237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968)
Southall Realty Co. brought an action for possession against its tenant, Mrs. Brown, for nonpayment of rent.1 At trial the parties stipulated that the rent was in arrears in the amount of $230.00.2 Mrs. Brown contended that no rent was due under the lease because it was an illegal contract.3 The trial court held to the contrary and awarded the landlord possession for nonpayment of rent.4
Mrs. Brown had moved from the premises and did not wish to be returned to possession. Nevertheless, she pursued an appeal asserting that the judgment of the trial court would render facts res judicata in any subsequent suit for rent.5 In a prior case, Bess v. David, this court had held that a judgment in a possessory action foreclosed questions of tenancy in a later suit for rent.6
The evidence at trial showed that prior to the signing of the lease agreement, the landlord was on notice that Housing Code violations existed on the premises. An inspector for the District of Columbia Housing Division testified that an obstructed commode, a broken railing, and insufficient ceiling height in the basement existed at least some months prior to the lease agreement and had not been abated at the time of trial.7 The inspector also stated that the basement violations prohibited the use of the entire basement as a dwelling place.8
The landlord admitted telling the tenant after the lease had been signed that the back room of the basement was habitable despite the Housing Code violations.9 The owner of the premises testified that he had submitted a sworn statement to the Housing Division on December 8, 1964, to the effect that the basement was unoccupied at that time and would continue to be kept vacant until the violations were corrected.
Whether the appeal should be heard when the tenant has moved from the premises and does not wish to be returned to possession?10
A judgment taken by default in summary proceedings by a landlord for non-payment of rent is conclusive between the parties as to the existence and validity of the lease, the occupation by the tenant, and that rent is due.11
Yes. Although Mrs. Brown had moved from the premises and did not wish to be returned to possession, she pursued an appeal asserting that the judgment would render facts res judicata in subsequent suits for rent.12 In Bess v. David, this court held that any question of appellant’s tenancy is foreclosed by the judgment in the previous possessory action.13 The stipulation of $230 arrears and the determination that rent is owing would be irrevocably established if the trial court judgment stood, making the appeal necessary to challenge the lease validity.14
The appeal is timely and should be heard.15
Whether the trial court erred in failing to declare the lease agreement void as an illegal contract?16
The general rule is that an illegal contract, made in violation of the statutory prohibition designed for police or regulatory purposes, is void and confers no right upon the wrongdoer.17 Sections 2304 and 2501 of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations prohibit renting any habitation unless it is in a clean, safe and sanitary condition, in repair, and maintained to provide decent living accommodations.18
Yes. The landlord was on notice of Housing Code violations including an obstructed commode, a broken railing, and insufficient ceiling height in the basement prior to signing the lease.19 These violations made the habitation unsafe and unsanitary, and the premises had not been maintained as required by the regulations.20 The owner had submitted a sworn statement that the basement would remain vacant until corrected, yet the lease was entered anyway.21
To uphold the lease would flout the evident purposes for which Sections 2304 and 2501 were enacted to insure habitable rental units for prospective tenants.22
The trial court erred in failing to declare the lease void as an illegal contract.23