, national, and international affairs is grist for the First Amendment mill.54 He emphasizes that First Amendment rights are fundamental because we the people are the sovereigns.55
Joined by Justice Stewart And Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan argues that the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes.56 There is no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.57 He maintains that the mere existence of a statute that sweeps too broadly results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.58
He would reverse the judgment of the District Court on the strength of Coates v. City of Cincinnati.59